拉丁美洲經貿季刊

THE QUARTERLY OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY AND TRADE

十週年特輯
10th Anniversary Special Issue

Jorge Pinto Mazal
Marta Chang de Tsien
Gary M.C. Ngai
Sonia Chan Prado
Margaret Myers

陳珠龍
江時學
馮毅
向洵

致理科技大學
Chihlee University of Technology

拉丁美洲經貿季刊

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拉丁美洲經貿季刊創刊暨拉丁美洲經貿研究中心成立十週年賀詞

　　2010 年 6 月,《拉丁美洲經貿季刊》(*The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade*)第一期出版,稍後本校成立「拉丁美洲經貿研究中心」。《拉丁美洲經貿季刊》創刊後初期,並無經常性預算支持。經幾位具理想、熱忱的老師及志工努力,及中、外拉丁美洲區域研究學者、專家支持下,10 年來已出版 40 期。該季刊為接受中文、英文及西班牙文三種語文稿件的學術性區域研究刊物,並獲「臺灣期刊論文索引系統」及「華藝電子期刊資料庫」(CEPS)收錄,成為國內外拉丁美洲研究重要資訊來源之一。

　　拉丁美洲經貿研究中心十年來舉辦多次有關拉丁美洲之學術研討會,成果豐碩,如:拉丁美洲獨立 200 週年(2010)、亞洲與拉丁美洲經貿關係展望(2011)、兩岸合作開發拉丁美洲(2012)、美中拉三邊關係(2016)、兩岸高校拉美研究現狀與合作願景(2017)、拉丁美洲經貿發展(2018)、亞太與拉美關係(2019)等,為兩岸、美國與拉丁美洲相關學者提供學術研究交流平台。拉美研究中心團隊成員之研究成果為臺灣社會科學引文索引(TSSCI, Taiwan Social Sciences Citation Index)之期刊採用,團隊成員更經常對拉丁美洲時事接受電子、平面與網路媒體訪問、邀稿及成立專欄,對拉丁美洲事務的專業論述、研析與評論意見受到各界之重視,成為拉丁美洲區域研究重要智庫之一。

　　《拉丁美洲經貿季刊》十週年專輯,感謝平臨泰(Jorge Pinto Mazal)大使、錢曾愛珠(Marta Chang de Tsien)大使、上海大學特聘教授拉美研究中心主任江時學及澳門亞太拉美交流促進會理事長魏美昌等撰文祝賀。專輯並收錄美國克萊蒙大學(Claremont Graduate University)馮毅(Yi Feng)教授、華府智庫「美洲對話組織」(Inter-American Dialogue)馬麗娟(Margret Myers)主任、本校向駿教授稿件。期盼在中心團隊成員的努力與大家的支持下,第二個十年的成果將更豐碩。

陳珠龍 博士
致理科技大學校長
2020 年 6 月 1 日

On the 10th anniversary of The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade and the Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies.

In June 2010, the first issue of *The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade* was published, and the Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies of the University was also inaugurated later in the same year. In the early days of The Quarterly without financial supports, depended on the efforts of several volunteer teachers with ideal and passion, as well as some scholars specialized in Latin American area studies at home and abroad. The Quarterly accepts manuscripts in Chinese, English and Spanish and has been published 40 issues within 10 years. It has been included in the "Index to Taiwan Periodical Literature System" and College Education and Professional Studies(CEPS), becoming one of the most important sources for Latin American and research.

The Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies, held a number of academic symposiums on Latin America with fruitful results, such as, The 200th Anniversary of the Independence of LA (2010), The Prospects for Economic and Trade Relations Between Asia and LA (2011) ,The Cross-Strait Cooperation in the Development of LA (2012), Triangular Relations among LA, China and the US (2016), The Status of LA Research in the Cross-Strait Universities and Cooperation Vision (2017), LA Economic and Trade (2018), and Asia Pacific-LA Relations (2019), which provided an academic research platforms for scholars on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the United States and Latin America.

The research outcomes of the Center where in the team members were dedicated have been adopted by the Taiwan Social Sciences Citation Index (TSSCI) journals. It's team members frequently receive social media interviews, writing columns for discussions, analysis, and comments on Latin American affairs. In fact, the Center has been highly valued and become one of the important think tanks for regional studies in Latin America.

The 10th Anniversary Special Issue of The Quarterly thanks to congratulations from Ambassadors Jorge Pinto Mazal(平臨泰) and Marta Chang de Tsien(錢曾愛珠), Shanghai University Distinguished Professor Jiang Shixue(江時學), President of the Macao Association for the Promotion of Exchange between Asia-Pacific and LA, Gary Ngai (魏美昌), etc. This special issue also includes articles from Professor Yi Feng(馮毅), Claremont Graduate University, Director Margret Myers(馬麗娟), Inter-American Dialogue, and Professor Antonio C. Hsiang (向駿) of Chihlee University of Technology. With the efforts of the Center team members and the support of everyone, the results of the second decade will be more successful.

Dr. Ju-Long Chen
President of Chihlee University of Technology

Promoviendo la Interdependencia Taiwan-America Latina

Embajador Jorge Pinto

Una de las razones por las que Taiwan se ha distinguido como un milagro económico y social ha sido su rico y sofisticado capital humano, formado en sus numerosas y excelentes universidades e instituciones académicas de investigación.

Durante los casi diez años de residir en Taipei he tenido el privilegio de relacionarme con centros académicos de gran prestigio, impartiendo clases y conferencias, además de conocer a distinguidos intelectuales y académicos que realizan importantes de trabajos de investigación sobre México y América Latina

En particular, ha sido un gran honor participar en los diferentes eventos que durante estos años ha sido organizados por el Professor Antonio C. Hsiang, Director del "Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies" en la Chihlee University of Technology. Una de las características de las actividades del citado Centro son las conferencias acerca de una gran diversidad de temas atrayendo una pluralidad de ponentes locales y latinoamericanos, expertos en varias disciplinas de carácter económico y cultural. De esta forma el Centro se ha caracterizado por difundir el conocimiento de América Latina, una region con muy diversas y complejas culturas que ofrecen grandes oportunidades para una más activa y productiva relación entre Taiwan y los países de esa región.

Vivimos en mundo interdependiente, en el que además del intercambio de bienes y servicios, los intercambios culturales y de conocimientos son una pieza clave que contribuye de manera efectiva a un mundo interconectado, más próspero y pacífico.

El Centro de Estudios sobre Economia y Comercio para América Latina es sin duda un valioso instrumento de comunicación entre académicos y servidores públicos de Taiwan con sus contrapartes en los países latinoamericanos y con ello un promotor de un mayor entendimiento de los enormes beneficios que una más cercana relación implica.

En una época en la que los nacionalismos y las corrientes contrarias al libre comercio ganan terreno, el trabajo de los centros académicos como los que dirige el Profesor Hsiang son cada vez más necesarios e importantes para preservar la paz y expandir la prosperidad.

Me siento orgulloso de la posición de "Advisor, at College of International Business and Foreign Languages" que por varios años me ha permitido junto con mi esposa, la curadora de cine Christine Tsui-Hua Huang, estar en contacto con estudiantes y profesores de la Universidad de Tecnología Chihlee y su prestigiado Centro a cargo del Profesor Hsiang. Asimismo, fue una oportunidad estar en el Consejo Editorial de la prestigiada publicación "*Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economicos Latinoamericanos* ".

En numerosas ocasiones hemos sido invitados a impartir clases sobre política internacional y sobre el cine latinoamericano y de esta forma compartir nuestros conocimientos y experiencia como organizadores del Festival de Cine Latinoamericano en Taiwan (Taiwan Latino Film Festival 2011).

Con gran interés de seguir los eventos, actividades y publicaciones que en el futuros se organicen y ofrecer mi modesta colaboración cuando esta sea necesaria.

Felicidades al Professor Antonio C. Hsiang, por los logros alcanzados por el Centro de Estudios sobre Economia y Comercio para América Latina desde su fundación.

Jorge Pinto Mazal
Taipei, Abril 12, 2020

Embajador Jorge Pinto y esposa, la curadora de cine Christine Tsui-Hua Huang.

百尺竿頭　更進一步
——賀致理科技大學拉美經貿研究中心成立十週年

2004 年 9 月隨同中國社會科學院院長陳奎元訪問古巴時與卡斯特羅合影

　　我與致理科技大學拉美經貿研究中心（以下簡稱拉美經貿中心）的學術關係由來已久。我曾多次參加該中心的學術會議，多次為學生作學術講座。我還榮幸地擔任該中心的顧問。

　　拉美經貿中心的研究員既要從事研究工作，也要承擔繁重的教學工作。就此而言，該中心既是智庫，也是教學單位。在向駿教授的領導下，拉美經貿中心在學術研究和培養人才等方面取得了令人矚目的成就，在學術界的地位與日俱增。任何一個智庫的立身之本都是科研成果。換言之，多出成果、出高品質的成果，是任何一個智庫必須要追求的終極目標。在追求這一目標的過程中，除了擁有高品質的人才和充裕的資金以外，還應確立符合自身特點、有利於推動學科建設的研究方向，善於發現重要的研究領域和學術問題。

　　拉美經貿中心的研究方向是明確的，即拉美國家的對外經濟關係。但是，須知，拉美國家的對外經濟關係與其政治、經濟、外交、社會、文化和歷史是息息相關的。換言之，除了研究拉美國家的經貿以外，還應該研究其他領域的眾多問題。令人欣慰的是，拉美經貿中心的每一位研究人員都是知識淵博、學術興趣廣泛、語言功底扎實、寫作能力強、對拉美國家的國情瞭若指掌的人才。

　　當前，拉美研究領域有哪些重要的問題值得學術界關注？這個問題的答案可能是見仁見智的。我認為，以下幾個問題或許是比較重要的：（1）新冠病毒疫情將使拉美經濟衰退到什麼程度？這一衰退將在多大程度上影響拉美國家的對外經貿關係？（2）拉美左翼力量風光不再，對該地區的發展道路將產生什麼影響？民眾主義會不會成為拉美政治舞臺的主角？（3）美國與拉美國家的關係是否已經基本定型？門羅主義是否會永遠成為美國對拉美政策的圭臬？如果特朗普連

任，美國對拉美的政策是否還將發生新的變化？如果他不能連任，美國對拉美的政策是否會「重歸」歐巴馬時代？（4）久治不癒的拉美社會問題有無出路？2019年下半年智利和哥倫比亞等國的社會動盪會不會在新冠病毒疫情結束後死灰復燃？（5）委內瑞拉的四重危機（政治危機、經濟危機、外交危機、社會危機）能否儘快了結？（6）中國大陸與拉美國家如何在「一帶一路」倡議下加強合作？臺灣企業能否參與「一帶一路」倡議的有關項目？

我深信，向駿教授及其團隊一定能對上述問題進行深入的研究，推出一大批高品質的研究成果。

江時學
上海大學特聘教授、拉美研究中心主任

Tenth Anniversary of Chihlee University promoting Culture, Trade and friendship in Taiwan

校長尚世昌博士頒贈薩爾瓦多駐華大使錢曾愛珠女士拉丁美洲經貿研究中心顧問證書

Taiwan is a melting pot of nationalities and culture from different parts of the world in the numerous universities and high academic institutions of the country, and Chihlee University of Technology is no exception.

In 2010 the University created a "Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies", organized and directed by the distinguished Professor, Dr. Antonio C. Hsiang. Their purpose was to know more about Latin America culture through academic interchanges.

I came to Taiwan in 2010 as Ambassador of El Salvador. In November of that year, I had the privilege and the honor of becoming an advisor to the new Department of Latin American Studies at Chihlee University of Technology during a ceremony with the participation of diplomats from Latin America.

At Chihlee University I was very pleased to see some good old friends, like Dr. Hsiang who had visited El Salvador in the past; also distinguished diplomats such as Francisco Ou, ex Foreign Minister; both General and Dr. Antonio Yang and General Chen Chin Chong, who graduated from the Military Academy in El Salvador.

During my stay of eight years in Taiwan I had the opportunity to witness how Dr. Hsiang and professors worked very diligently in organizing the Department activities. I had the opportunity to participate in many of these events, such as judging an oratory

competition in Spanish; Craft Fairs, lectures, presentations, etc. Always under the direction of Dr. Hsiang.

The Department of Latin American Studies at Chihlee University of Technology is certainly a powerful tool of communication between Taiwan and the Latin American countries to exchange culture, trade and promote friendship and cooperation in this globalized world.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere congratulations to Dr. Hsiang and all the distinguished professors who work hard in these initiatives to share their knowledge and experience to the new generations.

Congratulations to Dr. Hsiang for his accomplishments and wish him lots of success in his endeavor to bring Latin America closer to Taiwan.

Marta Chang de Tsien
Ambassador

校長尚世昌博士與薩爾瓦多駐華大使錢曾愛珠女士等貴賓共同主持
拉丁美洲文化週開幕典禮

2010 年 5 月時任澳門亞太拉美交流促進會理事長魏美昌先生
與拉美經貿研究中心主任向駿教授合影

Por ocasião do 10º aniversário da sua revista latino-americana, aceite as mais calorosas felicitações de todos nós de MAPEAL (Associação de Macau Para a Promoção de Intercâmbio entre Asia-Pacifico e América Latina). Olhando para o passado, ocorreram grandes mudanças nas relações bilaterais e multilaterais entre os países e as regiões de ambos os lados do Pacífico, em termos econômicos, culturais e até políticos. O seu Centro de pesquisa tem seguido de perto essas mudanças e publica muitos artigos dos quais também nos beneficiamos em Macau. Muito obrigado por sua valiosa contribuição, espero que a revista continue no futuro com resultados mais positivos, contribuindo para um entendimento mais próximo e a cooperação mútua entre pessoas e acadêmicos e ambos os lados.

Gary M.C. Ngai
Fundador e Vice-Presidente da Direcção
Associação de Macau Para a Promoção de Intercâmbio entre Asia-Pacifico e América Latina (MAPEAL)

Congratulations on the 10th Anniversary
of the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade

現任澳門亞太拉美交流促進會理事長陳家慧女士

On behalf of the Macao Association for the Promotion of Exchange between Asia-Pacific and Latin America (MAPEAL), I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations on the 10th Anniversary of the publication of *the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade*. Since the year of 2010, the journal has started providing a platform for scholars to reflect and drive the major currents of debate in all fields of economics related to Latin America. With a specialization in the Latin American economy and trade, the journal has been dedicated to presenting high-quality and stimulating articles that attracted a broad international readership.

