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## 主編的話

### From the Editor of this Issue

本期第一篇論文是就讀於政大亞太研究所博士班的墨西哥籍學者 Eric Gutierrez Macias 所寫的「中墨關係的愛恨情仇」。他敘述自 2001 年中國大陸進入世界貿易組織 (WTO) 迄今，墨西哥在政治與經濟面向上對中國觀感的演變。雖然墨西哥早在 1972 就與北京建立外交關係，且北京也看到墨西哥具備緊鄰美國的地理位置和對中美洲及加勒比海國家的影響力，但雙邊政治經濟的互動並不熱絡，直到中國大陸進入世貿組織後，中國對外貿易額特別是對美國的出口激增，這便與墨西哥形成在北美市場的競爭形勢。隨著中方在拉美的貿易額和海外直接投資 (FDI) 日益增長，雙方的貿易摩擦雖時有所聞，惟政經關係亦持續發展漸趨密切，直到 2013 年兩國建立「全面戰略夥伴關係」。本文從中、墨兩國在「北美自由貿易協定」下「競爭者」的關係，演變到川普上台後推動「美國優先」的單邊主義，在美墨邊境築高牆及重新談判「北美自由貿易協定」後，墨西哥感受以中國大陸市場取代部分美國市場的必要，加上中國大陸視拉美為「一帶一路的自然延伸」，墨西哥則是大陸資金技術登陸新大陸的灘頭堡，雙方互有需要，未來政經關係的發展將益趨密切。作者認為川普以鄰為壑的姿態帶給墨西哥上下對未來的不確定感，是墨西哥對中國態度轉變的觸媒，中國大陸正在填補美國川普政府輕率的拉美政策在拉丁美洲讓出的政經空間。

第二篇「從一帶一路計畫中理解阿根廷國內政治目標下的外交策略」，作者 Fernando Mauro Sambrani Cavalieri 是就讀政大亞太研究所碩士班的阿根廷籍學者。他試圖以 Gideon Rose 的新古典現實主義概念及本身作為阿根廷人的觀點，檢視 2013 年至 2017 年間，阿根廷從主張發展經濟必先發展國內工業，因此在國際貿易上採保護主義，在外交上主張南美優先、反美、親中俄的 Cristina Kerchner 總統，交棒給主張吸引外資、自由貿易、對外開放，寄希望於美國歐洲的右派總統 Mauricio Macri 期間，阿根廷國內政治由左向右擺盪，經濟政策走新自由主義路線，Macri 在競選期間甚至發出一些不利中阿經貿合作的訊息，按理說應該在當選後親歐美而遠中國，然而恰恰是川普的「美國優先」和歐盟保護主義的自私自利，無法提供阿根廷發展經濟急需的資金、和農牧產品輸出的市場，而中國不但能滿足前述需求，還主動提出改善鐵路系統、修建大型水電設施等基礎建設的資金技術，這就難怪 Macri 在 2015 年要跑去大陸參加一帶一路峰會，並加入「亞洲基礎設施投資建設銀行」了。作者將阿根廷最近兩任總統的政經路線的轉折娓娓道來，對照出阿根廷對「一帶一路」合作計畫的態度轉變，似乎也印證了 Gideon Rose 外交是內政在國際現實環境中的運作的理論。

第三篇「墨西哥加入北美自由貿易協定二十二年的評析」，是中國文化大學行政管理系副教授兼系主任余小云博士的大作。就在幾天前的八月二十九日，美國和墨西哥宣布經過一年多的艱辛談判，兩國終於達成了新的「北美自由貿易協定」，還邀請另一成員國加拿大盡快回歸云云。這是美國自己撕毀二十四年前與加拿大、墨西哥訂下的三邊經貿規則，以要求公平為名，重新強迫墨西哥即將卸任的總統簽下的雙邊 FTA，最終是遂了川普「美國優先」的訴求，卻將原先作為全球其他自由貿易協定典範的北美自由貿易協定送進歷史堆。此時此刻余教授的

論文讓我們再次回顧北美自由貿易協定談判的歷史背景、主要條款與貿易發展情況、墨西哥加入後經濟發展的成果與受到的影響等，既有不勝唏噓之感，亦覺得寫得正是時候。

主編要特別感謝教授學者提供論文，編輯委員與匿名審查人的費心努力，及執行編輯協助編校，使本期季刊能順利出刊，也期待國內外研究拉丁美洲的學者與實務專家能持續支持本刊。

陳敬忠  
致理科技大學 副教授  
拉丁美洲經貿研究中心 研究員

## From the Editor of this Issue

Our first research paper is "China-Mexico Ambivalent Relations" from the Mexican scholar Eric Gutierrez Macias, currently a doctoral student in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University. He describes the changes of Mexican political and economical perspectives toward China since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Despite Beijing established diplomatic relations with Mexico in 1972 and considered Mexico's close location to the United States plus its influence in Central America and the Caribbean, political and economical interactions between these two countries were little. After China joined WTO, its export volume surged, especially towards the United States. This has become leverage for Mexico in the North American market. Economic frictions appear often as the increase of China's trade volume and FDI in Latin America. Nevertheless, political and economic relations kept on and established the "comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2013. China and Mexico were competitors under North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). After Trump was in power, pushed the "America First" unilateralism, built the border wall, and renegotiated NAFTA, Mexico realized the necessity of replacing partial U.S. market with China. China considered Latin America as a natural extension of One Belt One Road, and Mexico is the frontier of bringing China's capital and technology on board. The future development in political and economic relations will definitely increase since their needs are complementary. The author thinks that Trump as the bad neighbor brings uncertainty to Mexico which triggers the change of Mexico's attitude towards China. China is filling the space that was given away by reckless Latin policy from the Trump government.

The second one is "Understanding Argentina's foreign policy by recognizing domestic politics goals Examining China's OBOR in Argentina" Author Fernando Mauro Sambrani Cavalieri is a Argentinian scholar, currently a master's student in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University. From an Argentinian perspective and Gideon Rose's Neoclassical Realism, he sees that through 2013 to 2017, Argentina claims to develop domestic industries as a priority for economical growth. The country chose protectionism in international trade. President Cristina Kerchner, who advocates South America first, anti-U.S., pro-China and Russia, passed the baton to Mauricio Macri, who claims to attract foreign business, free trade, open to the outside, and expects hope from the U.S. and Europe. During this period, the domestic politics shifted from left to right and the economic policies took the approach of neoliberalism. Macri even spread information against China-Argentina cooperation during his campaign. After being elected president, Macri was supposed to get closer with Europe and the U.S., and also stay away from China. However, the "America First" from Trump and the selfishness of E.U. protectionism could not provide the capital for Argentina's urgent economic needs and also the export market of its agricultural and animal husbandry products. China could satisfy these needs and also actively offer the capital and technology to improve railroad system and build fundamental establishments like large water and electricity facilities. This explains why Macri attended the 2015 One Belt One Road Summit and joined Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The author explains the changes and shifts of political and economic policies within the recent two presidencies and reflects on Argentina's change of attitude towards One Belt One Road plans. This also proves Gideon Rose's theory that foreign policy is the result of domestic policies plus international constrains.

The third one "Analysis on the Economic Development of Mexico's Twenty-Two Years Accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994-2016)" is the work of Hsiao-Yun Yu, associate professor and chair of the Department of Public Administration and Management. On August 29th, after one year of ongoing negotiation, the U.S. and Mexico announce their new NAFTA. They also invite Canada to rejoin. This trilateral economic and trade rule with Canada and Mexico was torn up by the U.S. twenty-four years ago. In the name of equality, Mexico's outgoing president was forced to sign this FTA. This met the demand of Trump's "America First" which also sent NAFTA, once the eparagon of free trade agreement, into history. Professor Yu let us look back into the historic background, main clauses, and trade development of the negotiation in NAFTA in addition to the effects and results of Mexico after joining. We can't help but sigh at the current condition and believe this paper has come at the right time.

I would like to thank professors and scholars for providing research papers, our editorial board and anonymous reviewers for their careful reading, and executive editors for their assistance to publish our quaterly. We appreciate and look forward for the support from scholars and experts in the Latin American field.

Chen, Ching-Chon  
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## 拉美專題

### China-Mexico Ambivalent Relations

Erick Gutierrez Macias\*

#### ABSTRACT:

*The China-Mexico relations have been examined mainly from the economic perspective, especially on trade, diminishing the political scope. This study considers both economic and political angles. The aim of this paper is to find out what are the strengths and limitations of China's economic and political influence in Mexico. After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Asian nation has often been portrayed as a "competitor" in Mexico. However, in 2013 after Chinese President Xi Jinping and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto elevated the bilateral relations to "comprehensive strategic partnership," the perception of China in Mexico has somewhat changed. In light of the recent bilateral developments, to what extent China represents a real strategic partner for Mexico? This study presents a general analysis of the Sino-Mexican political and economic dynamics from 2000 to 2018. The paper is organized as follows: First, a brief general discussion on China-Mexico ties and their approach to the theory of asymmetry. Second, an examination of the political events that have marked the Sino-Mexican relations, and the inconsistencies in their ties during the last eighteen years. Third, how China and Mexico have interacted economically in the same period. Fourth, a succinct evaluation of China's main effects in the U.S.-Mexico under NAFTA since 2001. Finally, some reflections and recommendations for Mexico are presented in this study.*

**Keywords:** China, Mexico, the U.S., NAFTA, China-Mexico relations

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## Preamble

On November 8<sup>th</sup>, 2016. Donald J. Trump became the new elected President of the United States (U.S.). During his campaign and his current administration, President Trump has verbally offended Mexicans. He also vowed for protectionism and threatened to withdraw the U.S. from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Overall, President Trump has restrained investment in Mexico, even before Mr. Trump took office, concerns about “the wall” issue left the reliant Mexican economy a historic currency exchanged record of 22.04 Mexican Pesos per U.S. Dollar (Reuters 2017). And yet, on August 27<sup>th</sup>, 2018. The U.S. and Mexico reached an initial agreement for resolving the major issues of NAFTA, implying a bilateral accord aside Canada (Swanson, Rogers and Rappeport 2018). Mexico’s Director General for Asia and Oceania and Multinational Organizations at the Economy Ministry, Maria Cristina Hernandez Zermeño, stated that even when Mexico continues to have a firm relationship with the U.S., Mexico has also strengthened relations with its Asian trade partners, particularly with China, Japan, and South Korea (Myers and Barrios 2017). Indeed, China is already the first Asian economic partner and the second source of imports to Mexico (Yang 2016).