The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade is a well-established and well-respected journal in Taiwan that seeks to reflect and respond to the changing real world of economics, by publishing articles that are of contemporary relevance to both the study and practice. Through the well-selected articles, the readers are exposed to a broad spectrum of issues that are of global and scholarly significance that matter for many states and countries irrespective of geographical location. In addition to enjoying the journal as a platform for diversified authorship, I also value the journal as a useful source of information and a record of accumulated knowledge and understanding.

A strong team is undoubtedly a valuable asset to a successful journal. The combined effort, professionalism and enthusiasm putting on this journal is remarkable and greatly appreciated. I would like to express my sincere respect and warmest congratulations to the Editorial Board of *the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade* for their excellent work, particularly Prof. Antonio Hsiang who has been playing a crucial role in the establishment and development of the journal for the past decade.

The tenth anniversary is a momentous milestone. This anniversary demonstrates the growing interest in and recognition of the importance of the Latin American studies, especially in the realm of economics. With this special occasion of the 10th Anniversary marking the close of one chapter and the beginning of another, I would like to conclude my congratulatory message by having a strong hope that *the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade* will gain more achievements, and continue to provide an outstanding vehicle for the dissemination of the high-quality, in-depth and innovative articles for the benefit of the scholars and readers. I wish *the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade* many more successes in the years coming ahead!

Sonia Chan Prado
President of the Executive Board of MAPEAL

Margaret Myers is the director of the Asia & Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue. She established the Dialogue's China and Latin America Working Group in 2011 to examine China's growing presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Myers also developed the China-Latin America Finance Database, the only publicly available source of empirical data on Chinese state lending in Latin America, in cooperation with Boston University's Global Economic Governance Initiative (GEGI).

It is a distinct pleasure and an honor to contribute to the *Quarterly* on the 10th anniversary of the Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies at Chihlee University of Technology. Both the Center and the *Quarterly* have become indispensible sources of information on Latin American affairs and on Asia-Latin America relations, a topic I have been fortunate to also follow for a number of years now as director of the Asia and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC.

My most recent visit to Taiwan was in October 2019, to attend the Center's International Symposium on Asia Pacific-Latin American Relations. The event itself was a great success, and representative of the Center's remarkable convening capacity—bringing together scholars and practitioners from across the Americas and the Asia-Pacific region for in-depth discussion of key developments in economic and political relations.

Cobertura, temas y autores: Breve análisis estadístico de las publicaciones de la Revista Trimestral de Estudios Económicos Latinoamericanos durante el periodo de junio 2015 a marzo 2020

Yi Feng is the Luther Lee Jr. Memorial Chair Professor at Claremont Graduate University where he served as Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs (2006-2011) and Dean of School of Politics and Economics (2003-2006). He is currently Chair of the Department of International Studies and Director of the Maldonado Institute for International Security and Global Leadership at Claremont Graduate University.

Es de mi conocimiento que la *Revista Trimestral de Estudios Económicos Latinoamericanos* es la única revista académica que se publica a nivel mundial en tres idiomas: inglés, español y chino. A manera de felicitación por su décimo aniversario, este ensayo hace una investigación enfocándose en sus últimos cinco años de publicación. Debido a la limitación de caracteres, me valgo de datos generales para presentar sus investigaciones, alcance y cobertura.

De junio del 2015 a marzo del 2020, la revista ha hecho 71 publicaciones, divididas en investigación y análisis de medios de comunicación, de las cuales 28 fueron publicadas en inglés, 27 en chino y 16 en español. La mayoría de los ensayos fueron de autoría individual. Es decir, 56 ensayos no tuvieron coautores o colaboradores. Doce ponencias se efectuaron en colaboración de dos autores y solamente tres obras fueron escritas por tres autores.

De los ochenta y nueve autores, cuarenta y siete o 53 por ciento de ellos son de origen hispano. Esta diversidad indica un fuerte logro de la revista por presentar investigaciones desde varias perspectivas. Los estudios se dividieron por país y regionales. El 65% de los 71 ensayos se enfocaron en países en particular y el 35% a nivel regional. Con respecto a la cobertura, los estudios acerca de Brasil y México fueron los más constantes, con 13 ensayos dedicados a cada uno, seguidos por Venezuela (4), Colombia (3), Argentina (2) y Nicaragua (2). En el caso de Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua y Honduras solo un ensayo para cada uno, Finalmente, El Salvador, Perú, NAFTA y Mercosur se encuentran en la revista una vez.

En cuanto al tipo de temas, algunos estudios tratan de las relaciones con otros países y otros sobre asuntos domésticos. Es decir, cuarenta o 56% de los ensayos se dedican a investigaciones de temas domésticos. En cuanto a los ensayos que se enfocan a relaciones internacionales, veinte tratan sobre temas relacionados con China. Por ejemplo, las relaciones entre México y China, o entre Brasil y China. Por otra parte, algunos estudios exploran las redes entre Americana Latina y China, un ejemplo es la iniciativa de China para construir la infraestructura en la región. También, algunos artículos sitúan los países latinoamericanos en el contexto de la actual rivalidad entre EE. UU. y China. Finalmente, cinco abarcan el tema de las relaciones bilaterales entre países latinoamericanos y EE. UU.

Americana Latina experimenta cambios dinámicos a diario. En cuanto a análisis en medios de comunicación, la revista presta una seria atención a asuntos actuales, como los cambios del gobierno en Argentina o las maniobras políticas en Venezuela. Además, toma un papel fundamental en la difusión de resoluciones a indagaciones sobre América Latina.

Yi Feng
Departamento de Estudios Internacionales
Instituto Maldonado: Seguridad Internacional y Liderazgo Mundial
Universidad de Posgrado de Claremont
Claremont, CA EE. UU.

Gráfico 1 Idiomas de los artículos publicados

- Ingleis 39%
- Español 23%
- Chino 38%

Gráfico 2 Número de autores

- Tres 4%
- Dos 17%
- Uno 79%

Gáfico 3 Origen de los autores

- Otros 47%
- hispano 53%

Gráfico 4 Tipo de tema

- LAC 35%
- Los paises 65%

Gáfico 5 Paises mencionados en los ensayos

Gráfico 6 Las relaciones con otros paises

- el pais mismo
- con China
- con China y EE.UU.
- con EE.UU.

Jerome Hsiang, Partner at Shiang Law Firm and Researcher for the Center for Transnational Law and Business at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law.

I write to congratulate *the Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade* on its 10th anniversary of initial publication. It is a true milestone to have provided a decade's worth of fascinating and useful scholarship on the Asia-Latin America relationship. Just as importantly, the Quarterly has shown that there is a good team running the show, and thus is likely to continue its success well into the future.

The Quarterly is important for both informing academic study as well as fostering a greater general understanding of the linkages between Asia and Latin America. This relationship is ripe for more scholarship and is often underappreciated when, in fact, there is a rich history and a tremendous wealth of topics to explore. The challenge is mainly organizational: the two regions are huge, distant, and internally diverse, making it difficult to study coherently. The shrewd approach of the Quarterly is to use the perspective of economics and trade to get some traction. Economics and trade have always been some of the most compelling reasons for far flung peoples and countries to interact. It is no different for Asia and Latin America, from the earliest days of intra-Spanish-colonial globalization, to the contemporary supply chain linkages between Japan and Mexico.

But a thematic approach is only a gateway—and the Quarterly understands this. People and cultures are just as integral to the Asia-Latin America link. Relationships that may have been started by economic concerns soon blossom into cultural and personal ties. Of course, all the attendant societal problems and opportunities present in any cross-cultural relationship are present in the Asia-Latin America dynamic as well. Thus, it is a great testament to the quality of the Quarterly that it welcomes and publishes articles that speak to politics, culture, and society.

I also wish to congratulate the Quarterly for contributing to Taiwan's reputation as a place to do good global scholarship. It is extraordinarily important for institutions to support scholarship in non-western countries and in various languages. Not only is this a matter of equity, it pertains to the legitimate production of knowledge in a world that is increasingly multipolar.

Here's to another decade (at least) of the Quarterly doing its fine work and illuminating a fascinating part of our world.

拉美專題

"¿Cuál es su opinión sobre China?"
A Multivariate Analysis of Determinants of Public Image of China in Latin America[*]

Yi Feng[†]

Abstract

This research examines the 2018 survey data of *Latinobarómetro* to explore the determinants of the opinion of China at the individual level in Latin America. In a sample of 8,751 respondents from all eighteen Latin American countries, multivariate logistic regression identifies the effects on the opinion of China of age, gender, ideology, education, income, social economic status, views on regional political and economic integration, views on democracy and corruption, and overseas travels. It has been also found that ethnicity, religion, and employment status have no effect on opinions of China. Finally, specific country effects exist. Holding the above variables constant, this study finds that respondents from some countries *sin* diplomatic relations with PRC hold a generally positive opinion of China (*e.g.* Paraguay and Honduras) and at the same time, the respondents from China's "comprehensive strategic partner" countries, relatively, have a negative opinion of China (*i.e.* Ecuador and Venezuela).

Keywords: *China, Latin America, National image, Survey, Latinobarómetro.*

1. Introduction

As an emerging superpower, China has reached every corner of the world with its seemingly unstoppable economic forces. In tandem with its ever increasing influence, the image of China has become not only a test of China's "peaceful rise," but also a determinant of its success or failure for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's global development strategy initiated in 2013.

Xie and Page (2013) regard national image as "the prevailing perception of a country among the public of other countries" (p.851). Ding (2007) maintains that national images are "intangible but important national power resources" (p. 628). Van Ham (2001) considers national image part of a state's strategic capital.

As there is hard capital or power such as money or military, there is soft capital or power such as image and reputation.   Public image is important for any major powers. A good image will facilitate their global strategy and a negative image will set back their international initiatives. The improvement of China's image has been part of a major objective in its foreign policy (Ding, 2007) and is pursued in different ways, including human resources development and human capital training in Africa (Benabdallah, 2019).

Despite its thematic importance, there are only limited studies of China's national image overseas.   The work by Eichenauer, Fuches, and Brünckner (2018) focuses on the public opinions toward China and economic relations between China and Latin America. The study establishes some negative effects of China's exports, FDI, and aid on the public image of China in Latin America. Zhang and Liu (2012) identify the main factors shaping China's national image as poor product quality, illegal operations of enterprises, and difficulties of certain Chinese employees integrating into local life.

Performing an analysis of online discourse through examining comments posted by individual readers on the news content related to China on their official Facebook profiles, Armony and Velásquez (2015) find that in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, negative views of China are the results of y language barriers, cultural differences, the poor quality of "Made-in-China" goods, unfair business practices, environmentally unsustainable development policies, and fears of Chinese economic and demographic domination in international relations.

Xie and Page (2013) use the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey to investigate macro-level sources of variations across countries regrading public opinion toward China. Their results suggest that the only macro-level factor that affects China's image in foreign countries is the level of economic and social development, as measured by the UN Human Development Index. Publics in poorer countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan are much more likely to have a favorable view of China than publics in developed countries (Xie and Page, 2013).

Most of the above studies use aggregate data at the national level. However, one useful avenue of research is to investigate the data at the individual level. This approach examines the micro data of a person's characteristics and her or his view on an issue. It allows the search for the micro-foundations of a person's positive or negative opinion

of China, Montalvo (1995) uses the 2014 survey data of *Latinobarómetro* to study what determines an Ecuadorian respondent's response to a free trade treaty between Ecuador and China. He finds that females and people of color tend to have a negative view of a free trade treaty with China, while those who perceive a better national economy or approve of President Rafael Correa's performance tend to support a free trade treaty with China.

There has been no study of the determinants of China's image at the individual level across Latin American countries. In this work, I use a 2018 survey in Latin America, the most recent edition of *Latinobarómetro*, to investigate those factors that may influence an individual's opinion of China in 18 Latin American countries including some of the variables used by Montalvo (1995) in his study of the opinion on a free trade treaty with China in Ecuador. The purpose of this study is to probe the micro-foundations at the individual level of public opinions of China among Latin American countries.

Section two examines the national image of China comparatively with those of the United States, Russia, and European Union and presents variations of China's image across 18 Latin American countries. Section Three specifies a multivariate model to study determinants of opinions of China in Latin America from an individual perspective. Section Four conducts a logistic regression analysis of the economic, demographic, political, religious, and educational factors to identify the sources of opinions of China. Section Five concludes the study.

2. China's Public Image in Latin America in Comparison

First, we examine the cross-country variations in *Latinobarómetro* of the relations perceived by the respondent between her/his country and China, along with those of United States, Russia and European Union. *Latinobarómetro* (2018) asks the respondent to rate the relations between her/his country and one of the entities: China, the United States, Russia, and European Union in this question: "¿Y cómo calificaría Ud. las relaciones entre (PAÍS) y _____?" (How do you rate the relations between (country) and _____?) The respondents choose one of the following: Muy buenas (Very good), Más bien buenas (Rather good), Más bien malas (Rather bad), and Muy malas (Very bad).[1]

Figure 1 groups the responses choosing "Rather good" and "Very good" and presents the result as the percentage of total responses, excluding the missing values. The portion not in the graph is the percentage of those choosing the categories "Rather bad" and "Very bad." According to the data, 81.0% of the respondents rate the relations between their country and China as good or very good. By comparison, 68.6% of the respondents believe that the relations between their country and the United States are good or very good. The equivalent assessment of the relations between their country and Russia is 73.8%, and that between their country and European Union is 74.4%.[2] Obviously, percentagewise, more respondents overall believe that their country has

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[1] In the questionnaire, there are also categories "Don't Know," "No answer/Refuse," "Not asked." In the data, there are, however, only the above four categories and the missing values.
[2] The non-missing observations are 14,888 for China, 17,651 for the United States, 13,460 for Russia and 13,372 for EU.

good relations with China than with EU, Russia, and the United States. In the data, on the subject of foreign relations as perceived by the respondents, China leads the United States by a difference of 19.4%.

Figure 1 Bilateral Relations

However, when it comes to personal opinions of these entities, the respondents no longer place China as the most favorite overall. In the survey, the respondents were asked "Me gustaría conocer su opinión sobre los siguientes países u organizaciones que le voy a leer ¿Tiene Ud. una muy buena (1), buena (2), mala (3) o muy mala (4) opinión sobre ___?" (We would like to know your opinion of the following countries or organizations that I am going to read. Do you have a very good (1), good (2), bad (3) or very bad (4) opinion of ___?)

Figure 2 combines the good and very good categories in one group and presents it as a percentage of the total responses excluding the missing values. The percentage of the positive opinion among the respondents is the highest for European Union at 78.5%. About 74.8% of respondents have good or very good opinion of China. For the United States, the comparable number is 70.6%. For Russia, it is 71.7%.[3] In terms of the percentage of those holding a positive opinion, China leads the United States by only 4.2%. There is a large difference between what the respondents think of the relations between their country and China/the United States and what they think of China and the United States. Though far more respondents in terms of percentage believe that their country has good relations with China than with the United States, the difference in personal opinions toward the United States and China is not significantly large. It may be surmised that at the country level, far more people in Latin America think that their countries have good relations with China than they think about the United States; at the personal level, the level of positive sentiment toward these two countries is not very different.

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[3] The non-missing observations are 15,484 for China, 18,164 for the United States, 14543 for Russia and 14,304 for EU.

Figure 2 Personal Opinions

Next I disaggregate the survey data by country regarding the relations between the respondent's country and China. The countries are ranked by the percentage of those of who view the relations between their country and China as "Rather good" or "Very good."

Surprisingly, many respondents from Latin American countries that do not have diplomatic relations with China view the relations between their country and China as "Rather good" or "Very good." For example, Paraguay (90.6%), Honduras (83%), and Nicaragua (82.6%) all exceed the average (80.95%) of the proportion of the respondents in the overall sample who believe that their country has "Rather good" or "Very good" relations with China. The two countries at the bottom are Guatemala (71.1%) and El Salvador (70.1). Guatemala does not have diplomatic relations with China, and El Salvador and China established diplomatic relations in August 2018, following Panama, which established formal relations with China in 2017. The highest percentage comes from Uruguay (92.8%), followed by Costa Rica (90.8%) and Paraguay (90.6%).

Figure 3 Relations with China

I then disaggregate the data on the proportion of the respondents who have a good or very good opinion of China. There are two surprises. First, two countries that do not have diplomatic relations with China are top ranked in terms of the percentage of respondents who favor China. About 86% of the respondents in Paraguay and about 82% in Honduras have favorable attitudes toward China. The second surprise is that the countries that used to be part of Gran Colombia are in the bottom of the percentage favoring China: Bolivia (66%), Colombia (69.1%), Venezuela (69.8%), and Ecuador (70.3%). China signed the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" agreement with Venezuela and Ecuador in 2016. It is a surprise to find that, with respect to a positive opinion of China, the respondents from China's two "comprehensive strategic partners" lag behind those of the Latin American countries that do recognize China diplomatically.

Figure 4 Favorable Opinion of China

Several possibilities exist about this discrepancy: There may have been some profound changes in the perceptions of China in Ecuador and Venezuela between 2016 and 2018 due to, or in relation with, political change, or there may have been a large divide between what the government advocates in the public and what people think privately about China, or there may have been a sample bias in the survey that oversamples the respondents in disfavor of China. Given that the same survey design applies to all countries consistently, the latter possibility should not be a problem.

3. Model Specification and Data

In this section, I specify a multivariate model and discuss the variables in the model. Utilizing the *Latinobarómetro* data, we are able to study the individual information of the respondents to establish a relationship between her or his opinion of China and the personal characteristics of the respondent. In this sense, I try to identify any association of personal traits and the person's opinion of China. For example, do richer persons or poor persons like China more? Or do people of left or right ideologies think better of China? The opinions of China formed are the result of many factors, and therefore, we need to adopt a multivariate analysis to study the determinants of public image of China in Latin America. In the multivariate framework, the effect of one factor on the opinion of China is studied while keeping other factors constant. Therefore, we can answer the question such as: Given the same ideology, does socio-economic

status determine a respondent's view of China, or vice versa: Given the same socio-economic status, does ideology shape one's perception of China?

In this multivariate analysis, the dependent variable is whether an individual in Latin America thinks positively or negatively of China. In the 2018 *Latinobarómetro* survey, question P40ST_C asks the respondent to identify his or her opinion of China in one of the following categories: "Very good," "Good," "Bad," and "Very bad." In the analysis, I exclude the missing values. For the four remaining categories, I construct a binary variable: if the respondent's opinion of China is "Very good" or "good," this binary variable is coded as one and otherwise, is coded zero. This new variable, denoted *favoriteopn*, is the dependent variable in the model. In the 2018 survey, 11,577 respondents report positive opinion of China and 3,907 report negative opinion of China, with 4,720 missing values. In the sample created for the multivariate statistical analysis, because of availability of the usable data for other variables, 8,723 observations for opinions of China remain, of which, 6,523 respondents think of China positively, and 2,200 respondents view China negatively. In the complete sample, the percentage of favoring China is 74.77% and in its subsample for multivariate analysis, the percentage is 74.73%. There is almost no difference between the complete sample and the subsample used in the multivariate analysis with respect to the opinions toward China.

Among the independent variables, I select those fundamental variables considered fabrics of life, such as age, gender, race, religion, and ideology. I also include education, socioeconomic status, employment category, views of the economy, democracy, corruption, economic and political integration with other Latin American countries, and exposures to other countries. I provide a brief discussion of each of the independent variables selected from *Latinobarómetro*.

Age (EDAD): The mean of the age of the respondents is 40 years old and the range is from 16 years old to 94 years old, with a standard deviation of 16 years.

Gender (SEXO): There is almost even distribution in gender, with 50.72% as male and 49.28% as female. In the data, a male is coded as 1 and a female, 2.

The population of the place where the respondent lives (TAMCIUD): There are six categories: 1 (1-5000), 2 (5001-10,000), 3 (10,001-20,000), 4 (20,001-40,000), 5 (40,001-50,000), 6 (50,001-100,000), 7 (100,001 and more), 8 (Capital). I treat this variable as an ordinal variable (except the capital), for lack of the information of the exact population of the place where the respondent resides. As a capital may be different, I create a dummy variable on residence in the capital of the country. About 1,689 or 19.36% of the respondents live in the capital of the country. The mode of the categories is residence in a city of 100,001 or more; 2,890 or 33.13% of the respondents live there.

The country's current economic situation (P6STGBSC Situación económica actual *del país):* This variable is coded as 1 (Very good), 2 (Good), 3 (About average), 4 (Bad) and 5 (Very bad). This is an ordinal variable. The mode is "About average," at 46%.

Poor-Rich (P10STC.A Autoubicación en escala de pobreza-riqueza: Personal): This is an ordinal variable with self-input from the respondent regarding her or his own poverty-wealth rating; it has 10 ordinal groups from 1 (the poorest) to 10 (the richest). The mode of the variable is "5" (30%), and the first six groups (1-6) carry 88% of the

respondents.

Democracy (P13STGBS.A Grado de satisfacción con el funcionamiento de la democracia): It asks the respondent about her or his satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country. Its ordinal groups are: 1 (Very satisfied), 2 (Rather satisfied), 3 (Not very satisfied) and 4 (Not at all satisfied). In the sample, only 25.73% of the respondents say that they are very satisfied or satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the country. The values of this variable take a range from 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not all satisfied).

Left-Right (P22ST Escala Izquierda-Derecha): This is a self-evaluation of the respondent's ideology on a scale of 0 to 10 using an interval of 1; with 0 as the extreme left-wing ideology and 10 as the extreme right-wing ideology. The mode of this variable is around the central position in the ideological spectrum: 30.7% of the respondents locate them in Group 5. About 11.6% of the respondents place themselves as the extreme left and about 13% of them reveal them as the extreme right.

Corruption (P25ST Acuerdo/Desacuerdo: Se puede pagar el precio de cierto grado de corrupción, siempre que se solucionen los problema): This variable is an answer to the statement "We can pay the price of a certain degree of corruption as long as corruption solves the problems." The respondent choose 1 (Very agree), 2 (Agree), 3 (Disagree) and 4 (Very much disagree). About 42.1% of the respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement and about 57.9% the respondents disagree or strongly disagree with this statement.

Economic Integration (P39ST.A ¿Está Ud. a favor o en contra de la integración económica de su país con los otros países de la región?): This variable asks the respondent about her or his opinion regarding economic integration with other Latin American countries. The responses are coded as 1 (Very much in favor), 2 (Somewhat in favor), 3 (Somewhat against) and 4 (Very against). The higher value for the ordinal group, the stronger the sentiment against regional economic integration. A positive effect of this variable on the opinion of China indicates that if the respondent feels against regional economic integration, she or he will be more likely in favor of a positive view of China. A negative effect of this variable indicates the opposite: If the respondent feels against regional economic integration, the person will be more likely to take a negative view of China, or if the person likes regional economic integration, she or he will more likely adopt a positive outlook of China. In the sample, about 79% of the respondents are in favor of regional economic integration with other Latin American countries.

Political integration (P39ST.B ¿Está Ud. a favor o en contra de la integración política de su país con los otros países de la región?): This variable asks the respondent about her or his opinion on political integration with other Latin American countries. The responses are coded as 1 (Very much in favor), 2 (Somewhat in favor), 3 (somewhat against), and 4 (Very against). The higher the value is, the stronger the sentiment against regional political integration. A positive effect of this variable on the opinion of China indicates that if the respondent feels against regional political integration, she or he will be more likely in favor of a positive view of China. A negative effect of this variable implies that if the person likes regional political integration, she or he will more likely take a positive view of China. In the sample, 64.4% of the

respondents are in favor of regional political integration with other Latin American countries, much lower than the percentage of the responses in favor of regional economic integration (79%).

Imports (P52N.C Acuerdo/Desacuerdo con afirmaciones: En general, los productos nacionales son de menor calidad que los productos importados): This variable measures the respondent's comparison of the domestic products with imports in terms of quality. For the statement "In general, domestic products are of lower quality than imported products," the responses are placed in one of the four groups: 1 (Strongly Agree), 2 (Agree), 3 (Disagree) and 4 (Strongly Disagree). The responses were divided 46% (agree/strongly agree) vs. 54% (disagree/strongly disagree).

Commitment (S5A Compromiso religioso): This variable is about commitment to religion. It has four ordinal groups. Among them, 1 stands for "Very practising," 2 for "Practising," 3 for "Not very practicing," and 4 for "Not practicing at all." The responses in the data are split almost half and half between the practicing and very practicing on the one side and not very practising and not practising at all on the other.

Religion (S5 Religión del entrevistado): This is a categorical variable with the following denominations – 1 (Catholic), 2 (Evangelic without specification), 3 (Evangelic Baptist), 4 (Evangelic Methodist), 5 (Evangelic, Pentecostal), 6 (Adventist), 7 (Jehovah Witness), 8 (Mormon), 9 (Jewish), 10 (Protestant), 11 (Afro-American Cult, Umbanda, etc), 12 (Believer, not belonging to any church), 13 (Agnostic), 14 (Atheist), 96 (Others) and 97 (none). As expected, the majority of respondents are Catholic (59.3%). The next large group is "Evangelic without specification (16.68%), followed by "None" (15.56%). Protestants carry 1.89% and the rest are all under one percent. In the multivariate analysis, I create dummy variables for the following groups: Catholic, Groups 2-5, Groups 6-8, Jewish, and Protestants.

Education (S10 Estudios del entrevistado): This ordinal variable places respondents in 17 categories. Among them, 1 is for without education; 2, one year; 3, two years; 4, three years; 5, four years; 6, five years; 7, six years; 8, seven years; 9, eight years; 10, nine years; 11, ten years; 12, elven years; 13, twelve years; 14, Incomplete University; 15, Completed university; 16, High school/academies/Incomplete technical training; 17, High school/academies/Complete technical training. In the analysis, Group 16 is combined with Group 14; Group 17 is merged with Group 15.

Travel (S13C ¿Ha viajado al exterior alguna vez en su vida?) This variable is about the respondent's overseas travel experience. 1 (I have never traveled abroad); 2 (I traveled a few times); 3 (I traveled at least once a year); 4 (I traveled more than once a year). The majority of the respondents (71.4%) have never traveled overseas.

Occupation (S14A ¿Cuál es su situación ocupacional actual?): This variable measures employment status of the respondent – 1 (Self-employed), 2 (Salaried employee in a public company), 3 (Salaried employee in a private company), 4 (Temporarily out of work), 5 (Retired), 6 (Don't work/responsible for shopping and house work), and 7 (Student). In the sample, 34.6% are self-employed and 17.8% are in the private sector. A dummy variable is created for each of these groups, except for Group 7 (Student), which is the benchmark group.

SES (S26 Nivel Socioeconomico del entrevistado. Contestada por encuestador): In this ordinal variable, the respondent provides an assessment of her or his own socio-economic status – 1 (Very good), 2 (Good), 3 (Not bad) 4 (Bad) and 5 (Very bad).

*Race (S6 ¿A qué raza se considera perteneciente Ud.?):*This categorical variable has seven groups – 1 (Asian), 2 (Black), 3 (Indigenous), 4 (Mestizo), 5 (Mulato), 6 (White), 7 (Other). The mode of this variable is Mestizo at 49.9%, followed by White at 23.7%. In the analysis, a dummy variable is created for each group except for 7 (Other), which is the benchmark group.

In the multivariate analysis, considering that individual countries contain unique determinants affecting their citizens' views of China, I also include country-specific dummy variables.

4. Statistical Analysis

The estimation method is logistic regression, as the dependent variable is binary. The independent variables include the following dimensions: demography, religion, education, ideology, socio-economic status, employment status, wealth, education, views on regional integration, views on imports and the country's economic situation, and views on democracy and corruption.

Table 1 reports the results from the logistic regression. The difference in specification between Model 1 and Model 2 is that the former does not contain country dummy variables in the regression, and the latter includes 17 country dummy variables.[4] To save space, the parameter estimates on country dummy variables are not reported in Table 1, but are reported separately in Table 2, which allows a special treatment of the specific effect of a certain country on its citizens' views of China. In Model 3, the statistically insignificant variables were removed from Model 2, but the country dummy variables are retained. Most of the variables retained in Model 3 are highly statistically significant. Some of them are extremely statistically significant even at the 0.0001 level in a two-tail test. These variables are *Age*, *Gender*, *Democracy*, *Economic Integration*, and *Political Integration*.

Table 1 Logistic Regression Results

Variables	Model 1	Model 2 (Country)	Model 3 (Modified)
Age	-0.0077 (0.0920)*	-0.0077 (0.0020)*	-0.0087 (0.0018)*
Gender	-0.2726 (0.0548)*	0.2659 (0.0557)*	-0.2799 (0.0521)*
City Size	-0.0023 (0.0014)	0.0098 (0.0130)	
Economy	-0.0164 (0.0305)	-0.0242 (0.0333)	
Poor-Rich	0.0473 (0.0146)*	0.0382 (0.0149)**	0.0394 (0.0148)*
Democracy	-0.1393 (0.0334)*	-0.1255 (0.0345)*	-0.1324 (0.0328)*
Left-Right	-0.0290 (0.0090)*	-0.0304 (0.0092)*	-0.1313 (0.0092)*
Corruption	-0.0401 (0.0313)	-0.0579 (0.0325)***	-0.0545 (0.0321)***
Economic Integration	-0.3125 (0.0354)*	-0.3029 (0.0359)*	-0.3029 (0.0357)*

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[4] For the country dummy variables, Dominican Republican is the benchmark and is not represented by a dummy variable while all others are.