Beijing’s new strategy attempts to induce Mexican decision-makers to start to lessen the U.S. overdependence, as well as considering China as their new partner in strategic affairs. Chinese leaders have considered Mexico as one of the possible partners within a new “BRICS plus” framework. Furthermore, China’s President Xi Jinping contemplates Mexico as a key player in the new “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative extension to Latin America. In September last year, President Xi affirmed the importance of Mexico as a pivotal country within the OBOR in Latin America. In January this year, China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, met with the delegates of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in Santiago, Chile. Mr. Wang referred to Latin America as a “natural continuation” of the OBOR scheme, in which China attempts to boost economic cooperation with the developing world while maintaining a fair trade. According to Wang Yi: “China will always stay committed to the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening up and stands ready to share development dividends with all countries” (Camero and Sherwood 2018).

Mexico not only carries a strategic value for the Chinese leaders. The Latin American country represents an opportunity as it counts with vast raw materials and natural resources, particularly oil and gas. During the sexennial period of Mexico’s

President Enrique Peña Nieto, an energy sector reform took place, welcoming foreign initiative in that sector. The reform has already attracted Chinese state-owned firms, such as SINOPEC and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) (Pardo and Myers 2017).

Despite the fact that China has acknowledged Mexico as a “strategic partner” since 2003, there are economic and political challenges to overcome between both countries. Since 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asian country has directly or indirectly affected NAFTA. In addition, given China’s unbalanced economic exchange and the similar structure of trade with Mexico, China has often been perceived as “competitor” or a “threat” to Mexico’s economic interests. Meanwhile, in the political area, the bilateral relationship has also been characterized by ambivalences and misunderstandings. Under these circumstances, I hypothesize that China has not yet achieved a consistent strategic partnership with Mexico. To support this assumption, I address the following question: To what extent China represents a practical political and economic partner for Mexico?

The aim of this paper is to find out the strengths and limitations of China’s economic and political influence in Mexico. The study is organized as follows: First, a brief general discussion on China-Mexico ties and their approach to the theory of asymmetry. Second, an examination of the political events that have marked the Sino-Mexican relations, and the inconsistencies in their ties during from 2000 to 2018. I concentrated in the last eighteen years of China-Mexico ties based on the fact that from the year 2000 and forth the relations began to experienced more diverse effects. Third, how China and Mexico have interacted economically in the same period. Fourth, a succinct evaluation of China’s main effects in the U.S.-Mexico under NAFTA since 2001. Finally, some reflections and recommendations for Mexico are presented in this study.

Most of the literature concerning China-Mexico ties has discussed the economic aspects of the relations. Some studies portray China as Mexico’s economic competitor in the U.S. market due to the similarities of their manufacturing sectors (Leon Manriquez 2012, Peters and Gallagher 2013, Rosas 2010). In addition to that argument, China’s trade controversies with Mexico, including the legal and illegal incursion of Chinese goods into the Mexican market have dissuaded Mexico to get closer to China (Rosas 2010). Another issue generally discussed in the literature is that neither China nor Mexico have not achieved a consensus to balance their trade, which also reflects the low investment between both nations (Peters 2016, Sun 2014).

In the political realm, some literature revisits the evolution of the China-Mexico diplomatic relations and exchanges from a historical perspective. Other works describe the different economic policies adopted by China and Mexico, and how Mexico the economic and political approaches with respect to China differs from other Latin American countries (Leon Manriquez 2012, Yang 2016, Rivera 2017, Sun 2014). Finally, the literature suggests a drastic change in China-Mexico relations under two periods: 1) China's adhesion to the WTO in 2001, and 2) China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013 (Cordova 2016, Peters and Gallagher 2013, Peters 2016, Velasquez 2017).

## Theoretical Approach

The asymmetry theory purposed by Brantly Womack (2004) can help to understand the rationale behind the current China-Mexico relations. This theory rests on the assumption that every State-actor count with different capabilities, and these follow diverse perceptions and interests. Essentially, Womack claims that difference of power can lead to “misperceptions” of the other States’ intentions, resulting in a “vicious circle of misunderstandings” that may lead to divergences. Womack affirms that unlikely the traditional realism and neorealism, powerful States do not necessarily threaten weak States. From this perspective, the power dynamics are based on a “relatively stable matrix” of relations, in which States may interact asymmetrically. These unequal relations can be compromised. Every State has different on the economy and population size, institutions, and other material capabilities. Therefore, any bilateral relationship carries opportunities as well as challenges (Womack 2004).

Narrowing down the theory. For a major actor, as China, the bilateral relationship with Mexico represent fewer incentives than its global agenda. In terms of China’s national interests in Mexico, e.g. the energy sector, these will play a major role in the bilateral relations. On the other hand, for a weak State, as Mexico, the relationship with a major State like the U.S. is pragmatically vital for its survival. Although inequalities may occur, the importance of a major State (the U.S), over a minor State (China), will be more important for the weaker State (Mexico). The exposure of “opportunities” and “risks” of weak State in a bilateral relationship with a major State is more likely, thus, the weakest State will pay concrete to foster ties with the stronger State. The impacts of this asymmetry are more evident for neighboring States since “closeness increases the importance of asymmetry by increasing the general importance of the relationship. This is true even for the most peaceful asymmetric relations” (Womack 2004, 360).

This theoretical assumption suggests that remoteness bilateral relations for mending “mistakes”, as well as prioritizing political agendas with neighbor States. For instance, the possibility of China to settle their economic differences with Mexico have not been actually addressed either in Mexico or China. According to Womack, global powers normally do not difference national interests from international interests, this may be reflected on the policy-oriented to minor States. This assumption is manifested in the new contemplation of Mexico as a pivotal State in China’s OBOR extension in Latin America.

## Political Developments

Most of the studies agree that economic aspects, not political ones, have championed the relations. However, it is worth noticing that political actions have triggered certain socioeconomic interactions between Mexico and China.

In the early 1970's, given the historical context, political matters primarily shaped the Sino-Mexican ties. As the People's Republic of China (PRC) took the place of the Republic of China (ROC), now in Taiwan, in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and General Assembly. In 1972, Mexico was the fourth country in the Latin American region to adopt the so-called “One China Policy”, which recognizes the PRC as the sole and legitimate government of China within the international arena (Leon-Manriquez 2012, Rosas 2010, Sun, 2014).

Mexico has been recognized as a “strategic partner” by the Chinese leaders. However, the perception of China in Mexico has been quite mixed. In the early 2000's, among diverse Mexican business and academic circles, China's image was generally portrayed as an unfair trade player, one-sided investor, as well as a competitor in the domestic and the U.S. market. Two main factors seemed to contribute in maintaining that Chinese image in Mexico: First, the increasing unbalance trade, and second, the nonexistent economic policies to spur Mexican goods to China and investment from that country. On the other hand, more recently, under President Peña Nieto's term (2012-2018), the Chinese image has changed, to some extent China now represents an opportunity to diminish the U.S. overdependence of the Mexican economy, besides being a source of infrastructure and technology.

Overall, the Sino-Mexican political ties have been characterized by cooperation and challenges. Since official diplomatic ties were established with the PRC, all Mexican Presidents has visited China (MEB 2018). This gesture symbolizes the

importance of China to Mexico. In turn, the Chinese leaders have explicitly referred to Mexico as a “strategic partner”, not only because of its geostrategic position with the U.S. but also with its southern neighbors. Given the fact that Mexico is the second economy of Latin America, Beijing may consider Mexico as an actor assert certain influence to its Central and Caribbean neighbors to establish diplomatic relations with China, as some of those countries maintain official ties with Taiwan (Garcia, Cota and Zhang 2015, Rosas 2010).

During former Mexican President Vicente Fox’s sexennial period (2000-2006) relations with China started moving forward. Mr. Fox visited the Asian country twice, and both nations established a strategic dialogue in 2003 (Sun 2014). Likewise, the then China’s leader, Hu Jintao, visited Mexico City aiming to intensify the high-level dialogue in 2005 (CGPRCSF 2005). During following Mexico’s administration, former President Felipe Calderon was received in Beijing. Following this visit, the Mexican government established the “National Plan for Development (2007-2012)”, which integrates Mexico’s development based on infrastructure projects (Leon-Manriquez 2012).

In 2006, the China-Mexico Center of Studies CECHIMEX (Centro de Estudios China-México) was established at National Autonomous University of Mexico UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), with the aim to intensify mutual understanding and exchanges between both nations. Two years later, the Mexican government through the National Council of Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología CONACYT) in cooperation with the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas CIDE) established an academic program to learn more about China (De Castro and Candano 2016).

Furthermore, in order to enhance the bilateral ties, both countries created various institutional mechanisms: The China-Mexico Permanent Binational Commission (Comisión Binacional Permanente México-China) in 2004; Top-Level Group (Grupo de Alto Nivel GAN) in 2005; the Top-Level Investment Group (Grupo de Alto Nivel sobre Inversión GANI) and the Mexico-China Top-Level Business Group (Grupo de Alto Nivel Empresarial GANE) both founded in 2013 (De Castro and Candano 2016, Torres 2016). In June 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping undertook a state visit to Mexico. He met with President Enrique Peña Nieto, both leaders announced their desire to elevate the bilateral ties to “comprehensive strategic partnership”, which not only touches upon economic aspects but also a closer political

and social exchange between both countries (Torres 2016). During 2012 to 2018 China-Mexico mutual dialogue has been the most active. In fact, the number of ratified agreements between China and Mexico under Peña's tenure was 23, whereas in the Calderon administration were 15. These agreements included important projects related to energy, telecommunications, finance, manufacturing, direct civil flights to increase tourism and people-to-people exchanges (Yang 2016, 39).