Political Integration	-0.1585 (0.0324)*	-0.1693 (0.0331)*	-0.1708 (0.0329)*
Commitment	0.0188 (0.0318)	0.0037 (0.0329)	
Education	0.0129 (0.0075)***	0.0262 (0.0081)*	0.0308 (0.0079)*
Travel	-0.0459 (0.0330)	-0.0850 (0.0338)**	-0.0864 (0.0336)*
SES	-0.1191 (0.0337)*	-0.1117 (0.0348)*	-0.1125 (0.0343)*
Self	-0.1494 (0.1815)	-0.0019 (0.1392)	
Public	0.1577 (0.1606)	0.1593 (0.1634)	
Private	0.0046 (0.1409)	-0.0806 (0.1435)	
Jobless	-0.1521 (0.1574)	-0.1708 (0.1603)	
Retired	-0.1946 (0.1815)	-0.2760 (0.1847)	
Home	-0.0725 (0.1436)	-0.1391 (0.1462)	
Catholic	0.0233 (0.2015)	0.2006 (0.2045)	
Evangelic	0.0541 (0.2069)	0.1444 (0.2103)	
AJM	0.0388 (0.2587)	0.1993 (0.2621)	
Jewish	-0.8882 (0.8127)	-0.6525 (0.8334)	
Protestant	-0.2255 (0.2519)	0.0152 (0.2611)	
Asian	-0.4765 (0.3494)	-0.3945 (0.3554)	
Black	-0.0939 (0.1729)	-0.1434 (0.1773)	
White	-00448 (0.1537)	-0.1442 (0.1581)	
Indigenous	-0.0660 (0.1647)	0.0680 (0.1708)	
Mestizo	-0.0932 (0.1483)	0.0142 (0.1532)	
Mulato	0.0393 (0.1781)	0.0376 (0.1822)	
Constant	3.6093 (0.3914)*	3.2581 (0.4063)*	3.3975 (0.2697)*
AIC	9380.086	9251.349	9235.168
SC	9613.625	9605.195	9440.398
-2 Log L	9314.086	9151.349	9177.168
N	8,751	8,751	8,751

Notes:

Standard errors in the parentheses.

*: 1% error level; **: 2 % error level; ***10% error level. All are the two-tail test.

Among the three models, the best one is Model 3, based on the overall evaluation of the AIC, SC, and -2 Log L. These statistics reflect the standard error of regression and overall, the model that minimizes the errors is Model 3.   The parameter estimates and levels of significance are both fairly stable, with only minor changes, particularly between Model 2 (with country dummy variables) and Model 3 (with country dummy variables and excluding statistically insignificant variables in Model 2).

Of the independent variables, religion, race, and employment status do not matter. Their variation does not predict variation in the opinion of China. Montalvo (2015) finds that persons of color in Ecuador tend not to support a free trade treaty with China (except in the category of "más oscuro"). In this study, we find no impact of race on the opinion of China. Nor is important the respondent's view of the country's economy, or of the quality of the imports, or the size of the population of their city, town, or pueblo. These variables have no effect on a person's view of China. In a variant model of Model 1 and Model 2, I replace *City Size* with *Capital*; the latter as a dummy variable, takes the value of one for those respondents who live in the capital and zero otherwise.

Capital is not statistically significant in the re-specification of Model 1 or of Model 2.

The variables that matter include the following. First, age matters. Older people tend to have a negative view on China. Similarly, gender also matters. Women are less positive than men in their opinions toward China. The latter finding is consistent with Montalvo (2015) who finds that women in Ecuador are less supportive than men of a free trade treaty between Ecuador and China.

The perception of the respondent about her or his wealth level has a positive effect on her or his view of China. The respondent who identifies herself or himself as a richer person tends to have a positive opinion of China compared to a poorer person.

The view of the functioning of democracy in the country is statistically significant and has a negative sign. The values of this variable have a range of 1 to 4, with 1 as the most satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the country and 4 as the most dissatisfied. A negative effect of this variable on the opinion of China indicates that those who are satisfied with the functioning of democracy are more likely to view China positively.

Ideology matters too. As this variable ranges from zero to 10, with zero representing the extreme left and 10 as extreme right, we can conclude that people of left ideology tend to have a positive view of China, while people of right ideology are inclined toward a negative opinion of China. By contrast, Montalvo (2015) does not find that ideology has a statistically significant effect on the respondent's view regarding a potential free trade treaty with China in Ecuador. By using a cross-country analysis and ideology as an ordinal variable[5], this study identifies ideology as relevant factor shaping people's opinions of China in Latin America.

The corruption variable has a negative effect on the opinion of China. The lower value of the variable indicates an agreement with the statement that it is OK to pay the price of a certain degree of corruption as long as it solves the problem (Se puede pagar el precio de cierto grado de corrupción, simpre que se solucionen los problemas). A negative effect in Table 1 means that those who are not against corruption on the basis of a moral principle and accept some corruption tend to hold a positive view of China.

The two regional integration variables have a statistically significant negative effect on the opinion of China. The lower value of these two variables indicates support for regional integration and a higher value points to a dislike about regional integration. Therefore, a negative coefficient means that those who support regional economic and political integration are more likely to have a positive opinion of China. Economic regional integration refers to freeing countries of restraints of movements of goods and services, as well as capital and labor, along with monetary and fiscal policy coordination among states in the region. Those who support regional economic integration logically may harbor a positive view of China, as the latter is fully engaged in international trade and foreign direct investment. With respect to political integration, the statistical result is a little surprising. One may assume that the reason that people want to have political integration with other Latin American countries is to avoid vulnerability in politically depending on non-regional countries. The finding here

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[5] In Montalvo (2015), the values of ideology are categorical, and in this study, they are ordinal.

indicates the opposite. Those who entertain the notion of regional political integration also think of China positively, though the magnitude of the parameter estimate on political integration is just a little over half of that on economic integration.

Education has a positive effect on the opinion of China. Those better educated tend to have a positive view of China, similar to income levels. The people with education and income may find themselves substantive beneficiaries in relations with China, either as consumers buying Chinese products or knowledge workers riding on the waves of globalization of which China is part.

The variable travel has a statistically significant negative effect on the image of China. It is highly statistically significant in Model 3 when controlled by the country dummy variables and with the removal of statistically insignificant variables from Model 2. A lower value of this variable indicates fewer overseas travels and a higher value indicates more travels. Therefore, a negative effect of travel on the opinion of China signifies that those who do not have much exposure to the outside world tend to have a positive opinion of China. Plausibly, people of Latin American countries typically travel to North America (the United States and Canada) or Western Europe. Potentially, they may have better affinity and closer relations with the countries in these two regions at the cost of China. In the data, the majority of the respondents (71.4%) have never left their homeland.

Finally, socio-economic status has a negative effect on the opinion of China and is statistically significant across the three models. The construction of this index gives a lower value (such as 1 or 2) to higher socioeconomic status and a higher value to lower socioeconomic status (such as 3 and 4). Therefore, the negative coefficient indicates that people of higher socioeconomic status tend to hold China positively. Combined with the findings on income and education, there is further evidence that the relatively well-to-do individuals in Latin America are more likely to have a positive opinion of China than their less educated and poorer counterpart with lower socioeconomic status.

The parameter estimates on the country dummy variables exhibit some interesting results. The country dummy variables contain the effects on the opinion of China that are not represented by all the other independent variables in the model. In other words, with all other factors accounted for, being a citizen in a certain country may still matter in forming a positive or negative opinion of China. The benchmark country not included in the dummy variables is Dominican Republic. A positive or negative sign on the country dummy variable is in comparison with the benchmark country which holds a zero value.

Table 2a and Table 2b display the parameter estimate on the country dummy variables using Model 3. While Table 2a presents those countries whose dummy variables carry a positive sign, Table 2b contains those with a negative sign. In Table 2a, statistically significant dummy variable are Uruguay, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Brazil. The respondents from these countries tend to have a positive opinion of China even after controlling other independent variables in the model. Some unique factors – related to these countries, but not included in the model – are captured by the country dummy variables.

Several countries on the list do not have diplomatic relations with China: Paraguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The parameter estimate on Paraguay is of the largest magnitude of all, at 0.9148; the positive effect is statistically significant at the 1% error level for both Paraguay and Honduras, and it is at the 10% error level for Nicaragua. For Guatemala, the country dummy variable is not statistically significant, though positive.

Table 2a Country Dummy Variables in Logistic Regression: Positive Sign

Uruguay	0.6971 (0.2043)*
Costa Rica	0.4094 (0.1651)**
Paraguay	0.9148 (0.1840)*
Chile	0.4049 (0.1744)**
Honduras	0.7933 (0.1931)*
Nicaragua	0.3051(0.1784) ***
Mexico	0.2162 (0.1613)
Panama	0.2327 (0.1552)
Brazil	0.3930 (0.1509)*
Argentina	0.1149 (0.1595)
Peru	0.0952 (0.1491)
Guatemala	0.0011 (0.1702)
El Salvador	0.1963 (0.1842)

Notes:
Standard errors in the parentheses.
*: 1% error level; **: 2 % error level; ***10% error level. All are the two-tail test.

Table 2b displays the country dummy variables with negative parameter estimates. As there are surprises in Table 2a, they exist in Table 2b too. The respondents from two of the China's "comprehensive strategic partners" in Latin America tend to have a negative opinion of China, contrary to more consensual assessments of the relations between China and these two countries – Venezuela and Ecuador.[6]

Venezuela, a country that apparently enjoys friendly political relations and collaborative economic links with China, does not appear to favor China specially. The parameter takes a negative sign, though is statistically insignificant. One would expect to find Venezuela in Table 2a. The respondents from Venezuela do not particularly hold China in a positive view, despite the existence of a "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries. The government of Venezuela emphasizes a strong relationship with China,[7] but the data do not indicate that the Venezuelan respondents particularly endorse a positive opinion of China.

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[6]For example Piccone (2016) find that Latin American countries with close economic ties to the PRC, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, consistently voted at the United Nations in the past with Beijing.
[7]For example, see the recent announcement by the Venezuelan government. "Venezuela and China deepen unbreakable comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation."
http://mppre.gob.ve/en/2020/01/17/venezuela-china-partnership-cooperation/

Table 2b Country Dummy Variables in Logistic Regression: Negative Sign

Venezuela	-0.1580 (0.1465)
Bolivia	-0.2804 (0.1457)**
Colombia	0.2665(0.1511)***
Ecuador	-0.2689(0.1423)***

The other "surprise" is Ecuador. Though a relatively small economy in Latin America and a small country of 17.5 million of population, the economic relations between Ecuador and China were very active under the past president Rafael Correa who sought China's financing and endorsed China's contractual projects. Under him, Ecuador became a "comprehensive strategic partner" of China in 2016. His departure from office after two terms and the arrival of the new president Lenin Moreno in 2017 ushered in better relations with the United States and the receipt of badly needed loans from the IMF. Meanwhile, some high profile Chinese contractual projects were under new scrutiny for quality concerns. The findings in this study seem to confirm the political dynamics in Ecuador. Using the data from the 2014 edition of *Latinobarómetro*, Montalvo (2015) finds that those who approved of President Rafael Correa tend to support a free trade treaty with China. Ecuador in 2018 was under a different president who wanted to bring the former president to trial (In April 2020, former President Rafael Correa was tried in absence and sentenced for eight years in prison on bribery and corruption charges). The Ecuadorian respondents in the 2018 survey tend to hold China in negative views even after all other factors in the regression are accounted for. The political tide in Ecuador may have changed.

5. Conclusion

The multivariate analysis points to the profile of a person in a Latin American country who tends to have a positive opinion of China: relatively younger, well-educated, affluent, with a left ideology, but high socio-economic status, male, who believes in regional economic and political integration, does not travel much overseas, tolerates some corruption, and feels that democracy functions well in the country. A person that possesses all of the above traits is certainly very hard to find, though all those individual factors are found to shape a person's opinion of China. It requires further work to fathom the underlying structures that make the micro-foundations of these effects. For example, both Montalvo (2015) and this study find that a woman is less positive about China than a man is. Though this negative effect is statistically significant, it remains unclear why it is a relevant factor; still further work needs to be conducted in order to find what exactly makes a woman take a negative opinion of China in Latin America.

Beyond this research, the findings from the data have profound and fundamental implications. First, in the eighteen Latin American countries, elections for the chief executive officer of the country, *i.e.* the President, take place regularly. The respondents in the survey are the voters in elections and considering the mandatory requirements to go out and vote, what the voters think of China will have consequences on the official position of the government on China. For example, the findings on Paraguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua may produce implications causing concerns for Taiwan, as the findings on Ecuador and Venezuela may suggest the needs for Beijing to watch and repair the comprehensive strategic partnership with these two countries.

Second, Chinese influence in Latin America has been on the rise, fueled by China's economic involvement in the region through inward FDI from China to Latin America, large scale Chinese contractual projects, exports to China of agricultural produce and extractive commodities, imports of the merchandise from China, and the expansion of Chinese telecom companies such as Huawei. However, China's economic relations with Latin America are fundamentally defined by mutual economic and financial benefits to both parties, rather than by friendship and goodwill. Pursuit of profits by one party may lead to conflict with, and engender negative feelings of, the other party. For example, putting a low bid in order to win a contract may force a Chinese company to use low-quality, or even flawed inputs, to justify a budget, potentially compromising the integrity of the project. Prospecting petroleum in the rain forest may lead to protests and uprising of the indigenous inhabitants, generating a national front on environmental protection and sustainable development. Without fully understanding the political, social, and cultural dynamics of the Latin American societies, China's long march to Latin America would be accompanied with stumbles. A further study of the *Latinobarómetro* survey can help gauge and fathom the public sentiments of China with sources across the landscape of politics, economics, demography, and culture, providing a template for the analysis of causes of successes and failures of Chinese economic involvements in Latin America, or elsewhere.

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拉美專題

Trans-Pacific Integration in an Era of Uncertainty

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Margaret Myers[*]

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It is a distinct pleasure and an honor to contribute to the *Quarterly* on the 10th anniversary of the Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies at Chihlee University of Technology. Both the Center and the *Quarterly* have become indispensible sources of information on Latin American affairs and on Asia-Latin America relations, a topic I have been fortunate to also follow for a number of years now as director of the Asia and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC.

My most recent visit to Taiwan was in October 2019, to attend the Center's International Symposium on Asia Pacific-Latin American Relations. The event itself was a great success, and representative of the Center's remarkable convening capacity—bringing together scholars and practitioners from across the Americas and the Asia-Pacific region for in-depth discussion of key developments in economic and political relations. My contribution to the day's events took the form of a speech conveying three main points, as indicated below.

1. The economic and political impact and influence of Asian economic partners varies considerably across the Latin American region.

Japan is extremely active in some countries, such as Chile and Brazil, but has very limited activity in others. This is especially true of Japan's major trading companies, which are often geographically diversified—Mitsubishi is very active in Chile, for instance, whereas Mitsui is heavily focused on Brazil. Japan's foreign direct investment (FDI) has frequently been directed to those countries that have large overseas Japanese communities. Over 1.6 million people of Japanese descent, or nikkei, reside in Brazil, for example, which is a key destination for Japanese FDI. In those countries where Japan is heavily invested, activity is fairly evenly distributed between services, manufacturing, and primary commodities sectors.

China's presence has had wide-ranging effects across the region over the past two decades. China was responsible, on the one hand, for moderate rates of growth in Latin America during and after the global financial crisis, but has also fundamentally altered economic landscapes in Latin America, from the expansion of Brazil's soy producing regions to the recent boom in infrastructure development in Panama.

That said, China's economic activity is also unevenly distributed across Latin America. China's trade relations are concentrated in South America, for example, and

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[*]Margaret Myers, Director of the Asia and Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue.

the vast majority of Chinese state finance has been directed toward only four countries—Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Chinese companies are also less active in those countries that maintain diplomatic ties to Taiwan, despite continuous efforts by Chinese representatives to strengthen ties with Taiwan's remaining allies in the region.

Most of China's foreign direct investment in Latin America has focused on Brazil and Peru, with considerable interest in the mining sector in the case of the latter. China's FDI is also heavily focused on extractives and infrastructure, but also to a degree on manufacturing, especially in the automotive sector.

China's infrastructure investment is more heavily focused in some countries than others. China expressed interest in about 150 transport infrastructure projects between 2005 and 2018. Actual Chinese construction has in Latin America and the Caribbean has so far focused rather extensively on ports, however. And the major road and rail projects that are underway or operational are most evident in Argentina, Bolivia, and Jamaica, among other countries. China has made considerable infrastructure headway among new partners. Colombia signed a number of agreements with China early in 2020, for example—a marked change of course for the South American nation.

Taiwan maintains close and productive ties to a number of very specific countries in the region, with a focus on Central America and the Caribbean, but also some engagement with other key partners on trade and other matters. Taiwan also imports a lot of coffee --- about US$148 million worth of coffee beans, among many other things, from Latin America. Brazil alone accounted for about 12 percent of the region's coffee supply to Taiwan, followed by Guatemala and Colombia. Taiwan's Covid-19 related overtures have also been much welcomed by recipients in the region.

India and South Korea are also active in specific industries in certain countries though investment in the region has tended to slow somewhat in recent years as economic conditions worsen in many countries. Other Asian partners play an important role in specific sectors. In the case of Ecuador, for example, most of the country's crustaceans exports are destined for Vietnam. And if former Venezuelan National Constituent Assembly Speaker Diosdado Cabello's September 2019 visit to North Korea was any indication, North Korea is also active in a limited way with some very specific partners in the region.

The differences in the nature and extent of Asian engagement with the region are especially evident on the trade front. Japanese trade with Latin America is exceedingly limited in comparison to Chinese trade, and tends to be focused in those countries that have economic partnership agreements—a form of free trade agreement—with Japan. Those include Mexico, Chile, and Peru and possibly also Colombia assuming its eventual ratification of its agreement with Japan.

Also of note is the variation in the types of goods being exported to Asia. Both Japan and China are importing extensive quantities of agricultural goods and minerals and metals, but as the world's largest net oil importer, China has imported far more crude petroleum in recent years. China's crude imports have slowed somewhat of late, as China grapples with the effects of Covid-19, and are expected to continue sliding. Japan has been an important consumer of some of the region's high quality agricultural

exports, including high-grade, organic Colombia coffee, Blue Mountain coffee from Jamaica, and other high-end varieties.

There is also considerable variation in the scale and type of Latin American imports from across Asia. Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Peru are among the top importers of Chinese goods in Latin America, although many countries in the region have imported Chinese high-tech equipment and services in recent years, including Chinese surveillance systems and telecommunications technologies. In the case of Mexico, many of its Chinese imports are intermediate goods for use in car and other manufacturing, usually for eventual exportation to the North American market.

Asian countries also differ in their approach to foreign aid in the region. Japanese aid has focused for the most part on lower middle-income countries in Central America and the Caribbean, but the Japan International Cooperation Association engages in technical cooperation in a wide variety of countries in the region, according to OECD DAC standards for development assistance. China's overseas development assistance has also focused to a degree on technical cooperation, but mostly consists of concessional loans to a select few countries in Latin America. China has given approximately $137 billion in finance to the region since 2015, some of which was at concessional rates. Taiwanese aid to Latin America is focused heavily on technical cooperation and assistance in the areas of health and education.

2. Intra-regional and cross-regional agreements have been supportive of stronger ties but have yet to fundamentally alter existing Asia-Latin America trade relations.

Intra-regional and cross-regional trade and other agreements have been supportive of stronger ties, in some cases. The Pacific Alliance has generated new platforms for engagement with Asia, for example, and has created mechanisms for coordination and information sharing among the organizations in member nations that are responsible for outreach to Asia. The trade bloc has also made notable progress in trade and tourism promotion and other areas. However, for the most part the Pacific Alliance, though promoting of integration among member countries, has yet to fundamentally alter existing trade dynamics with the Asian region. In addition, Mexico's current government has been broadly supportive of the Pacific Alliance but is not expected to engage with the bloc as extensively as previous administrations.

Mercosur's recent agreement with the European Union could have been a key opening for possible negotiation of something similar with Asian nations, but that agreement was put at risk by Brazil's treatment of the Amazon fires, Brazil's precarious political climate, and an overall weakening of Mercosur in the face of strained Brazil-Argentina ties.

Japan has moved ahead with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) without the United States, as the Trump administration remains opposed to the cross-regional trade agreement and generally non-supportive of multilateralism, broadly speaking. The current agreement, called the TPP-11 or CPTPP, includes Mexico, Peru, and Chile and represents approximately 15 percent of the global economy. There is not much of a sense to date of the impact of the CPTPP in Latin American, however. Mexico ratified

the agreement in March 2018, but has yet to put it to much use. Peru was expected to have ratified the CPTPP in March 2020.

APEC is yet another important platform for Asia-Pacific economic engagement, although issues of trade and especially tensions between China and the US have dominated recent summits. In 2014, APEC leaders launched a road map to implement a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), an agreement that would cover all economies belonging to the forum. The China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and TPP were seen as precursors to the FTAAP, but the FTAAP seemingly lost steam after the US withdrew from the TPP at the beginning of Trump's presidency. The RCEP has moved ahead on its own, however, and is nearing completion, although plans might be derailed by the Covid-19 crisis.

3. The ways in which Asian countries are engaging the region are evolving, in many cases. This will continue as relations are shaped by the Covid-19 crisis and its aftermath.

Shifting foreign policies, new overseas investment guidelines, and domestic economic calculations are all shaping the ways in which Asian governments and companies are engaging with Latin America. Prospects for Asia-Pacific integration will also be affected by political and economic developments the Americas, and by broader trends, including the wide-ranging effects of Covid-19, the extent to which the US-China trade war persists, and minimal support from the US for multilateralism in its various forms.

Asian policies toward the region, which continue to evolve, will also shape Asia-Pacific-Latin America relations in the coming years. Japan's commitment to upholding free and open economic systems, whether through the TPP-11 or other means, is clearly articulated in its most recent policy toward the region, which was upgraded in 2018. In this most recent policy, called "Juntos," Japan has sought to emphasize key features of its engagement with Latin America, including its commitment to sustainable development and quality infrastructure. China has two official policy papers on Latin America --- one was written in 2008 and the other in 2016. Both stress cooperation, but the 2016 version makes mention of cooperation in a number of new areas, including on maritime affairs, in non-governmental fora, and on space policy. The most recent policy also supports a new approach to global economic governance.

The Belt and Road has of course come to dominate discourse on China and Latin America over the past year, albeit with little clarity, whether in Latin America, or China, arguably, on what the Belt and Road is and aims to achieve. For many in Latin America and other parts of the world, the Belt and Road equates to infrastructure development. And for China, these bilateral agreements are more symbolic than anything else, although 2019 saw a spike in Chinese greenfield FDI announcement in the region, with many in BRI-type infrastructure development. Whatever the interpretation, nineteen countries in Latin America have so far signed Belt and Road Cooperation agreements, which differ somewhat on a country by country basis but all generally read as memorandums of understanding.

Despite the BRI's extension to the region, looking ahead, we are likely to see more

moderate engagement from China, especially as China struggles to achieve its own stated growth objectives. The same can be said of other Asian nations. While many in the region will look to China and others to play a role in their recovery, in the immediate aftermath of Covid-19, Asian nations will be far less capable of helping than it was in the past. To make matters worse the economic situation in Latin America was already exceedingly delicate even before the pandemic. With the worst economic performance in the world, the region has had very limited fiscal space to help mitigate the effects of the crisis. And the likelihood of growing political instability in the region will have a further dampening effect on inward investment.

There is nevertheless the possibility of enhanced Chinese engagement with Latin America either in support of strategic interests or among those industries that benefit to a degree from Chinese stimulus measures. These include artificial intelligence technologies, automation, and 5G telecommunications, among others. China might also continue to focus on the provision of medical supplies, knowledge and technologies in the coming months and that we may see some lasting changes in global pharmaceutical supply as a result.

拉美專題

Triangular Relations of Taiwan, US and Latin America: A Grand Strategy Perspective

Antonio C. Hsiang[†]

Abstract:

Triangular relation among the US, China, and Taiwan was based on three communiqués, the US acknowledged "the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." The US had benefited from the stable and closer economic ties between China and Taiwan. Latin America has long been most important region for Taiwan's diplomatic survival. However, Taiwan can hardly to maintain diplomatic relations in the region for two reasons. First, Latin American countries are coming to see the United States as "less and less relevant to their needs—and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them." Second, China's diplomatic overtures in the region correspond with the global expansion of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The paper tries to explain the triangular relations of Taiwan, US and Latin America from a perspective of Grand Strategy.

Key Words: Grand Strategy, Taiwan, US, Latin America

[†] Dr. Antonio C. Hsiang, Professor and Director of Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies, Chihlee University of Technology.

Introduction

In their monograph titled *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust*, Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi argued in more than 30 years of U.S.-China diplomatic relations, both sides have not succeeded in persuading each other's long-term good intentions in the relationship, so that each side distrusts what the other side will do over a 10 or 15-year period. That is why the term "strategic distrust" meaning long-term and comprehensive.[1]

Covid-19 crisis provides the most recent example. From the beginning of the outbreak, the public was informed that the disease originated with human exposure to a virus carried by wild animals. But the suddenness and mystery of the bug's appearance left fertile ground for speculation, and soon enough, online sources began to advance the claim that the virus was genetically engineered.[2] Consequently, President Donald Trump has defended repeatedly calling the coronavirus the "Chinese virus".

For Frank Snowden, the Andrew Downey Orrick professor emeritus of history and history of medicine at Yale University, "of the politicians who are using the term 'Wuhan Virus', that's actually quite an aggressive thing and politically charged, and I imagine that people that are still calling it that are using it in a very loaded, ethnic way, and I believe it's mainly associated with people on the political right."[3]

China's diplomatic relations with geographically and culturally distant continents such as Latin America are widely considered to form part of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) quest to assert itself as a global leader, as well as secure new markets and resources for its sustained growth. Yet, the distance between the regions has also proved a significant hurdle for ties.[4] However, for Taiwan, Latin America has long been most important region for its diplomatic survival.

Triangular relation among the US, China, and Taiwan was based on three communiqués (in 1972, 1978, and 1982), the US acknowledged "the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." It agreed to downgrade its ties with Taiwan and maintain only unofficial relations with the island. For Richard N. Haass, this structure made for a winning formula. The mainland has enjoyed the most successful economic run in history, becoming the world's second-largest economy. Taiwan, too, has experienced phenomenal economic success and has become a thriving

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[1] Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust*, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, Brooking, Number 4, March 2012. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf

[2] Yanzhong Huang, "U.S.-Chinese Distrust Is Inviting Dangerous Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories," *Foreign Affairs*, March 5, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-03-05/us-chinese-distrust-inviting-dangerous-coronavirus-conspiracy

[3] Katie Rogers, "Politicians Use of 'Wuhan Virus' Starts a Debate Health Experts Wanted to Avoid," *The New York Times*, March, 10, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us/politics/wuhan-virus.html

[4] Ludmilla Nunell, "It Takes Two to Tango: China and Argentina Are Becoming Closer Than Ever," *Australian Outlook*, Oct. 1, 2019. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/it-takes-two-to-tango-china-and-argentina-are-becoming-closer-than-ever/

democracy. The US benefits from the region's stability and closer economic ties to both the mainland and Taiwan.[5] The paper tries to explain this triangular structure from a perspective of Grand Strategy.

Grand Strategy: US vs. China

Responding to John Kerry's declaration "The era of the Monroe doctrine is over." in November 2013, scholars criticized that he "failed to mention the elephant in the room: the growing interactions of the region's most dynamic economies with China, a customer for raw materials but also an investor that competes with US companies in several sectors."[6] During the congressional testimony about one year later, R. Evan Ellis warned that "Latin America and the Caribbean deserve [U.S.] attention; its security and prosperity are in our common interest."[7] Indeed, the region provides a significant opportunity for China to achieve a strategic advantage over the United States. Latin American has become the Colosseum for the Grand Strategies between the United States and China.

Grand strategy comprises the "purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community."[8] According to military historian B. H. Linddell Hart,

> [T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy...Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity.[9]

In a classic work published at the height of the Second World War, *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, Edward Meade Earle defined grand strategy as "the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation…to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed."[10]

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[5] Richard N. Haass, "The Looming Taiwan Crisis," *Project Syndicate*, Feb 15, 2019. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/looming-taiwan-crisis-over-one-china-policy-by-richard-n--haass-2019-02

[6] Federico Finchelstein and Pablo Piccato, "Latin America sees straight through John Kerry's 'Monroe' speech," *The Guardian*, Nov. 21, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/21/latin-america-john-kerry-monroe-doctrine-speech

[7] R. Evan Ellis, "The Strategic Importance of the Western Hemisphere: Defining U.S. Interests in the Region," Testimony to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Feb. 3, 2015.