Last year, in the advent of the 45<sup>th</sup> anniversary of China-Mexico relations, President Peña was invited to Xiamen, China, to join President Xi and the rest of BRICS leaders for the “Emerging Market Economies and Developing Countries” summit. Xi Jinping reiterated his interest in incorporating Mexico as a “pivotal country to the natural extension” of the OBOR in Latin America (MOFA 2017). During his visit, Peña met with several entrepreneurs from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Mexican President also signed a commercial agreement with Alibaba E-commerce Group, in which provisions for Mexican products in the Chinese market were made by making use of the platform (Myers and Barrios 2017).

In addition, public and private synergy between both countries have already taken place to invest in infrastructure projects. For instance, GANI created the China-Mexico Fund, which it is administrated by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank (WB)'s private investment body. This Fund is composed of Chinese and Mexican capital, and it aims to promote the participation of Chinese companies in Mexico. The IFC projects are mostly focused on the energy sector, some others included telecommunications and construction (Pardo and Myers 2017). Moreover, the China Development Bank (CDB), China Investment Corporation (CIC), National Finance Company (Nacional Financiera NAFINSA), and National Infrastructure Fund (Fondo Nacional de Infraestructura FONADIN) have jointly evaluated various projects in Mexico. Finally, prominent financial institutions, such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Bank of China (BOC) have already started operations in Mexico. Both Chinese financial institutions are also collaborating with Mexico's infrastructure bank, National Works and Public Services Bank (Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos BANOBRAS) (Torres 2016).

As a result of these new structural reforms more opportunities to attract Chinese investment in oil, gas, clean energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure projects are likely to take place in the following years. The Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, is already part of the “Red Compartida” (Shared Network), a project that pledges to provide free wireless Internet across Mexico. China Telecom is also

analyzing the possibility of participating in the project. In 2014, the IFC and the China-Mexico Fund made their first investment in Mexico. The 140 million USD were granted for to a new Mexican oil company, Citla Energy (Pardo and Myers 2017).

Following the Chinese example, on September 29<sup>th</sup>, 2015, President Peña Nieto presented a bill to the Mexican Congress so as to approve the creation of five Especial Economic Zone (EEZ) across the country: 1) Puerto de Lazaro Cardenas; 2) Itsmo de Tehuantepec; 3) Coatzacoalcos; 4) Salina Cruz; 5) Puerto de Chiapas. Throughout the creation of these EEZ with various fiscal benefits, Mexico bets to attract more investment from China (Torres 2016).

### Ambivalences

China's adhesion to the WTO back in 2001 was not welcome by Mexican delegates. In fact, Mexico was the last country to agree upon the Asian country's membership to the organization based on unfair trade grounds, besides fears from competition within the Mexican manufacturing sectors (Leon-Manriquez 2012, Peters and Gallagher 2013, Rosas 2010, Velasquez 2017). An arrangement between Mexico and China was made, in which Chinese imports in Mexico would face duties and high tariffs on dumping within a six-year period. During that period, many Chinese products reached 1000 percent in duties (Cordova 2016). These countermeasures were justified due to the similarity of Mexico's trade structure with that of China. For instance, electronics and appliances, auto parts and automobiles, low wage labor force, and high-skilled human capital (Peters and Gallagher 2013).

Although these policies were instigated, the Mexican manufacturing sector was surpassed by the Chinese. As a result, thousands of jobs were lost, following an FDI reduction of 29 billion to 18 billion USD only during 2001 and 2003. Nonetheless, the Mexican manufacturing sector at the time was considered low-skilled. This situation also created a higher competitiveness level for Mexico's manufacturing sectors (Cordova 2016). The trade disputes within the WTO framework have been another impediment to improve the perception of China in Mexico. During 2003 to 2018 Mexico has appealed for four trade controversies against China. Until now, China has never brought a trade dispute with Mexico within the organization (WTO 2018).

Although China and Mexico have pursued good political relations since the early 2000's, there have been a series of episodes that have deteriorated the mutual understanding and trust since the Calderon tenure. In 2007, the Chinese state-owned

automaker, FAW, made an agreement with Salinas Group, a retailing and banking corporation, to penetrate the Mexican market. Initially, FAW announced its intentions to build a plant in Michoacan state, Mexico. However, two years later, the Chinese company left Mexico without building the factory, and affecting nearly five thousand Mexican customers who purchased their cars. Surprisingly, FAW decided to come back to Mexico. Currently, the Chinese firm sells only trucks with the support of Giant Motors (Myers and Barrios 2017, Sanchez 2014). Subsequently, in 2009, during the outbreak of the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic. A Mexican commercial aircraft with 138 passengers and 36 crew members were put into quarantine for various days. The passengers reported discriminatory treatments from the Chinese officers (Otero 2009). Perhaps, the worse episode of the China-Mexico relations came in September 2011, when the Mexican government received the Dalai Lama, provoking dissatisfactions among the Chinese leaders (De Castro and Candano 2016, Sun 2014).

Misunderstandings and uncertainties continued even during Peña's term. In 2015, because of environmental issues, the federal government disapproved the Dragon Mart commercial venture in the Mexican resort of Cancun, Quintana Roo. Hitherto, in 2012, the same consortium from China experienced similar difficulties in Puebla state. The Chinese delegation was involved in an attempt to bribe the then Zuetla-town Mayor, Victor Manuel Iglesias Parra, in order obtain the permit to reopen a mine rich in gold, silver, and copper. Nevertheless, Chinese entrepreneurs have expressed interest in developing projects in Quintana Roo state (Caballero 2015).

In November 2014, the Mexican government suddenly canceled the high-speed train project Mexico City-Queretaro, after being granted to China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC). At that time, allegedly, the Mexican government declared that the project cancellation was due to the need to cut public spending, as the oil prices were unfavorable to meet the increasing budget. However, the high-speed train cancellation rests on Peña's government corruption scandals (Cabrera, et al. 2014). In the end, the Chinese public enterprise, CRCC, was compensated with \$1.31 million USD by the Mexican government (China Daily 2015).

Chicoasen 2, another infrastructure project involving a Chinese company, Sinohydro Corporation that built China's massive "Three Gorges" dam, was awarded by the Mexican government to build a hydroelectric power station in Chiapas state, south of Mexico. The project was presented by the Mexican public power company, Federal Electricity Commission (Comision Federal de Electricidad CFE) in 2014. Chicoasen 2 was supposed to see the light this year, but only 17 percent of the project

has been completed. CFE determined to temporarily suspend the project due to an increment in the original budget. In the interim, conflicts among the local opposition and the Chiapas government, as well as the construction workers and the contractors, have contributed to the virtual cancelation of the project (Leon and Gomez 2017). All these failures reflect two things: First, the lack of commitment and transparency of the bilateral mechanisms mentioned above, and second, the limitations from China to conduct business in Mexico.

Mexico's National Plan for Development intended to build strategic alliances with Asian partners, while Mexico being an active member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework. However, in practice, Mexico often excluded China from its development plans with other APEC member States. Mexico's National Plan for Development was expected to deliver mid and long-term results by 2030, which would suggest a continuity for the next twelve years. In spite of this, there is still no concrete plan on how Mexico will approach to its Asian counterparts, specifically to China. Because of the political system in Mexico, there are different governments every six years, thus, the projected within the National Plan for Development seem difficult to attain. On the contrary, policies directed to trade and investment with the U.S., under the NAFTA framework, remain a constant in Mexico's political agenda (Rosas 2010).

Certainly, another obstacle for China in Mexico is the persistent strong political and economic of the U.S. influence. Both countries share a long history in their economic, political, security, and social spheres. Apparently, these exchanges intensified after the ratification of NAFTA in 1994. Mexico's trade has intensified since the NAFTA came into effect, it also has increased FDI from the U.S. in Mexico. At some point, Mexican and the U.S. enterprises had benefitted with NAFTA. It is not surprising why despite Trump's intentions to undermine NAFTA, a bilateral deal between the U.S. and Mexico took place. Therefore, the traditional U.S.-Mexico relationship may be difficult to overcome for China. More importantly, Mexico is still quite dependent on the U.S. economy. Because of historical, geographical and cultural explanations, Mexico seems more likely to fix their differences with the U.S. than with China.

## Economic Interactions

Since 2003 the competition between China and Mexico has turned more challenging in the U.S. market. Enrique Dussel Peters and Kevin P. Gallagher (2013)

show that over half of Mexican exports to the U.S. are under “threat” from Chinese exports. Under these conditions, the trade deficit itself and the increasing competition has not only economic connotations in Mexico but also political ones. It seems that the above challenges have been transmitted to the Mexican society in general, making China’s image not very well perceived by some academics and business circles.

In 2010, imports from China to Mexico increased 48 percent, 15 and 20 percent higher than the number of imports from the U.S. and European Union (EU) to Mexico respectively. In turn, Latin American exports to China augmented considerably between 2006 to 2010. China is already a strategic partner of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. Nevertheless, in comparison with their Latin American counterparts, China’s approach to Mexico is quite different (Wang 2014). It seems that Mexico has hesitated to get closer to China and vice versa. For instance, between 2001 and 2011, both countries ratified 39 agreements. Whereas, China and Brazil signed 26 bilateral agreements in a shorter period, 2009 to 2011 (Sun 2014). This situation reflects the lack of motivation for Mexico to deepen other markets and tries to reduce their dependency from the U.S.

In December 2011, the antidumping duties to Chinese imports were lifted by the Mexican government. This initiative signified a preliminary reconciliation to China in economic and political affairs. And yet, between 2012 to 2015, the Mexican steel manufacturing sector struggled against the Chinese low-cost steel companies, which led to the reincorporation of antidumping tariffs to Chinese imports. Consequently, many Mexican steel companies ran out of business, due to the lack of competitiveness within the international market (Cordova 2016).

To this date, China is the second source of imports for Mexico, after the U.S., while China is the third destination of Mexican exports, only after U.S. and Canada (OEC 2018). Apparently, economic interactions are slightly growing. Despite the competitor perception of China in Mexico, during 2000 and 2009, Mexican exports to China shifted from the nineteenth to the seventh place, whereas Chinese exports to Mexico went from the seventh to the second place (Wang 2014).

In 2015, the China-Mexico bilateral trade summed 74.8 billion USD, 3.7 percent more than 2014. In the same year, Mexican exports to China corresponded only to 4.8 billion USD, 1.3 percent of the Mexican net exports. Whereas, the imports from China reached 69.9 billion USD, representing 5.6 percent of the total imports into Mexico (Torres 2016). The unbalance tendency in the bilateral trade continued in 2016.

Table 1 illustrates that Chinese products account for 17 percent of Mexico's net imports (USD 63.7 billion), while China's imports from Mexico are only 1.9 percent (USD 7.42 billion).

**Table 1.**  
**Mexico's Top 5 Global Exports and Imports as of 2016**

Export Destinations			Import Origins		
Country	Value	Percent	Country	Value	Percent
USA	\$289B	74.0%	USA	\$179B	49.0%
Canada	\$23B	5.8%	China	\$63.7B	17.0%
China	\$7.42B	1.9%	Japan	\$15.5B	4.2%
Japan	\$5.5B	1.4%	Germany	\$13.2B	3.6%
Germany	\$5.38B	1.4%	South Korea	\$12.3B	3.3%
<hr/>			<hr/>		
Rest	\$63.7B	15.5%	Rest	\$85.3B	22.9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$394B</b>	100%	<b>Total</b>	<b>\$369B</b>	100%

Built with data from OEC (2018)

Based on these numbers, one can deduce that the Chinese market has not been well-explored by Mexican entrepreneurs, consequently, China only still perceiving a low volume of Mexican imports. As a result, Mexico continues to have a deficit with China, which undermines the “win-win relationship” statements made by Chinese leaders. In fact, Sino-Mexican ties continue to be characterized by economic competition and trade divergences. According to China's official sources only from January to September 2011 Mexico trade deficit registered 33.6 billion USD (Wang 2014). Only five years later, 2016, that deficit became 64.1 billion USD; the highest ever registered in Mexico with a trade partner (Reforma 2017).

Although, Mexico is the second largest economy in Latin America, and the ninth worldwide (OEC 2018), it is surprising that China's has not invested much in that country. Oddly, even when China figures as the second trade partner for Mexico, it has only received 0.1 percent of Chinese FDI. Among the Asia-Pacific investors in Mexico, China ranks sixth, and the thirtieth worldwide. From 2013 to 2015, Mexico only perceived 0.2 percent of Chinese investment, while Brazil received 2.1 percent, Peru 1.9 percent, and Argentina 1.8 percent respectively (Torres 2016, 50-51). Overall, the depleted Chinese FDI to Mexico provides another explanation for Mexico's trade deficit with China. Taking the above data into account, it is valid to argue that there is

an evident trade asymmetry between China and Mexico. This indicates the need for Mexico to strengthen its economic interactions with China.

According to Sergio E. Martinez Rivera (2017), China does not represent a real opportunity for Mexico to growth. Rather, an opportunity for specific industrial sectors, such as infrastructure, energy projects, natural resources, and commodities. Based on the Inter-American Dialogue and the Global Economic Governance Initiative at Boston University's Global Development Policy Center (2017), since 2005, the Chinese government through China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank have provided \$150 USD billion of ODA (Official Development Assistance) loans across the Latin American region. So far only one energy-related project was granted by China Export-Import Bank with one billion USD in 2013 (see, Table 2).

**Table 2.**  
**Chinese loans to Latin America as of 2017**

Country	Number of Loans	Amount
Venezuela	17	62.2 Billion
Brazil	12	42.1 Billion
Argentina	11	18.2 Billion
Ecuador	13	17.4 Billion
Bolivia	10	3.5 Billion
Trinidad and Tobago	2	2.6 Billion
Jamaica	11	2.1 Billion
Mexico	1	1 Billion
Peru	2	478 Million
Costa Rica	1	395 Million
Guyana	2	175 Million
Barbados	1	170 Million
Bahamas	2	99 Million

Modified from Gallagher and Myers (2017)

Although, the nature of these loans has been criticized for being mercantilist-oriented (pursuing China's energy and commodity needs), and their positive impacts for tackling poverty at the micro level in recipient countries are still questionable. The point is that the number of Chinese loans to Mexico in comparison with other Latin American minor economies are much lower.

Sergio E. Martinez Rivera (2017) sustains that China's FDI inflows would not have a positive impact on Mexico's domestic national product, even in those Latin American countries that hold Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with, such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru. As said by the Martinez Rivera, the free market model has already demonstrated its pitfalls across the Latin American region under the Washington Consensus framework. The neoliberal approach, which has been implementing Mexico for three decades, will only increase Mexico's imports dependency. Resulting in low levels of local value-added products and services. These problems have been affecting the production chain with local suppliers while diminishing employment opportunities and outward investment (Velasquez 2017). What China and other Asian countries development models can offer to Mexico is the synergy of public and private growth initiatives to meet their respective developmental goals.

Although, the perception of China as a "threat" may still present among Mexico's businesses community. It is important to highlight that the size of the Chinese market represents a great opportunity for Mexican exports, as it is projected that China's mid-class, thus its consumption, will significantly growth by the year 2030. Moreover, China has moved towards high tech and added-value sectors, such as electronics and appliances, this translates to additional options for Mexican exports, as China will demand more basic and intermediary goods (Cordova 2016).

## China and NAFTA

Scholars agree that China has influenced NAFTA to a certain level. In 2002 only after a year, China joined the WTO, two hundred manufacturing companies migrated from Mexico to China. In the same year, Mexico fell twelve positions within the Global Competitiveness index, while China moved forward (Rosen 2003). This situation has continued, from 2013 to the present Mexican imports to the U.S. have been overshadowed by Chinese imports. Meanwhile, the U.S. imports have lost presence in Mexico as well. During 2000-2007, the U.S. amount of Mexican imports declined from 66.25 percent to 52.64 percent, and then grew again to 62.04 percent in 2013. The U.S. has moved its manufacturing sector from Mexico to China carrying out socioeconomic problems across the North American region (Garcia, Cota and Zhang 2015).

Is China affecting the U.S.-Mexico economic interactions? In an empirical study, Samuel Ortiz Velasquez demonstrates (2017) that when China joined the WTO, the imports dependency problem in Mexico has worsened. Since the last decade, in the

Mexican market, China has replaced the U.S. as the major provider of imports in 152 industries out of 220 that are assessed in the study. Among them are: textile, leather, machinery and equipment, electronic appliances, and auto parts.

China by providing intermediary goods for Mexico has indirectly penetrated the U.S. market through NAFTA. Samuel Ortiz Velasquez (2017) results show among the 152 industries in which China has been replacing the U.S. imports, only a sub-group of 90 of them target the Mexican market, the rest, implicitly focus on the U.S. market. This situation also affects Mexico's production chains, especially in terms of labor opportunities. Apparel, footwear, plastic, paper, rubber, furniture, chemical applications, electric appliances seem to be affected by the growing Chinese imports in Mexico, which has brought negative implications in terms of local output growth and production chains. Overall only 26 Mexican industries related to energy and automotive were strongly integrated into the U.S. market.

Enrique Dussel Peters and Kevin P. Gallagher (2013) also concur that China has been the main cause of the U.S.-Mexico trade fragmentation. The authors show that NAFTA has suffered mixed effects before and after China's adhesion to WTO in 2001. In the first period of NAFTA, between 1994 to 2000, the North American region experienced relative growth in various economic factors, such as GDP, trade, investments, employment, and wages. However, after 2001, even when Mexican industries were favorable in the U.S. through NAFTA, these did not experience a consistency in the U.S. market. As a matter of fact, NAFTA integration has been declining in terms of trade, investment, and intra-industry trade, and both Mexico and the U.S. have been falling behind to China.

The analysis of Enrique Dussel Peters and Kevin P. Gallagher (2013) shows that after 2001, China began displacing Mexico in the U.S. market within labor-intensive industries (yarn-textile-apparel). At the same time, China started competing with the U.S. in the Mexican market with capital-oriented industries (auto parts-automobile industry). In theory, this shift should make Mexican industries more competitive in the North American market. However, the authors project that Mexico eventually will face competition from the Chinese auto parts industry in the North American market as well. Probably, China will also begin to compete with the U.S. in the energy sector after Mexico's structural reform.

In a different study, Garcia, et al. (2015) argue that the Chinese impact on the North American region has been overstated by academics. The study shows that China

holds an active economic exchange with all NAFTA members. And yet, the NAFTA members still conducting most of their trade among themselves. In this sense, Chinese exports to NAFTA are lower than the exports among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Moreover, conflicts among NAFTA members have arisen, such as trade disputes, rules of origin, government contracts, especially under the current U.S. protectionism. Therefore, China is not the sole cause of NAFTA deterioration.

In order to support the above argument Garcia, et al. (2015) explain that the composition of exports is quite different. For example, Chinese exports to the U.S. consist of more labor-intensive goods, whereas Mexican exports are more capital oriented. Therefore, Mexican and Chinese exports do not necessarily compete in the U.S. market. Second, Mexico has priority over China in terms of intellectual property, logistics costs, and labor quality. Third, most of the Chinese exports to the U.S. are normally consumption items. At the same time, NAFTA has also fostered Mexican exports in the U.S. From 2002 to 2012 in some sectors the U.S. substituted Chinese exports to Mexican exports. For example, televisions, electronic equipment, auto parts, and assembled vehicles. From this standpoint, the authors concluded that exports from both China and Mexico have penetrated the U.S. market parallelly.

Nonetheless, these arguments fail to explain the cause behind the drastic trade deficit of Mexico with China. As mentioned above, the Sino-Mexican competition for the U.S. market and Mexico's trade deficit with China began in 2001 (Leon Manriquez 2012, Peters and Gallagher 2013, Rosas 2010). Consequently, the number of net Mexican exports to the U.S. market fell significantly from 82.42 percent in the year 2000 to 76 percent in 2013. However, it is worth noticing that even though Mexico enjoys relatively zero tariffs on exports to the U.S. as well as fewer logistics costs, China has replaced Mexico as the primary exporter to the U.S. market (Garcia, Cota and Zhang 2015).