[8] Colin Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations - An Introduction to Strategic History*, Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2007, p. 283.

[9] B. H. Linddell Hart. *Strategy* London: Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed. p.322.

[10] Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, "A New U.S. Grand Strategy towards China," The National Interest, April 13, 2015. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-must-be-contained-12616

For Fareed Zakaria, "grand strategy sounds like an abstract concept—something academics discuss— and one that bears little relationship to urgent, jarring events on the ground. But in the absence of strategy, any administration will be driven by the news, reacting rather than leading."[11] Thus, "selective engagement" becomes one of the key elements for policy-makers.

According to Barry Posen, "selective engagement" refers to, "with the caveat that the United States should not only act to reduce the likelihood of great power war, but also oppose the rise of a Eurasian hegemon capable of threatening the United States."[12] Since the 21st century, China has emerged as a new Eurasian hegemon. Consequently, Beijing became Washington's new target of "selective engagement."

The US return to the Asia-Pacific region poses a delicate challenge to China and could define the overall tone of the bilateral relationship. As one of the most important parts of Obama's "Return to Asia-Pacific" policy, trade has become a new arena for US-China competition. Ahead of the fall 2011 Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) meeting in Hawaii, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined a plan to transfer U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic resources from the Middle East to the Pacific, in what she called "America's New Pacific Century." Describing the pivot in militaristic terms as "forward-deployed diplomacy," Clinton hailed the TPP as a "benchmark for future agreements" leading to "a free trade area of the Asia- Pacific."[13]

However, scholars also criticized Obama's grand strategy. Daniel W. Drezner argues, "Grand strategies are not nearly as important as grand strategists like to think, because countries tend to be judged by their actions, not their words. What really matters for great powers is power -- national economic and military strength -- and that speaks loudly and clearly by itself. " He doubts Obama has a grand strategy.[14] Similarly, John Mearsheimer also warned, "The root cause of America's troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War."[15]

"U.S. grand strategy toward China will be seriously weakened without delivering on the TPP," Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis warned in their *report titled Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China*.[16] Trump retreated from the TPP is the best strategic gift to China in general and to Xi Jingping in particular.

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[11] Fareed Zakaria, "Wanted: A New Grand Strategy," *Newsweek*, Dec. 8, 2008, p.30. https://www.newsweek.com/fareed-zakaria-wanted-new-global-strategy-85311

[12] Barry R. Posen, and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No.3 (Winter 1996–1997): p.17. http://mitp-content-server.mit.edu:18180/books/content/sectbyfn?collid=books_pres_0&id=1240&fn=9780262522748_sch_0001.pdf

[13] Christine Ahn, "Open Fire and Open Markets: The Asia-Pacific Pivot and Trans-Pacific Partnership," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Jan. 14, 2014. https://fpif.org/open-fire-open-markets-asia-pacific-pivot-trans-pacific-partnership/

[14] Daniel W. Drezner, " Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? " *Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 2011*. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy

[15] John Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," The National Interest, Jan./Feb., 2011, p.18. https://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576

[16] Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, *Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China*, Council on Foreign Relations, April, 2015. https://www.cfr.org/report/revising-us-grand-strategy-toward-china

According to a policy report *Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America*, published by Inter-American Dialogue in 2012, most countries in Latin America are coming to see the United States as "less and less relevant to their needs—and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them."[17] China has been rising in Latin America for two reasons. "The first is the relative decline in the economic and political pre-eminence of the United States after its brief moment of unchallenged power at the end of the cold war…The second factor is that many Latin American countries have become more self-confident and bent on asserting their diplomatic independence."[18]

No wonder, it becomes clear that partnering with China seems to be way of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and "hedging against U.S. dominance in the region-- just as some states in the Asia-Pacific are edging closer to the U.S. in a bid against growing Chinese power."[19] In December 2014, the White House finally announced policy related to Latin America: the plans to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba. The move was a clear effort by Washington to distinguish itself in a new international theater. However, the gambit was soon eclipsed by China-Celac Forum on Jan. 8~9 2015 in Beijing. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, or Celac, "explicitly styles itself as an alternative to the U.S.-led Organization of American States and a 'weapon against imperialism,' aka American influence."[20]

As for China, its grand strategy to the region is clearly stated in *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*, release on November 5, 2008. It writes:

> "Under new circumstances, the development of relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries is faced with new opportunities...To enhance solidarity and cooperation with other developing countries is the cornerstone of China's independent foreign policy of peace. The Chinese Government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean from a strategic plane and seeks to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The goals of China's policy on Latin America and the Caribbean are: Promote mutual respect and mutual trust and expand common ground... Deepen cooperation and achieve win-win results... Draw on each other's strengths to boost common progress and intensify exchanges... The one China principle is the political basis for the establishment and development of relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries and regional organizations."[21]

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[17] *Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America*, Inter-American Dialogue, April, 2012. https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2012-Report-Remaking-the-Relationship.pdf
"The Real Back Yard," *The Economist*, April 14, 2012, p.48. https://www.economist.com/united-states/2012/04/14/the-real-back-yard

[18] "The dragon in the backyard," *The Economist*, Aug. 13, 2009.
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2009/08/13/the-dragon-in-the-backyard

[19] Shannon Tiezzi, "China's Push Into 'America's Backyard'," *The Diplomat*, Feb. 8, 2014.
https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-push-into-americas-backyard/

[20] Ilan Berman, "China's Newest Sphere of Influence," *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 22, 2015.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ilan-berman-chinas-newest-sphere-of-influence-1421949459

[21] Full Text: *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*, Xinhua, Nov. 5, 2008.

It is true China is still miles away from matching America's international political reach. But since the *Policy Paper* was released, Beijing's diplomatic behaviors in the region have overshadowed Washington's.

US-Taiwan:Extended Diplomacy

For the US grand strategy, Taiwan has long been one of the important options of selective engagement. During the Cold War, the United States provides extended deterrence and assurance guarantees in vital strategic regions across the globe to protect U.S. allies and friends from intimidation, coercion, or attack. Extended deterrence refers to a situation whereby a defender (US) seeks to prevent a challenger (China) from attacking its *protégé* (Taiwan). America's commitments to Taiwan were articulated in legislation (the Taiwan Relations Act) signed in 1979. The US stated that it would "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means of grave concern to the United States."[22]

After the Cold War ended, America's commitment to Taiwan became increasingly uncertain. In January 2016, Taiwan's voters rejected the cross-strait rapprochement policies of the Kuomintang (KMT) and turned over control of the presidency and legislature to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Scholar warns that "America's security commitment to Taiwan faces a significant test. China's growing power presents a challenge to U.S. military superiority, while Taiwan's investment in its own defense has languished." For Washington, it turns to a costly commitment because changes in the U.S.-China balance of power could make the Taiwan Strait a dangerous place once more if the implicit U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan loses credibility.[23]

More recently, the United States began to push "extended deterrence" to Taiwan's diplomatic front. It is particularly evident after seven countries had broken off relations with Taipei in favor of Beijing since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016. One of the most recent examples occurred in September 2018 when the United States recalled its top diplomats in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama over those countries' decisions to no longer recognize Taiwan. A month later US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Panama City to warn against the "predatory economic activity" of Chinese firms. US pressure put an end to China's plans to build a giant embassy at the mouth of the Canal. (details see Table 1)

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[22] Taiwan Relations Act, January 1, 1979. https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/

[23] Eric Gomez, "A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship" CATO *Policy Analysis*, No. 800, Sept. 28, 2016. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship

Table 1: Taiwan's Diplomatic Breakdown since 2016

Date	Country
Dec. 20, 2016	Sao Tome and Principe
June 13, 2017	Panama
May 1, 2018	Dominican Republic
May 24, 2018	Burkina Faso
Aug. 21, 2018	El Salvador
Sept. 16, 2019	Solomon Islands
Sept. 20, 2019	Kiribati

Also in Oct. 2019, U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and participated in National Day ceremony, the first United States senator to attend in 35 years. During the celebration, Sen. Cruz praised Taiwan's people who continue to stand up against the oppression of the Chinese Communist Party.

With US-China tensions rising, there are calls to renew ties with Taiwan. In December 2019, Joseph Bosco, who served as China country director for the Secretary of Defense during the George W. Bush administration, tried to have President Donald Trump publicly declare that the U.S. will defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression. Bosco believed that it was time to end the "strategic ambiguity" surrounding Taiwan. [24]

Referring to a term the president has used during diplomatic visits, Tsai has spoken of creating an "Alliance of Democratic Values" to stand in opposition to an increasingly overbearing China. In the process, however, Tsai has "rewarded" rights violators like Nicaragua, Haiti, and eSwatini, an absolute monarchy and one of the world's least free states. King Mswati III rules all branches of national government, and critics of the king are subject to imprisonment. In 2018, the king received an honorary degree from a Taipei university, where Tsai thanked eSwatini "for speaking up for Taiwan and always being by our side."[25]

In late October 2019, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act (台北法案). The TAIPEI Act involves the United States enhancing "economic, security, and diplomatic engagement" with countries that have "strengthened, enhanced or upgraded relations with Taiwan," On March 4 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives passed TAIPEI Act with a unanimous vote of 415 to zero. After Trump signed the Act into law on March 26, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Geng Shuang warns "we strongly urge the US to correct its mistake, refrain from implementing this act and obstructing other countries' pursuit of relations with China. Otherwise, it will be met with resolute countermeasure from the Chinese side."

In January 2020, Tsai Ing-wen won 57% votes and was reelected. Taiwan's elections make the US commitment more costly. It is particularly true as Joseph R.

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[24] Joseph Bosco, "Taiwan and the US are in sync as security partners against Communist China's aggression," *The Hill*, Dec. 24, 2019. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/475634-taiwan-and-the-us-are-in-sync-as-security-partners-against-communist

[25] Antonio C. Hsiang, "Meet the Monarchs and Dictators of Tsai Ing-wen's 'Alliance of Democratic Values'," *The News Lens*, Aug. 20, 2018. https://international.thenewslens.com/article/102299

Biden Jr. correctly points out, "diplomacy requires credibility, and Trump has shattered ours. In the conduct of foreign policy, and especially in times of crisis, a nation's word is its most valuable asset."[26]

President Donald Trump has long questioned the utility of the United States' alliances. Even Barry Posen has also argued that the United States should abandon the mutual-defense provision of NATO, replace the organization "with a new, more limited security cooperation agreement," and reduce U.S. commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Similarly, another progressive thinker, Peter Beinart, has also argued that the United States should accept Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, a strategy that would include abandoning Taiwan.[27] Taiwan should distinguish the difference between "selective engagement" and "selective retrenchment".

Taiwan-Latin America Relations

China has long been one of the most important factors for Taiwan's relations with Latin America. Beijing's distrust of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can be dated back to Taiwan's first "regime change" in 2000. It was heightened since the Chen Shui-bian assumed as President in May 2000. A number of years ago there was concern about angering the United States by engaging more extensively with China. But, for Latin America, certainly the US has not been the same trustworthy and steadfast partner under the current leadership as it has been previously, according to Margaret Myers, the director of the Asia & Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue.[28](Details see Diagram 1)

Diagram 1: Changing Relation between Taiwan and Latin America

Source: Tom Long and Francisco Urdinez, "Status at the Margins: Why Paraguay Recognizes Taiwan and Shuns China," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Jan. 16, 2020.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338633101_Status_at_the_Margins_Why_Paraguay_Recognizes_Taiwan_and_Shuns_China

[26] Joseph R. Biden Jr., "Why America Must Lead Again," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again
[27] Thomas Wright, "The Folly of Retrenchment", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/folly-retrenchment
[28] Andrea Jaramillo and Ezra Fieser, "Trump taunted Colombia. Then China poured billions into it," *Financial Review*, Jan 24, 2020. https://www.thedialogue.org/press-and-media/mentions/myers-financial-review-jan-24-2020/

It is particularly true for the Latin American countries switched from Taipei to Beijing since Tsai Ing-wen inaugurated as Taiwan's president on May 20, 2016. Relations between mainland China and Taiwan have deteriorated since Tsai took office because she has not formally endorsed the "one China" policy - an agreement in 1992 where both sides agreed there was only one China, but had different interpretations of what that meant. It is no surprise that Beijing has intensified its efforts to isolate Taiwan and persuade its supporters to switch sides.

Another important reason is China's diplomatic overtures in LAC presumably correspond with the global expansion of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which promises infrastructure and other forms of connectivity. For instance, Panama broke ties with Taiwan in 2017 and became the first country in the region to sign a bilateral Belt and Road Cooperation Agreement with China. As former president of Panama Juan Carlos Varela indicated in a speech in Hong Kong in 2019, the BRI is "all about connectivity and Panama is one of the most connected countries in the region." He added that his country saw a "big opportunity" in the BRI.[29]

The Dominican Republic also signed a similar agreement with China after establishing relations with Beijing. President Danilo Medina Sánchez believed the switch would be "extraordinarily positive for the future of our country" and he recognized Taiwan as "an inalienable part of the Chinese territory." In fact, even without formal diplomatic ties, China was already its second largest supplier of imported products.

El Salvador also reportedly inked several Belt and Road-related MOUs after its decision to break ties with Taipei.[30] The country's former ruling Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) tentatively negotiated at least two major projects with China—renovation of the La Union port and a possible special economic zone, which would account for about 14 percent of Salvadoran territory and much of the country's coastline—before siding diplomatically with Beijing. By the middle of 2019, sixteen other LAC nations have also signed bilateral BRI agreements with China.[31]

With regard to Paraguay-Taiwan relations, Asunción uses its diplomatic recognition policy for status-seeking, which generates intangible and material benefits that offset the macroeconomic opportunity costs of foregone Chinese investment, aid and credit.[32] However, the global pandemic is adding to existing pressures on Taiwan.