Why is that? Peters and Gallagher (2013) and Leon Manriquez (2012) studies reveal that this is caused by the Chinese cheap labor force and China's capacity to attract foreign investment, due to the increment of high consumption in that country. In addition to that, Peters and Gallagher (2013) add that among the Latin American countries, Mexico is the only country that counts with a similar level of specialization as China, especially within electronics and auto parts manufacturing industries.

This is currently evident, as machines and electronics are the primary Mexicans exports accounting for 35 percent of the total exports to China. Likewise, machines and

electronics are the main source of Chinese imports in Mexico accounting for 66 percent (see, Table 3). In general, the configuration Chinese and Mexican manufacturing trade is quite similar, which supports the “competitor” perception of China in Mexico. In addition, this data mirrors the inability of Mexico to compete with Chinese electronic machines (integrated circuits; computers; etc.). This evidence also reveals the relative advantage of Mexico in mineral and transportation defined as auto parts and vehicles<sup>1</sup>.

**Table 3.**  
**China-Mexico Top 5 Imports and Exports as of 2016**

Mexico's Top 5 Exports to China			Mexico's Top 5 Imports from China		
Product	Value	Percent	Product	Value	Percent
<b>Machines</b>	\$2.6B	35.0%	Machines	\$42.2B	66.0%
<b>Mineral Products</b>	\$1.89B	26.0%	Instruments	\$3.28B	5.2%
<b>Transportation</b>	\$1.22B	16.0%	Metals	\$3.13B	4.9%
<b>Instruments</b>	\$499M	6.7%	Textiles	\$2.67B	4.2%
<b>Metals</b>	\$493M	6.6%	Miscellaneous	\$2.61B	4.1%
<hr/>					
<b>Others</b>	\$718M	9.7%	<b>Others</b>	\$9.81B	15.6%
<b>Total</b>	\$7.42B	100%	<b>Total</b>	\$63.7B	100%

Built with data from OEC (2018)

According to Ping Wang (2014), Mexico has been using its surplus trade with the U.S. to compensate its deficit with China and other Asian partners, rather than diversifying its trade with China. As the Latin American country with the most signed FTA, Mexico champions the Neoliberal approach in the region, and yet the Mexican entrepreneurs do not take advantage of the whole trade network, which heavily relies on the U.S. market. On the other hand, China's has deregulated its economic policies, aiming to position as the major global economy, while conquering the U.S. market even at the expense of Mexico (Rosas 2010).

As the U.S. remains as the largest importer and exporter of Mexico, Mexico is highly dependent on that of the U.S. any trading pattern in NAFTA will indeed affect the Mexican economy. From this perspective, the more dependent Mexico is on the U.S. the more susceptible their economy is. One clear example was between 2008 and 2009 during the U.S. recession, Mexico registered the worst GDP rate ever, -0.1 percent in

<sup>1</sup> For details please refer to the following link at the Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT Media Lab  
[https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree\\_map/hs92/export/mex/chn/show/2016/](https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/mex/chn/show/2016/)

2008 and -7.4 percent in 2009 respectively. In October 2009, the Mexican economy collapsed about 7 percent, it was Mexico the worst Latin American country affected by the U.S. 2008 financial crisis (Wang 2014).

### Concluding Remarks

The analysis described in this study suggests that the Sino-Mexican strategic approach is still limited. Asymmetries are quite evident in the economic and political camps. For instance, both nations have undertaken mutual dialogues, state visits, and established institutional frameworks. At first glance, these developments fostered mutual understanding and consolidation. However, it seems that neither China nor Mexico have found a common agenda yet. Although, both countries elevated their relations to “comprehensive strategic partnership”, Enrique Dussel Peters (2016, 86), expert on China-Mexico relations and director of CECHIMEX, affirms that since 2013 the bilateral institutional mechanisms established (Binational Commission; GAN; GANE; GANI) lack of transparency and coordination. This was evident in the Chinese public and private project failures in Mexico mentioned above: Dragon Mart, the high-speed train, and Chicoasen 2.

In the one hand, these failures demonstrate how Mexican institutions remain weak while Chinese remain strong. In the other, these cases reveal the inability of Chinese firms to understand the business environment in Mexico. Chinese investors concentrated on the Mexican federal government, instead of collaborating with the private sector, civil society, and academic circles, which could influence the federal and local governments to terminate those Chinese projects. From this standpoint, challenges to foster Chinese investments in Mexico and vice versa persist. Therefore, in order to attract more Chinese capital, Mexico must use all their tools at their disposal simultaneously.

Another problem is that there is no consistency from the Mexican government to design economic policies that can be reoriented Mexicans exports to China, and promote more Chinese business culture and language in the country. It is necessary for Mexico to change their political and commercial agenda, which can diversity more its exports share to China, promote trade partnerships, and technology transfer. In the long run, this could help to compensate for the enormous trade deficit with that nation. There are reasons to believe that China and Mexico can solve their political and economies asymmetries. As both countries are still developing nations, both governments should design an agenda to address common socioeconomic problems, such as pollution and

unequal wealth distribution. In order to do that China and Mexico have to cooperate within different multilateral frameworks as well.

In regards to NAFTA, as Ping Wang (2014) pointed it out NAFTA has been a “systematic mechanism for the U.S-Mexico relations”, and it will continue to do so. Distinctly, Mexico and the U.S. have a common agenda, not only in trade but also in terms of security, immigration, copyrights, rule of law, and so forth. China simply does not. Perhaps, this is why the new elected President of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), changed his view about Trump. Both leaders already exchanged letters, and they expressed their desire to revise NAFTA (CNN en español 2018). However, if Mexico continuous focusing in the U.S., its economic dependency with its northern neighbor will continue to grow.

We cannot know what the new Mexican administration position will be with respect to China. In the meantime, President Xi Jinping was invited to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Lopez Obrador on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018 (Forbes 2018). This denotes the importance of China in the upcoming Mexican administration. China's global agenda under the OBOR initiative will continue to produce diverse effects in Mexico. It is important to recognize that China represents new opportunities but also new risks. There is still a great uncertainty to what extent China's economic influence can actually benefit Mexico or produce a new dependency problem, as it is with the U.S. Thereby, if Mexico does not want to be economically marginalized, it should take more advantage of its vast FTA network with various countries simultaneously.

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## 拉美專題

# Understanding Argentina's foreign policy by recognizing domestic politics goals Examining China's OBOR in Argentina

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### ABSTRACT:

*Mainstream academia in Argentina as well as Latin America usually takes a Chinese perspective when analyzing the relationship with China, even when analyzing the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America the same perspective is held. The aim of this paper is to have an Argentinean perspective in the Belt and Road Initiative. Using Gideon Rose's Neoclassical Realism, which states that the foreign policy of a country is the consequence of domestic policies plus international constraints will enable me to use an Argentinean perspective. I will analyze domestic politics in Argentina from 2013 to 2017 as well as the international constraints that the country experienced during that time and explain how the local politics shaped the Argentinian moves towards the Belt and Road Initiative. From 2013 to late 2015, when Cristina Kirchner was finishing her second term the country had a heterodox vision of development which emphasized industrialization with State intervention. Cristina's vision on the international affairs was based on the ideals of Latin American Union, strong relationships with Latin America was a must. Regarding non-regional actors, she seek to improve relations in new frontiers like Russia or China. Especially with China as it is the second trading partner of Argentina, in addition to China's special status as Argentina's main money lender. This was a consequence of the unresolved issue with the hedge funds. Macri's administration first years (late 2015-2017) were a return to heterodox economics, free trade and no State intervention. Foreign investment, in his thought, is key for the economic success. Interesting enough, at first he was not interested in Chinese investment, as he said we*

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*were too involved with China. He relied politically in the USA and the UE , but since neither of them could provide the investments he was looking for; he slowly welcomed some Chinese investment . Finally, I would like to give policy recommendations to the Argentinean administration. Even though Chinese investment, as well as the investment planned in OBOR should be welcomed, it should be done cautiously. What is more, since OBOR targets to cover Latin America, a Latin American common position is required.*

**Keywords:** Domestic politics goals, Industrialization, Latin American Perspective, Neoclassical realism, OBOR.

## Introduction

Perhaps, one of the biggest events we are witnessing in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is the transformation that China is undergoing. From a poor, backward country into a world class powerhouse, China's transformation is truly impressive. Much has been written about this as well as the effects this revolution has had in China's foreign affairs. It has become a hot topic in Argentina and Latin America to talk about China's involvement in the region. Usual research questions formulated by mainstream academia in both Argentina and Latin America usually goes by, can the Latin American region fulfill China's need for food<sup>1</sup>, or what role does Latin America play in China's oil security<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, some other mainstream researchers focus on how the United States feel about this growing Chinese influence in the region<sup>3</sup>, welcoming the investment but concerned on the influence that China is gaining. To be more precise, for the mainstream academia Argentina-China relations or Latin-America relation is all about the economic role that the region can play in Chinese plans, analyzing the positive and negative outcomes.

Nowadays, since China invited Latin America to One Belt One Road<sup>4</sup> the initiative has become a hot issue not only for the regional academia but also for the local governments, which have been present during the First Forum of One Belt One Road<sup>5</sup>. While it may provide Argentina and the region an interesting opportunity, a careful approach should be taken. What is more a Latin American perspective should be taken.

In my personally view, mainstream academia is lacking of a Latin American perspective of the relation with China. I believe that Argentina as well as Latin American have their own goals when dealing with China. Latin American countries are not merely passive objects without any type of goals or ambitions. Moreover, I feel that the mainstream academia does not clearly analyze and understand Latin American

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<sup>1</sup> Ray, Rebecca, Kevin Gallagher, Andres Lopez & Cynthia Sanborn, (2017) *China and Sustainable Development in Latin America The Social and Environmental Dimension*, New York, USA, Anthem Press

<sup>2</sup> Myers, Margaret & Carol Wise, (2017,) *The Political Economy of China-Latin America in the New Millennium Brave New World*, New York, USA, Routledge

<sup>3</sup> Gallagher, Kevin P. (2016) *The China Triangle Latin America's China Boom and the Fate of the Washington Consensus*, New York, USA, Oxford University Press

<sup>4</sup> Cambero, Fabian & Dave Sherwood, (January 23,2018) *China invites Latin America to take part in One Belt, One Road*, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-china/china-invites-latin-america-to-take-part-in-one-belt-one-road-idUSKBN1FB2CN>

<sup>5</sup>Pogoriles, Leticia, (May 14, 2017), *Xi Jinping inauguró el foro en el que el Presidente Macri dará su mensaje*, Telam, <http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201705/188931-xi-jinping-inauguro-el-foro-en-el-que-el-presidente-macri-dara-su-mensaje.html>

domestic policies. Following Gideon Rose's Neoclassical Realism theory, I believe that foreign policy is the result of domestic policies plus international constraints. By properly identifying domestic policies, the ideas of development and the goals that a Latin American government has, a researcher can have a better understanding of why the bilateral relationship with China is the way it is.

The aim of this paper, is to analyze how the domestic politics of Argentina from 2013 to 2017 shaped the relation with China and the approach it has been taken to the Chinese initiative One Belt, One Road. To accomplish this goal, I will use Gideon Rose's Neoclassical Realism as it states that foreign policy is the consequence of domestic politics and international constraints<sup>6</sup>. Using this theory, will allow me to dig into Argentina's goals and ambitions, in other words it will enable me to have the Argentinian perspective that I am looking for. I will explain investigate which were the goals that the Argentinian government had and the challenges it had to endure for achieving that goal. As the result of this factors shaped the relationship with China. I have selected 2013 to 2017 as during those years two different governments ruled the country. From 2013 to 2015 was the second term of Cristina Kirchner, her ideas were basically summed as industrialization is required for the country's economic success. In her view, Latin American integration was essential, as Latin American people shared a common identity, that resulted that having good relations with Latin America was a priority. From late 2015 to 2017 was Mauricio Macri first year as president of the country. His economic ideas are against industrialization; foreign direct investment is essential to the country's economic development. Regarding foreign policy, as he seeks investments he thinks that Europe and the United States are the ones that can give that, so relations with those countries should be the priority.

An Argentinian perspective is required to understand better the bilateral relationship with China in addition to the Argentinian perspectives on One Belt One Road. Currently this issue is not addressed. I think that by having an Argentinian perspective, the bilateral relationship can be fully comprehended. Furthermore, Argentinian domestic policy needs to be analyzed, as the academia does not take into account when studying the relationship with China or it is done in an incomplete, biased way. The changes of government, changes the domestic objectives, therefore bringing a new foreign policy. China makes a perfect example for analyzing how the Argentinian domestic politics changes shaped the bilateral relationship.

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<sup>6</sup> Rose, Gideon, (1988), "Neoclassical Realism and theories of International Policy", *World Politics Vol.51 number 1*

## Kirchnerist's goals

What started in 2003 as a new project that hope to rebuild the country from the ashes with President Nestor Kirchner came to an end, at least for now, with the second term of President Kirchner's wife, Cristina Kirchner. The bases that President Nestor Kirchner set on the economic side were: economic development through industrialization, State intervention in the economy and Social welfare.<sup>7</sup> These new goals were a big change, leaving behind almost 30 years of neoliberalism.

In the political side, the government first priority was to reestablish the confidence of the people in the Argentinian government<sup>8</sup>. Decades of unskillful governments, that lacked realistic policies in addition to corruption scandals made the Argentinian people lose the trust in their government. By 2003, few people believe in the government that's why Kirchnerist administration focus on rebuilding the trust, as if citizens do not believe in the government, democracy is in great danger.

Regarding the international affairs of the country, an heterodox approach was used.  
<sup>9</sup>Traditionally speaking, Argentina has been close to the United States and to the European Union. The economic model that came from the developed countries, neoliberalism, was followed without thinking if it was appropriate to the country well-being. Consequently, Argentina enjoyed a healthy relationship with those countries. Kirchner idea was not breaking up or generating tensions with the UE and the USA rather than that, main idea was to strengthen the relationship with Latin America. <sup>10</sup> The major constraint that Nestor Kirchner was facing was the 2001 default which prohibited the country from gaining access to loans. It was partially solved in 2005 when the debt with the International Monetary Fund was paid, however private creditors were still unpaid<sup>11</sup>. As the years went by, most of the private creditors were paid, except a small amount of them, also known as hedge funds, which gave trouble to the late Cristina Kirchner administration.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Quiroga, Agustina, (2008) "Aspectos de la política económica Kirchnerista", B.A in Sociology thesis, Universidad Nacional de La Plata

<sup>8</sup>González, Horacio, (October 28, 2011), *Néstor Kirchner, la política*, Página 12, <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-179978-2011-10-28.html>

<sup>9</sup> (October 28, 2011), *Las 10 claves de la gestión económica de Néstor Kirchner*, La Gaceta, <https://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/405508/argentina/10-claves-gestion-economica-kirchner.html>

<sup>10</sup>Creus, Nicolas, (2010) "La Política Exterior del Gobierno de Néstor Kirchner dilemas y contradicciones a la hora de pensar en el poder en clave internacional", paper presented in V Congreso de Relaciones Internacionales, La Plata, Argentina, 2010

<sup>11</sup> (December 16, 2005), *Histórico: el país saldrá en un solo pago la deuda con el FMI*, *La Nación*, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/765314-historico-el-pais-saldara-en-un-solo-pago-la-deuda-con-el-fmi>

<sup>12</sup> Machinea, Jose Luis & Lucio Castro, (2017), "Argentina, the US and China: a New Triangle in the making" in *China the United States and the Future of Latin America*, edited by David B.H. Denoon, New York, USA, New York University Press

Last two years (2013-2015) of Cristina Kirchner second term as President

By 2013, the Kirchner administration, this time commanded by Cristina Kirchner, had been for 10 years in power. The international context and constraints were completely different from the ones that her husband had. Naturally, the domestic political goals were different too.

If the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are labelled as one of the most prosperous in the World history, the second decade of the same Century could be labelled as a grim time. The eagerness for trading goods and economy prosperity that was present until 2007, disappeared in 2008 with the international crisis. Even though Argentina was not seriously affected, as the country did not have a big amount of debt and foreign reserves were high there were some effects on the long run<sup>13</sup>.

The idea of economic development that started with Nestor Kirchner were continued by his wife, Cristina Kirchner. On the one hand, this policy reactivated the industrial sector, the local market was growing fast. Using soy exports, Argentina could generate an important trade super plus to enlarge its foreign reserves as well as to have American dollars to pay for the equipment required for industrialization. Factory workers and unions grow quickly. By giving loans with few conditions, putting tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports, giving tax incentives among other policies industries had a gold era.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, the industrialization process was partially to blame on the trade deficit. This is because as the country industrialized expensive equipment was required to keep with the industrialization process. To reduce the effects on the trade balance, restrictions to imports were established, which created frictions with other countries.<sup>15</sup>

On the political front, Cristina Kirchner kept Latin American integration at her priority. The policy was done at the right time, since at that time most governments in South America shared progressive ideas. Even though differences existed between those governments, Chavismo's economy planning was substantially different to the Argentinian or Brazilian ones for instance, the higher goal of a united region was more important than the differences. Regional leaders shared a vision of a Latin America that has its own voice, in other words the region was not anyone's backyard anymore. In

<sup>13</sup> Arfaras, Fernando, (March 22, 2010), *En el año de la crisis, Argentina fue la quinta mejor economía del g-20*, Ámbito, <http://www.ambito.com/513653-en-el-ano-de-la-crisis-argentina-fue-la-quinta-mejor-economia-del-g-20>

<sup>14</sup> Cancino T, Daniela, (2017), "Transformación en la política industrial en Argentina: de la apertura a la restricción (1989-2015)", *Documento de Trabajo n 38*

<sup>15</sup> Buso, Anabella (2016), The axes of Cristina Fernandez's external action: Changes toward a new horizon or changes to consolidate a course, *Relaciones Internacionales n 50*

order to advance, important steps were taken like admitting Venezuela in MERCOSUR, South America's biggest trade bloc. Another big event was the creation of CELAC which is the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. This bloc, was the first one of the regions which included all Latin American countries but excluded Canada and the USA. Should it be used properly, the region could have a platform for dealing with global powers, so far due to government change in most countries it has not been the case.<sup>16</sup>

Sharing values, having a common identity fueled the integration in Latin America, but apart from integration itself, what was Cristina Kirchner looking for with this policy. In political terms, support was needed for some key goals. Firstly, Argentina has a territorial claim with the United Kingdom for the Malvinas (Falklands in English) Islands. The Argentinian administration strategy was gaining support from the region, which was achieved, as a first step into generating international support for the claim. In strategic terms was quite intelligent move, nevertheless to fully succeed it should be continued in time, which did not happen.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, regional support was extremely important in order to tackle the issue of the hedge funds. An unresolved consequence of the 2001 default, hedge funds did not accept Argentinian offer to repay the debt and went to the American court. The non-resolved issue with the hedge funds made extremely hard for Argentina to get finance from global markets.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, few countries or multilateral organizations were willing to lend money to Argentina<sup>19</sup>. What is more, Argentinian assets abroad were at risk, as they could be seized under the trial Argentina had with the hedge funds. Thirdly, regional integration provided a new model for the region, instead of just following other models, the region could create its own. This, was a breakthrough, not only for Argentina, but for the region itself. This new model was based on respect for democracy, human rights as well as improving the life of Latin Americans. Countries that did not play according to the rules suffered sanctions, for instance Paraguay was suspended from MERCOSUR for impeaching its president in a doubtful way. Finally, the regional integration included an economic agenda which aimed to increase the trade. However, as Argentina was experimenting an increase in