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[29] "Panama President Cheers China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative," VOA, April 2, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/americas/panama-president-cheers-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative

[30] "Far reaching co-operation agreements signed between China and the Dominican Republic," Caribbean Insight. https://www.caribbean-council.org/far-reaching-co-operation-agreements-signed-china-dominican-republic/

[31] "Weighing the Effects of Taiwan-China Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean," *The Dialogue*, Jul 29 2019. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/weighing-the-effects-of-taiwan-china-competition-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/

[32] Tom Long and Francisco Urdinez, "Status at the Margins: Why Paraguay Recognizes Taiwan and Shuns China," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Jan. 16, 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338633101_Status_at_the_Margins_Why_Paraguay_Recognizes_Taiwan_and_Shuns_China

On April 17, the Paraguayan Senate took a vote on whether to urge the president to change diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the end, Senate voted against the proposal, 25 to 16. But the debate is not definitively over, and pressures on Taiwan's support within Paraguay are increasing.[33]

Policy Implications for Taiwan

On March 23, 2020, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) said that Taiwanese government's plan to donate one million face masks to Paraguay, the only South American ally, amid the global coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak. Since then, Taiwan's "quick" and "effective" response to prevent the spread of the Covid-19 and aid other countries has set an example that other countries can learn from.

However, Taiwan is also the one of few countries still officially calling Covid-19 the "Wuhan Virus," a term that is actually quite aggressive and politically charged. In response to a joint agreement under which Taiwan will donate 100,000 face masks per week to the U.S, China's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) said that such a plan is tantamount to "confronting the Motherland," on March 24.

Worried by the Trump administration had upped the ante in its confrontation with the Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, Henry Kissinger warned, "restraint is necessary on all sides—in both domestic politics and international diplomacy. Priorities must be established."[34] It is also valid for both China and Taiwan.

Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, correctly points out, "nothing about the Covid-19 crisis will change China's view that the U.S. presence in Asia is a historical anomaly or reduce its resentment of U.S. policy on a range of issues, including trade, human rights, and Taiwan."[35] Taiwan should not overplay its "Covid-19 diplomacy" efforts and risk becoming a scapegoat for both the US and China. For her second term, President Tsai Ing-wen need to show the US and Latin America she knows the do's and don'ts.

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[33] Tom Long and Francisco Urdinez, "Taiwan's Last Stand in South America" *Americas Quarterly*, May 7, 2020. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/taiwans-last-stand-in-south-america/

[34] Henry A. Kissinger, "The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coronavirus-pandemic-will-forever-alter-the-world-order-11585953005

[35] Richard Haass, "The Pandemic Will Accelerate History Rather Than Reshape It," *Foreign Affairs*, April 7, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-07/pandemic-will-accelerate-history-rather-reshape-it

拉美新聞分析

China's presence in Latin America and an interdependence created by Covid19

Wilson Almeida

Introduction

China's presence in developing countries, mainly in Latin America, began in 1960 in Cuba and has been increasingly strong since the 2000s. The way it has been exercised has evolved and become more sophisticated. Initially, it represented only trade in goods, services and technology. Then it went on to loans and foreign direct investment and finally, it started to buy companies and government bonds, exerting an important influence, even political, in almost all the continents of the planet.

According to USP's NUPRI, there is a Chinese plan that establishes axes to exercise its influence on the underdeveloped part of the planet, 1) harmony; 2) inclusion, through bilateral agreements, economic cooperation and free trade agreements; 3) multiple balance, that is, greater participation in developing countries; and 4) the principle of mutual benefit and shared gain (YUAN, 2019).

China intends to promote the liberalization and facilitation of world trade and investment, opposing protectionist trade practices by the United States and Europe. (YUAN, 2019).

The emergence of COVID-19 has significantly changed previous trade and investment plans worldwide, however, understanding how the governments of Latin American countries behave in relation to the outbreak of the virus and its political, economic and public health consequences and, how is your relationship with mainland China, where the virus emerged and that there was a lot of good to contain the epidemic. The purpose of this article is to present to scholars of the subject some ideas on how Latin America is reacting to COVID-19, a little bit of the history of this relationship and, how LA will behave after the devastating effects of the global pandemic.

Health effects

COVID-19 is a pandemic, an acute respiratory disease caused by the coronavirus of severe acute respiratory syndrome 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The disease was first identified

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* Dean and researcher at the Master in Strategic Management at UniAlfa, Goiânia, Brazil. Advisor to Chihlee University of Technology.

in Wuhan, in the province of Hubei, People's Republic of China, on December 1, 2019, however the first case was only reported on December 31 of the same year. Some research, even in the US, points out that the virus has a zoonotic origin, because the first confirmed cases were mainly linked to the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, which also sold live animals.

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak or global extent of the pandemic. U.S. President Donald Trump has accused WHO of omitting information from the rest of the world, favoring mainland China. Trump even suspending (May 29, 2020) aid of half a billion dollars to WHO, definitively. The USA is the country that contributes the most to WHO. CNBC (2020)

As of May 31, 2020, at least 6,054,187 confirmed cases of the disease have been identified in more than 188 countries, with major outbreaks in the United States (1,805,745 cases), Brazil (498,000 cases), Russia (396,000 cases), United Kingdom (272,000 cases), Spain (239,000 cases), Italy (232,000 cases), India (173,000 cases) and mainland China where it all started, the 83,000 cases were an example of efficiency and discipline.

Worldwide, 368,711 people died (105,000 in the United States, more than 38,000 in the United Kingdom, 33,000 in Italy, 28,800 in Brazil, about 27,100 in Spain and 4,600 in China.

It is important to realize that Brazil, with almost 500,000, is among the countries that most increased the outbreak in COVID-19, mainly because it is the country that has dealt with this most serious challenge. President Jair Bolsonaro declared that he did not believe in the lethal ability of the virus and encouraged followers to do the same. Two health ministers were exchanged in the midst of a health crisis, and currently an army general is the minister of health.

During the appearance and evolution of the virus in LA, it was possible to notice that there is a strong interrelationship between LA and Europe. For this reason, the first cases from Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Ecuador came from Europe - Spain and Italy - and not from Wuhan. Latin America has evolved in the increase of cases and deaths, however unevenly, Chile, for example, evolved well at first, however it authorized the opening of commercial and leisure spaces very early and the outbreak has returned, currently the government Chilean decreed to stop activities again.

Economic effects

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently estimated (May 2020) that, on average, European economies are expected to shrink 7.4% in 2020 and that the recovery of European economies will not take place before 2022. For LA, the IMF predicts a 5.3% drop in GDP and the recovery may be even slower.

According to Kupfer (2020), "Based on data from April and leading indicators from May, a second wave of revisions is underway, for the worse, of the projections for the evolution of the economy, in 2020 and 2021". The contraction of the Brazilian economy, expected to be around 4% to 5%, by the IMF, is now estimated to be around 7.5% and 8%. After the figures for effective economic activity in April and May have

been released - the first two months full of the country's pandemic - it will not be surprising if the forecasts point to a 10% retraction in GDP, the highest in the entire history of Brazil.

Europe, as well as Africa, much of Asia and Latin America will try to cut spending to accommodate the huge debt they are taking on to combat COVID-19, all of which face both sanitary and economic pressures at the same time. Europe and the US will then have to cut spending on development aid or strengthening programs for Africa and Latin America to deal with their own problems related to COVID-19.

On the other hand, China (PRC) with its reserves, resources to invest in infrastructure in Latin America, already planned in previous programs, such as at the BRISCS meeting, in Brasilia (Nov 2019). Considering the immense difficulties that the governments of the local countries will face, they will certainly be interested and obliged to receive large sums of loans. Therefore, Latin America whose economy is expected to contract more than 7%, with unemployment at frightening levels, Brazil already has 20 million more among the new unemployed after COVID-19, will be a favorable territory for the expansion of Chinese influence, which is already great. ZARATE (2019)

Latin America has important and strategic ties with China, economic relations have grown dramatically in recent decades, through loans, foreign direct investments and mainly trade.

Considering the US commercial influence in the countries of Central America, the Caribbean and North America, the main trade partners of the Chinese in the region are Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, whose exports are concentrated in a few products, which represent 75% of Latin America's exports: soy, meat, oil, iron ore and copper. ZARATE (2019)

According to UNDP data from the UN, in 2000, China's trade with Latin America amounted to just over US $ 12 billion. In 2010, it had grown almost ten times more, to about $ 118 billion and in 2018, $ 306 billion. The forecast is to reach US $ 370 billion in 2020, according to Almeida (2020).

According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of the United Nations, in 2015 China overtook the European Union to become the second largest export market in Latin America just below the United States, and that in 2020 China will probably represent around 20% of the region's total exports and its first partner UNDP (2020). Comparing the performance of trade with Europe, in 2018, LA reached US $ 230.2 billion, with the whole of Europe, compared with US $ 535.7 billion with China, in the same year. For Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina, for example, China is already the first trading partner in 2020

COVID-19 has economic effects as a result of the measures that authorities take to prevent further spread of the virus such as closing factories, commerce and services. French Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire sees the epidemic as a chance for a shift to globalization, given the vulnerability of internationally interconnected supply chains. The outbreak and its consequences, he said, would have revealed an "irresponsible and irrational" dependence on China.

In relation to Latin America, Europe has always supported the Latin American continent, now weakened, it will devote less attention and resources, for example, trade and tourism, and more importantly, it will decrease its corporate presence in the region. In the period following the 2008 financial crisis, European companies such as Repsol, Statoil, Iberdola and many others sought to strengthen their weakened financial positions by divesting assets, many of which were bought by Chinese companies.

Final considerations

The political, cultural and socio-economic impact of COVID-19 can cause profound changes in global society.

Some can be viewed in advance, such as the increase in telework, the regionalization and redefinition of regional and mainly global supply chains. Distance education, at all levels of education and reduced travel, especially long distance travel, is almost always unnecessary, increasing global warming.

French Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire sees the epidemic as a chance for a shift to globalization, given the vulnerability of internationally interconnected supply chains. The outbreak and its consequences, he said, would have revealed an "irresponsible and irrational" dependence on China, thus creating a serious dependency on Chinese products. The world industry, even those of the USA, Europe and Japan, have found, in the worst way, that they need to find ways of autonomy in their production chains.

It is likely that after the effects of COVID-19, China will be able to increase its presence in Latin America, as it certainly will in regions with Africa. There are many factors to be considered and that cannot be presented now. Questions like, who will be the new US president in 2021? Will the Brazilian President change his posture, or will he be removed from power? what direction will countries like Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Argentina take? There are many undefined variables, so wait!

Tem também sido discutida uma possível reversão da globalização mais ampla, sobretudo no que diz respeito a cadeias de fornecimento.[478]

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https://www.br.undp.org/content/brazil/pt/home/presscenter/articles/2019/como-o-covid-19-ira-afetar-as-economias-na-america-latina-e-no-c.html

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拉美經貿中心研究成果

本書內容區分為三大部分:

壹、拉丁美洲民主發展與社會轉型

貳、拉丁美洲政治與國際關係

參、拉丁美洲經貿與區域整合

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《拉丁美洲經貿季刊》投稿須知及體例

壹、投稿須知

一、 本刊為針對拉丁美洲區域研究學術刊物，歡迎與拉丁美洲經濟、貿易、政治、教育、文化、書評及歷史等相關稿件。自民國 99 年 6 月 1 日創刊，每年區分春（3 月 1 日）夏（6 月 1 日）秋（9 月 1 日）冬（12 月 1 日）四季出版。並經收錄於國家圖書館「臺灣期刊論文索引系統」與國內知名遠流出版集團智慧藏公司之「TAO 台灣學術線上」(www.lib.ntu.edu.tw)、凌網數位出版品營運平台之 HyRead 台灣全文資料庫(www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/)及華藝線上圖書館(http://www.airitilibrary.com/)期刊資料庫。

二、 來稿請示作者基本資料註明作者姓名(中、英、西文)、服務機構(中、英、西文)，職稱、地址、聯絡電話、傳真、Email 及主要學經歷(中、英、西文)。

三、 來稿請依一般學術論文格式撰寫，文章分節並附小標題，包括中英西文論文名稱，文首請撰寫中英西文摘要 500 字以內及關鍵詞 4~6 個，加註釋及參考文獻。為求本刊的完整性、一致性和嚴謹性，請作者依本刊規定進行文章格式的編排及內容的增減。全文依據本刊格式規定後，以三萬字為限(含註腳文字)。

四、 作者投稿請自負文責，並注意著作權法等相關法律規定。經送審核准採用者，得依編輯需求刊載或加以刪修潤飾，若不同意者，請預為註明。

五、 本刊設有審稿制度，分初審及複審，聘請專家學者以匿名審稿方式審閱，以決定採用稿件，並視審稿情形，提出審稿意見供作者參考。審查時間原則不超過一個月，並在審查通過後，依論文刊登期數，編排刊登。

六、 投稿文章，若通過審查程序可獲刊之篇數超過當期篇幅容量，編輯委員會得斟酌領域平衡以及該稿件之時效性等因素，決定當期刊登之稿件及其順序。

七、 本刊典藏於中華民國國家圖書館「臺灣期刊論文索引系統」，請同意將來稿之合法權利以採取無償之非專屬授權方式供國家圖書館及其他本刊物授權之資料庫、數位典藏業者，進行重製，透過網路提供服務、授權用戶下載、列印等行為。或並得酌作格式之修改。經本刊刊載之文稿，版權歸本刊所有，除作者自用外，授權轉載須徵得本刊同意。

八、 歡迎以電子郵件投稿，電郵：cf100@mail.chihlee.edu.tw。如以紙本請寄新北市板橋區文化路一段 313 號，致理科技大學商貿外語學院-拉丁美洲經貿研究中心。

九、《拉美經貿季刊》接受中、英、西文稿件，經常性專欄列舉如下：Regular Columns as follow, new Column is welcomed!

（一）特稿：(如歐部長談外交休兵)Special Invitation (Ex. Francisco Ou on Diplomatic Truce across the Strait) (Articles from Center's Conference)

（二）專題：如拉美獨立 200 週年。Feature Articles

（三）拉美新聞分析：如拉美財長會議、總統大選。News Analysis (Ex. Peru's Presidential elections)

（四）拉美經貿分析：如拉美投資趨勢分析。Analysis of Latin American Economy and Business (Ex. Article from Fund Managers)

（五）拉美經貿書評或重要文獻介紹：如大陸的拉美政策白皮書。Book Reviews or Literatures Presentation on Latin American Economy and Business.

（六）拉美與兩岸：拉美對中國大陸、臺灣或兩岸關係的影響。China, Taiwan and Latin American (Changing relations between Latin American and China/Taiwan, and Impacts on Relations across the Strait)

（七）拉美人物側寫：如拉美國家駐中華民國大使、代表、拉美傑出人物、華商等。Personal Profiles: (Ambassadors and Representatives from Latin America)

（八）拉丁美洲史話：如兩岸與拉美關係變遷、拉美重要歷史事件回顧等，　　　特別歡迎有派駐拉美經歷者供稿。Latin American History (Articles from former Ambassadors to Latin America)

（九）拉美經貿統計：表列重要經貿資料。Statistics on Latin American Economy and Business

（十）拉美經貿新聞：(重要經貿新聞選粹) News on Latin American Economy and Business

（十一）拉美中心剪影：(拉美文化活動、研討會等照片) Photos of Center's Activities.