<sup>16</sup> Simonoff, Alejandro, (2013), “¿Las Segundas Partes nunca fueron buenas? Caracterización preliminar del nuevo mandato de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner”, paper presented in VI Jornadas del CERPI, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, La Plata, Argentina

<sup>17</sup> Simonoff, Alejandro (2012), “Breaking with the past: Argentinian Strategies towards the Malvinas since the recovery of democracy (1983-2012)”, *Humania del Sur n 13*

<sup>18</sup> Simonoff, Alejandro, (2013), “¿Las Segundas Partes nunca fueron buenas? Caracterización preliminar del nuevo mandato de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner”, paper presented in VI Jornadas del CERPI, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, La Plata, Argentina

<sup>19</sup> Machinea, Jose Luis & Lucio Castro, (2017), “Argentina, the US and China: a New Triangle in the making” in *China the United States and the Future of Latin America*, edited by David B.H. Denoon, New York, USA, New York University Press

its imports with a decrease in its exports resulting in an erosion of its foreign reserves this objective could not be achieved. Arguments with Brazil regarding Argentinian non-tariff barriers were an everyday thing, nevertheless both sides worked together to solve the difference.<sup>20</sup>

### Argentina strategy with China (2013-2015)

After briefly explaining which were the goals that the Cristina Kirchner administration had, it becomes clearer the bilateral relationship with China during those years. The economic model that Argentina had, certainly was a source of trouble with China. As it was stated before, Kircherist's administration primary concerned was to develop the local industry. In order to do so, tariff barriers as well as non-tariff barriers were imposed. Tariff barriers, putting an extra tax to imports, might not be always effective. The reason for this failure lays on the product price, let's say some machine spare part cost 1 us dollar, by putting a 35% import tax (maximum allowed by the World Trade Organization) the final price of the product would be 1,35 Us dollars, what makes the product still cheap. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of protecting the local industry non-tariff barriers are required. Quotas, longer procedures for importing as well as many others were used. These measures were not specifically target at China; they were for all imports world-wide. As a matter of fact, Brazil complained about them<sup>21</sup>. Kirchner's administration had talks for solving the issue, but as a matter of fact they were a constant issue of friction, complains ceased when the measures were erased. China's reaction was quite strong not only for the measures itself but also for the Argentinian ambitions of making the trade relationship more balanced. According to the Argentinian statistics, the country has a serious deficit with China there for a change is needed. In this trade relation, Argentina concentrates almost all its exports in 5 primary products, were in the Chinese side manufactures sells are 98% of the total sells. In the past Argentina tried to increase its sells of soy oil to China what motivated a Chinese reaction which included banning Argentinian soy oil<sup>22</sup>. Trade friction was there, Argentinian economic development plan had a lot to do, but how could the Argentinian government maintained its economic plan while having a better relationship with China? Taking into account Argentina situation at that time, by which due to the unresolved

<sup>20</sup> Simonoff, Alejandro, (2013), “¿Las Segundas Partes nunca fueron buenas? Caracterización preliminar del nuevo mandato de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner”, paper presented in VI Jornadas del CERPI, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, La Plata, Argentina

<sup>21</sup>( February 2, 2012), *Brasil se queja y prepara medidas ante el control de importaciones que debutó ayer*, El Cronista, <https://www.cronista.com/economiapolitica/Brasil-se-queja-y-prepara-medidas-ante-el-control-de-importaciones-que-debuto-ayer-20120202-0079.html>

<sup>22</sup> Oviedo, Daniel Eduardo, (2013) *Argentina Facing China: Modernization, Interests and Economic Relations Model*, East Asia

issue with the hedge funds the country could not have access to the financial markets, it was natural that the country looked for some other financial source. China was the obvious answer, not only because Chinese loans do not have conditions (although a higher interest rate is present) but also because it was a good way of reducing the tensions created by disagreements in trade. In consequence Argentina signed swap agreements with China, that could be used in an emergency. This turned provided Argentina an economic aid, if required, while having the benefit of not sacrificing the development plans set by the administration.<sup>23</sup>

Being Argentina's creditor make the bilateral relationship less bumpy, in order to stabilize even more investment agreements were signed. The projects that the Chinese compromised to make were among the biggest ones in the region. Firstly, hydroelectric power plants were going to be built. As the country economy grow, more power was required, this deal helps tackling the problem as well as getting things better with China. Secondly, the Argentinian railroad network was going to be repaired. Nowadays, Argentinian freight trains transport less than 8% of the total cargo that is shipped in the country. Consequently, shipping cost are high, Argentinian goods become harder to sell as their price goes up. These agreements not only stabilize relations with China but also help to achieve the national development goals set by the government.<sup>24</sup>

In this first part, it was shown how the local politics and its goals plus the international constraints shaped the foreign policy of Argentina. On the bright side, the government did not have to change its industrialization policies, sovereignty was not at risk. It could be said, that these outcomes show a skilled leadership of the Argentinian government when dealing with a global superpower like China. Nevertheless, the price paid was quite high. The country was extremely dependent on Chinese money in case of turbulence. What is more, Chinese investments privileged position, made China realize its special relation with Argentina. Should Argentina made a move that China dislike pressure could be easily applied. In theory this was one of the reasons that triggered the following Argentinian government change in its China's approach.<sup>25</sup>

## Macri's First years as President (Late 2015-2017)

Winning by a bare minimum in 2015, allowed Mauricio Macri to end, at least until

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid

<sup>24</sup> Uriburu Quintana, Juan, (2017). "El déficit Argentino en infraestructura y el rol de China. Grandes proyectos en revisión", in *Inversiones de China, Corea y Japón en Argentina*, edited by Eduardo Daniel Oviedo, Rosario, Argentina, Universidad de Rosario

<sup>25</sup> Oviedo, Daniel Eduardo, (2013) *Argentina Facing China: Modernization, Interests and Economic Relations Model*, East Asia

2019, 12 years of Kirchnerist government. The coalition party name that brought Macri into power, CAMBIEMOS, or Let's change in English promised a radical change in Argentina. This change, will erase all that was wrong (according to Macri) with the Kirchnerist experience.

The economic development of the country, was the first thing to experience the change. CAMBIEMOS strategy in that field, was to make Argentina the “Supermarket of the World”<sup>26</sup>. When going to a supermarket, what we can find is food, low added value manufactures and basically that is all. Consequently, Macri’s priority since day one is reorienting the economy towards primary sector. The biggest winners of this policy, has been big landlords, in Argentina the land is highly concentrated, and mining companies<sup>27</sup>.

In Macri’s own thought, the big landlords were punished by the Kirchnerist’s policies as part of a personal vendetta, so he came to fix this unfair situation. By removing the tax to the exports that agriculture products, used to have landlords have seen their profits increased substantially<sup>28</sup>. Industries in Argentina have not been as lucky as soy beans producers, blamed by CAMBIEMOS for being “inefficient” as well as selling expensive products the national government took measures to punish them in the name of free trade.

The first thing it can be said about CAMBIEMOS industrial policy is that is non-existent. Having a Ministry of Industry that celebrates that notebooks are easier to import thanks to the measures taken by their government tells what CAMBIEMOS thinks about the national industry<sup>29</sup>. By arguing that industries were stagnant as they were not able to import the component that they required, imports restrictions were lifted. Non-tariff barriers were erased, with the consequence of a massive influx of imports that added to a depressed local market due to CAMBIEMOS policies made a great damage to the industries, forcing many of them to go bankrupt.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> (July 29, 2017), *Macri Pidió ser el Supermercado del Mundo*, Tiempo Argentino, <https://www.tiempoar.com.ar/nota/macri-pidio-ser-el-supermercado-del-mundo>

<sup>27</sup>Rebossio, Alejandro, (February 5, 2018), *Quienes son los empresarios ganadores del modelo macrista*, Perfil, <http://noticias.perfil.com/2018/02/05/quienes-son-los-empresarios-ganadores-del-modelo-macrista/>

<sup>28</sup> (December 22, 2017), *Quita de Retenciones Perdida o Ganacia del Estado*, Infobae, <https://www.infobae.com/campo/2017/12/22/quita-de-retenciones-perdida-o-ganancia-para-el-estado/>,

<sup>29</sup> (February 21, 2017), *Como en la Dictadura, el gobierno celebra la apertura de Importaciones*, El destape, <https://www.eldestapeweb.com/como-la-dictadura-el-gobierno-celebra-la-apertura-importaciones-n25929>

<sup>30</sup>Kicillof, Axel & Carlos Bianco, (December 2, 2017), *El tiro de gracia de Macri a la industria Argentina*, Perfil, <https://www.eldestapeweb.com/como-la-dictadura-el-gobierno-celebra-la-apertura-importaciones-n25929>

In the political side, Argentina will compromise with democracy and liberty. International relations, would not be guided by political affinity, shared identity or goals. In theory, this should have been translated as that the country would sever its relations with any country labelled as authoritarian or any country that try to suppress human rights. In reality, these noble goals were just an excuse for going back to the old way of doing international relations for Argentina. Any ideas of Latin American integration were discarded. Sadly, this was a regional not only an Argentinian shift but a regional one. According to CAMBIEMOS, the country was “isolated” during Kichnerist’s time, so this new administration will make Argentina join the International Community once again.

What does isolation mean for a country? I believe it is having no links with any country in the world. Not getting political ties or any kind of investment from abroad, the only case I can think of was North Korea until 2017. Argentina was not even close to North Korean situation, moreover ties were strengthen with Latin American countries, the region was the priority. Making Latin America the priory, did not mean severing ties with other countries. As a matter of fact, the United States were in 2015 the biggest investors locally with 20 billion US dollars of investments stocks<sup>31</sup>. So what’s the meaning of isolation for CAMBIEMOS, based on their policies so far it has two meaning. In the political side it means, having an independent foreign policy or any type of policy that tries to find an alternative to purely bandwagoning with the the United States and Europe. On the economic side means having an economic model that does not follow the orthodox neoclassical model which emphasis on the comparative advantages by which Argentina should export primary products only.<sup>32</sup>

Having briefly explained CAMBIEMOS ideas on isolation and being integrated it is easier to comprehend their foreign policy. On the regional aspect, Latin America stopped to be a priority as more countries shifted to the right more emphasis was put on this. As a matter of fact, these new right governments started making public campaigns against “populist countries”. The multilateral organizations in the region like UNASUR or CELAC were weakened in favor of the traditional Organization of American States (OAS). OAS has been a place where the USA can exercise its influence easy, consequently countries that propose an alternative model to the American one, will surely have a hard time.