貳、體例

一、內文文字請依照以下規定：

中文字型一律採用新細明體、英文字型一律採用 Times New Roman；內文字型大小：12pt；
章節標題字型大小：14pt、粗體；字元間距：標準。

二、行間距：單行間距。段落與之間務必加一行空行間。

參、註腳（頁註）格式

一、本刊以橫式編排，採頁下註，作者姓名列於題目之下，作者介紹列於註釋前，並以＊號
表示，註腳方式如下。

二、註腳編號，使用阿拉伯數字，以每篇論文為單位順次排序，文中(含註腳)字體應統一採用
新細明體，英文字型一律採用 Times New Roman；字型大小：10pt。

三、專書

（一）中文：作者姓名，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Place of Publication: Publisher,
Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

四、專書譯著

（一）中文：Author's Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，《書名》(書名原文)（出版地：出版者，
出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Original Title of the Book), trans.,
Translator's Full Name (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

五、專書論文

（一）中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，編者姓名編，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x
或頁 x-x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," in Editor's Full Name, ed., Complete Title
of the Book (Place of Pubation: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

六、專書論文譯著　（請依個別刊物實際出版項，完整臚列）

（一）中文：Author's Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈篇名〉（篇名原文），編者姓名編，譯著
者姓名譯著，《書名》（書名原文）（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," in Editor's or Author's Full Name, (ed.,)
Complete Title of the Book (Original Title of the Book), trans., Translator's Full Name
(Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

七、期刊論文　（請依個別刊物實際出版項，完整臚列）

（一）中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Journal, Vol. x, No. x, Month
Year, p. x or pp. x-x.

八、期刊論文譯著

（一）中文，外文：：Author's Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈篇名〉（篇名原文），《刊物名
稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

九、學位論文

（一）中文：作者姓名，《學位論文名稱》（發表地：學校及系所名稱博／碩士論文，出版年），
頁 x 或頁 x-x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, Title of the Dissertation (Diss./Thesis, The Name of the
Department, the Name of the Degree- University, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

十、研討會論文

（一）中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，發表於「研討會名稱」研討會（地點：主辦單位，年月日），
頁 x 或頁 x-x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," paper presented at the Complete Name of
the Conference (Place of the Conference: Conference Organizer, Date), p. x or pp. x-x.

十、報紙（若為社論、短評、通訊稿或作者匿名，則可不列作者欄）

（一）中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《報紙名稱》，年月日，版 x。

（二）外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Newspaper, Date, Section or
Page Numbers.

十一、網際網路依線上實際資訊完整臚列，須註明上網查詢年月日及時間。

（一）中文

1. 專書：作者姓名，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x，《網站名稱》，<網址>。
2. 論文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x，《網站名稱》，<網址>。
3. 報導：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《網站名稱》，年月日，<網址>。

（二）外文

1. 專書：Author's Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x, Name of the Website, <URL http://www.atimes.....>.
2. 論文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Journal, Vol. x, No. x, Date, p. x or pp. x-x, Name of the Website, <URL http://www.atimes....>.
3. 報導：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Website, Date, <URL http://www.atimes.....>.

Publication Guidelines for The Quarterly of
Latin American Economy and Trade

1. The Quarterly Guidelines

1.1. The Quarterly is a specialized journal in topics related to Latin American contemporary and historic issues, mainly in the fields of economy, trade, politics, education, culture and social sciences. The official languages of the journal are Chinese, English, and Spanish. Book reviews are also welcome. The Quarterly has been published since June, 2000, and every year there are Spring (March), Summer (June), Fall (September), and Winter (December) issues. The published papers are recorded in different data bases in Taiwan, including the ROC National Library's Journals and Thesis Index System, the Taiwan Academy Online "TAO" Database (http://www.lib.nyu.edu.tw); HyRead Database (http://www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/), and Chinese language database Airiti (http://www.airitilibrary.com/).

1.2. Submitted papers should include, in the first page, the author's detailed contact information (name, affiliation, position, mailing address, telephone number, email address, and a brief curricular summary).

1.3. Papers and book reviews must use an academic language, and should include: a title (no longer than 20 words); a 150-250 words abstract; 4-6 keywords; the main text, footnotes and references. All submitted manuscripts should follow these rules, in order to maintain academic consistency and quality. Papers should not exceed 30 pages, including references, notes, graphs and figures.

1.4. Authors are the only responsible to comply with copyright norms and must refrain from committing plagiarism. Submitted manuscripts will go through a blind peer-review process, including possible changes recommended by The Quarterly Editorial Board. In case of rejecting the proposed changes, or deciding to withdraw the manuscript during the review process, the author must do it in written form.

1.5. The Quarterly observes a blind peer-review process, employing anonymous reviews who are specialists in Latin America related-topics. Reviewers will be in charge to evaluate the relevance of the submitted manuscript, and to accept or reject it within a previously determined period of time. The comments and changes proposed by the reviewers should be considered and answered by the author, in order to be considered for publication. Accepted papers will be published in the next Quarterly issue, or a following issue, depending on the final decision by the Editorial Board.

1.6. Accepted manuscripts will be published according to the number of existing papers. The Editorial Board will also consider the suitability of the manuscript for following special issues, which will be dedicated to exclusive relevant topics.

1.7. After being accepted, the author will automatically cede the paper publication rights to The Quarterly, and it will be contained in electronic and print versions. The paper will also be recorded in the aforementioned databases.

1.8. Manuscripts must be send in a Microsoft Word file, to The Quarterly email address: m100@mail.chihlee.edu.tw. It is not necessary to submit a print version of the manuscript. However, if the author wants to send physical mail, it can be done to the following address:
The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade

Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies
Chihlee University of Technology
No. 313, Section 1, Wenhua Rd.
Banqiao District, New Taipei City, 220, Taiwan (R.O.C.)
Tel. +886-02-2257-6167#1639.

1.9. The Quarterly accepts manuscripts written in Chinese, English, or Spanish, and it usually contains the following sections (depending on the availability and reception of papers):
a) Papers on Relevant Topics
b) Special Issues
c) News Analysis

d) Economic and Financial Analysis
e) Latin America-related Books or Important Documents Reviews
f) Papers on Latin America Relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait
g) Papers or Short Analysis on Important Latin American Individuals
h) Latin American History
i) Latin American Regional Trade Statistics Data
j) Relevant News on Latin American Economy and Trade

2. Papers and Reviews Format

2.1. Submitted manuscripts should be written in Microsoft Word format, in A4 size, Times New Roman, 12pts. font. The title should be written in 14pts. with a bold format.

2.2. Space between words should be normal, and space between lines should be single (please do not use 1.5 or double spaces).

2.3. A double space should be left only between paragraphs.

3. Foot-notes and References Style

3.1. Submitted manuscripts should include page-numbers at the bottom of each page. The name of the author should come immediately after the title of the paper. The personal information of the author must be contained in a foot note, indicated with a * next to the author's name.

3.2. Footnotes should be limited to making additional statements or clarifying a secondary idea. They should be presented in Arabic and consecutive numbers. Footnotes should not be used for bibliographic references. References should be included at the end of the paper. Citations and reference to other authors' works should be presented in the text according to the following format:
* Author's last name (publication year: page). Ex: Ramírez (2012: 25).
* Author's last name (publication year). Ex: Ramírez (2012).

3.3. References or Bibliography should be presented in alphabetical order according to the authors' last names. When presenting numerous works of a single author, they should be ordered according to their publication year, starting from the oldest one. The presentation of bibliography should be done according to the criteria established by *The Chicago Manual of Style.* For example:

A) One author
Ayala-Espino, José Luis (1992). *Límites del mercado, límites del Estado: Ensayos sobre economía política del Estado*. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.

B) Two authors
Hearn, Adrian H. & José Luis Leon-Manriquez (2011). *China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

C) Edited Books
Chen, Lucía & Alberto Saladino (Eds.) (2008). *La nueva Nao: De Formosa a América Latina. Intercambios culturales, económicos y políticos entre vecinos distantes*. Taipei: Tamkang University.

D) Organizations or Institutions as Authors
World Bank (1993). *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report.* New York: World Bank & Oxford University Press.

E) Paper or Chapter in an Edited Book
Teng, Chung-chian (2007). "Hegemony or Partnership: China's Strategy and Diplomacy Towards Latin America" in *China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century,* edited by Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heigenbotham, & Derek Mitchell, 84-112. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

F) Paper in a Journal
Fiori, José Luis (1992). "Economía política del Estado desarrollista en Brasil." *Revista de la CEPAL*, no.

47: 187-201.

G) Non-published Materials
1. Thesis
Li, Y. (2008). "A Study of Bilateral Trade Between Taiwan and Mexico." Master Thesis. Kaohsiung: I-Shou University.

2. Papers presented in Conferences
Resende-Santos, Joao (1999). "Socialization and Emulation in International Relations Theory". Paper Presented in the International Conference of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 3.

I) Material from the Internet
Documents, internet sources or databases online, should include the respective URL, and if possible, the retrieval date (month-day-year).

3.4. Figures, graphs, maps, pictures and other illustrations must include their respective sources, and should be contained in an appendix after the references. Graphs and tables should also be submitted in a separate Microsoft Excel file.

Note: The present Quarterly guidelines (except for those related to footnotes, citations and references) were translated from the original Chinese version. In case of any controversy or discrepancy, the content of the original document in Chinese must prevail.

Lineamientos para publicar en Revista Trimestral de Estudios Económicos Latinoamericanos (RTEEAL)

1. Lineamientos de la revista

1.1. Esta revista está especializada en temas históricos y de actualidad de América Latina, y acepta artículos sobre economía, comercio, política, educación, cultura y sociedad en la región latinoamericana. Los idiomas oficiales de la revista son: chino, inglés y español. Las reseñas de libros relacionados con temas regionales también son bienvenidas. La revista se publica sobre una base trimestral, ininterrumpidamente, desde el 1 de junio del año 2000. Cada año se publican números de primavera (1 de marzo), verano (1 de junio), otoño (1 de septiembre) e invierno (1 de diciembre). Los artículos publicados en la revista quedan registrados en diferentes bases de datos de Taiwán, incluyendo el Sistema de Indexación de Revistas y Tesis de Taiwan, de la Biblioeca Nacional; el Consorcio Académico de Bases de Datos y Libros Electrónicos de Taiwan "TAO" (http://www.lib.nyu.edu.tw); la base de datos HyRead de la plataforma educativa taiwanesa Hyweb Technology (http://www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/); y, la base de datos de la biblioteca electrónica de la compañía de contenidos académicos en lengua china Airiti (http://www.airitilibrary.com/).

1.2. Los artículos enviados deberán contener, en la primera hoja, la información detallada del autor, incluyendo: el nombre completo del autor, la institución a la que pertenece, título o posición laboral, dirección a la que se enviará la correspondencia (de ser necesario), teléfono de contacto, dirección de correo electrónico, y otros datos relevantes sobre su formación académica.

1.3. Los artículos y reseñas serán escritos con un estilo académico, y deberán incluir: un título de no más de veinte palabras; un resumen de no más de 250 palabras; 4-6 palabras clave; el texto del artículo, notas al pie y bibliografía. Los envíos deberán apegarse a estas reglas, con el fin de preservar una alto nivel de consistencia y rigor académico. Los artículos enviados no deberán sobrepasar las 30 páginas, incluidas las referencias, notas, cuadros y figuras.

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2.2. El espaciado entre palabras debe ser normal, y el espacio entre renglones debe ser simple (no se aceptan 1.5 o doble espacio).
2.3. Entre cada párrafo deberá dejarse un renglón en blanco.

3. Estilo de notas al pie y bibliografía

3.1. Los artículos y reseñas serán presentados con una numeración de páginas al inferior de las mismas, y el nombre del autor inmediatamente después del título. La información personal del autor será presentada en una nota al pie, marcada con un * junto al nombre del autor.

3.2. Las notas al pie de página deberán restringirse a lo estrictamente necesario, reservándose únicamente para hacer aclaraciones o ampliaciones sobre alguna idea contenida en el texto. Las notas serán presentadas con números arábigos y consecutivos. Éstas no deben utilizarse para las referencias bibliográficas, las cuales deben incluirse en la bibliografía. Por su parte, las citas o referencias a trabajos de otros autores, deben presentarse según los formatos siguientes, dependiendo del caso:
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* Apellido del autor (año de publicación). Ejemplo: Ramírez (2012)

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A) Un autor
Ayala-Espino, José Luis (1992). *Límites del mercado, límites del Estado: Ensayos sobre economía política del Estado*. Ciudad de México: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.

B) Dos autores
Hearn, Adrian H. y José Luis Leon-Manriquez (2011). *China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

C) Compiladores
Chen, Lucía y Alberto Saladino (comps.) (2008). *La nueva Nao: De Formosa a América Latina. Intercambios culturales, económicos y políticos entre vecinos distantes*. Taipéi: Universidad Tamkang.

D) Organismo, institución o asociación como autor
Banco Mundial (1993). *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report.* Nueva York: Banco Mundial y Oxford University Press.

E) Artículo en un libro compilado por otro(s) autor(es)
Teng, Chung-chian (2007). "Hegemony or Partnership: China's Strategy and Diplomacy Towards Latin America" En *China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century,* compilado por Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heigenbotham, y Derek Mitchell, 84-112. Nueva York: M.E. Sharpe.

F) Artículo de publicación periódica
Fiori, José Luis (1992). "Economía política del Estado desarrollista en Brasil". *Revista de la CEPAL*, no. 47: 187-201.

G) Materiales no publicados
1. Tesis
Li, Y. (2008). "A Study of Bilateral Trade Between Taiwan and Mexico". Tesis de Maestría en Economía. Kaohsiung: I-Shou University.

2. Ponencias
Resende-Santos, Joao (1999). "Socialization and Emulation in International Relations Theory". Ponencia presentada en el Encuentro Anual de la American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 3 de septiembre.

I) Citas de material obtenido de Internet
Los documentos, fuentes o bases de datos publicados en Internet, deben indicar el URL respectivo y, de ser posible, la fecha de la consulta (día-mes-año).

3.4. Los cuadros, gráficas, mapas, esquemas e ilustraciones deberán incluir su respectiva fuente y aparecerán en hojas numeradas, después de la bibliografía. Las gráficas deberán también ser enviadas en otro archivo adjunto de Excel.

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