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<sup>31</sup> Oviedo, Daniel Eduardo, (2013) *Argentina Facing China: Modernization, Interests and Economic Relations Model*, East Asia

<sup>32</sup> Instituto Patria-Comisión de integración regional y asuntos internacionales, (2016) *El Primer año de la política exterior de Macri*

It can be said that Argentina adopted a traditional way of doing foreign policy. In the first place, to come back to the World, Argentina needed to be close to Europe and the United States as they constitute the World for CAMBIEMOS. Obama made a visit on early 2016, which constituted a show of good will from the USA. However, Macri's Foreign Minister at that time Susana Malcorra, made a terrible mistake regarding the USA. At the height of the American presidential campaign, Mrs. Malcorra openly supported the democrat candidate, Hillary Clinton. Instead of remaining silent about the possible outcome of the election or stating that Argentina will respect the decision of the American people, Malcorra preferred to take sides.<sup>33</sup> The consequence of this decision was a hard start with Trump administration. Macri had to appealed to him, going to Washington, following Trump's advice on isolating Venezuela in hope of being able to leave behind Malcorra's mistake. So far it can be said, that despite Trump's words the relation is still far from Macri wants. In trade terms, Argentina still cannot export lemons to the USA even though Macri begged Trump situation remains the same. The relationship with the European Union and its members has been more fluid. Macri is able to say that he has received many Europeans leaders in the country, showing that the country is "once again in the Community of Nations". The price to pay for "returning to the Community of Nations" has not been cheap. In the political order, the country has stopped its claims for the Malvinas Islands, even though nominally still claims them<sup>34</sup>. On the economic side, MERCOSUR is trying to move forward with the free trade agreement with the European Union, still without success. Brazilian and Argentinian big industries oppose it, as this agreement will be a threat to both of them. The agriculture sector of MERCOSUR countries is lobbying for the agreement, but due to European farmers opposing it, so the free trade agreement is still stuck.<sup>35</sup>

Restoration of classical way of doing foreign policy in Argentina is a consequence of restoration of orthodox economy in Argentina. Economic targets set by CAMBIEMOS require going back to Europe and the United States. However, this administration that looks for foreign investment and free trade why has not properly used the relationship established by Cristina Kirchner with China? If investment and trade is what a country is looking for China should be among the obvious options, even more if the relation is somehow solid.

<sup>33</sup> (September 28, 2016), *Malcorra se la jugó por Hillary Trump refleja un proceso de cierre y Xenofobia*, TN, [https://m.tn.com.ar/internacional/malcorra-critico-trump-y-manifesto-su-preferencia-pro-hillary-clinton\\_740943](https://m.tn.com.ar/internacional/malcorra-critico-trump-y-manifesto-su-preferencia-pro-hillary-clinton_740943)

<sup>34</sup> (April 2, 2018), *Que ha pasado con las Malvinas durante el gobierno de Macri*, Telesur, <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/que-pasado-islas-malvinas-durante-mauricio-macri-20180402-0039.html>

<sup>35</sup>Kicillof, Axel & Carlos Bianco, (December 2, 2017) *El tiro de gracia de Macri a la industria Argentina*, Perfil, <http://www.perfil.com/noticias/economia/el-tiro-de-gracia-de-macri-a-la-industria-argentina.phtml>

## Argentina-China relations 2016-2017

At the presidential campaign of 2015, among the many promises Macri was making one caught the attention of Beijing Argentina would substantially modify its relation with China. In Macri's own words, Argentina was too involved with China this was not good for Argentina own interests. Macri went even further, he openly said that the investment agreements signed during Cristina Kirchner Administration will be revised and could even be cancelled. Moreover, the agreements terms will be openly displayed. Even the more controversial one, like the deep space exploration station that China built in South of Argentina. Alarm bells rang in the Chinese Embassy in Argentina, China was trying hard not to lose what has been won.<sup>36</sup>

This desire to change the Argentina-China relation, can be understood if we see the bigger picture of an Argentina that goes back to its old foreign policy where the USA and Europe were the center for Argentina. More than the center Europe and the USA are the World for Argentina for this old politics. An interesting situation was this one, a political party that ties foreign investment with economic development is trying to reduce or stop the Chinese offers for investment.

Despite this initial cold relationship thing changed for basically two reason. First one, China's quick reaction prevented a further deterioration of the relations. China's ambassador explained that the country was willing to renegotiate the deals that were signed during the Cristina Kirchner administration (repairing the railroad network and the two hydroelectrically) plants but cancelling them would bring trouble. What is more, the Chinese made a warning, if one contract is cancelled both of them are cancelled, this cross-default statement was present in the contracts.<sup>37</sup>

China's rapid move are not the only reason behind why Macri changed it originals plan with China. International constrains are largely responsible for this too. To be more precise, Trump becoming the new American President have a lot to do with this. The reason behind it, does not lay in Trump's hostile words against Latinos, rather in its policy "America First". The idea of forcing American companies to invest in America as a plan to increase the manufactures made in America to reduce the trade deficit put Macri's plan in a tough spot. As it was previously stated, even though Macri tried to increase the exports to the USA and seek American investment it was impossible for

<sup>36</sup>Uriburu Quintana, Juan, (2017). "El déficit Argentino en infraestructura y el rol de China. Grandes proyectos en revisión", in *Inversiones de China, Corea y Japón en Argentina*, edited by Eduardo Daniel Oviedo, Rosario, Argentina, Universidad de Rosario

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

him to change President Trump's mind. A new partner was required.

Showing the traditional Chinese pragmatism, agreements were allowed to be revised and renegotiated. The deep exploration station was prohibited from doing military activities (these concerns are based on the company that built it because it is owned by the People's Liberation Army). In order to demonstrate its good will, China even went as far as accepting to reduce the size of the generators of the hidroelectrical plants. Macri's administration soften its tone with China, and it even show interest to participate in China's biggest bet, One Belt, One Road.<sup>38</sup>

### One Belt, One Road from an Argentinian Perspective

China's One Belt, One Road has been described as an open project for connectivity. A project that is continuously being reshaped and expand. Its goal is to build infrastructure to connect China, with Central Asia, Europe and Africa. It has been accused of being the greatest geopolitical move that China has ever done to dispute global governance by exporting the "China model" to the countries where the infrastructure will be built<sup>39</sup>. Some critics are also fearful of a potential debt-trap diplomacy in this infrastructure building, taking the case of Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka.<sup>40</sup> These issues are constantly developing, but where does Argentina and Latin America fit into the equation?

Originally, Latin America was not part of the project, but as it was previously stated One Belt, One Road is an open project that is constantly redeveloping itself. Consequently, on May 2017 President Macri as well as Chilean President Bachelet attended to the 1<sup>st</sup> One Belt, One Road Forum<sup>41</sup>. Leaving behind a year that started with a strong rhetoric from President Macri regarding ties with China<sup>42</sup>, 2017 look much more promising to the bilateral relationship. Argentinian administration realized that

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<sup>38</sup>Dinatale, Martin, (May 20, 2016) *China aceptó cambios en los contratos que acordó con Cristina Kirchner*, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/1900603-china-acepto-cambios-en-los-contratos-que-acordó-con-cristina-kirchner>

<sup>39</sup>Ekman, Alice & Francoise Nicolas & John Seaman, (2017) Three Years of China's New Silk Roads: From words to (Re)Action, *Etudes de l'Ifri, Ifri*

<sup>40</sup>Priyandita, Gatra & Trissia Wijaya, (May 4, 2018), *Winning Hearts on China Belt and Road*, The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/winning-hearts-on-chinas-belt-and-road/>

<sup>41</sup>Brinza, Andreea, ( March 20, 2018) *Redefining the Belt and Road Initiative*, The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/redefining-the-belt-and-road-initiative>

<sup>42</sup>Curia, Walter ( March 13 2015), *Carta de Macri a China: Los Acuerdos podrian ser inconstitucionales*, El Cronista, <https://www.cronista.com/economia/politica/Carta-de-Macri-a-China-los-acuerdos-podrian-ser-inconstitucionales-20150313-0052.html>

taking a pragmatic was the only possible move. Even though Macri's administration is close to Trump in politics, Trump's politics prevent from having a close economic relation. Therefore, China can provide what the USA does not, investment and trade<sup>43</sup>. A gesture of political goodwill might give Macri what he is looking for. To show how ready Argentina is for One Belt, One Road, the country asked to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the financial institution created for being the economic support of One Belt, One Road.

The coming of 2018, appears to promise big news for Argentina and Latin America. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited the region to join One Belt, One Road So Latin American countries can also enjoy the benefits of development.<sup>44</sup> This traditional Chinese diplomatic language does not say much, does not say how the region is going to be connected or what type of infrastructure is going to be built. Consequently, what we can do is use analogy in order to see what the One Belt, One Road could mean for Argentina.

One Belt, One Road has been partially built on existing and projected projects. In other words, it would be reasonable to think that for Argentina and the region as well, projects of infrastructure that are already programmed by China could be part of One Belt, One Road. In the Argentinian case, one project will likely be part of it. The renovation of the Argentinian railroad network is a must. Taking into account that the current railroad network, despite its deplorable situation, is connected to the Chilean one which has access to ports in the Pacific Ocean it highly probable that the renovation project will be part of One Belt, One Road. It connects Argentina with China easily, for the Chinese it means cheaper Argentinian food and an easier road for Chinese goods. China achieves a victory here, but what about Argentinian interests? With the current Argentinian administration, the railroads could be used for exporting agriculture products to China, from the administration focus on Europe and the USA is hard to see a China plus policy (ASEAN countries, India, Pakistan and Northeast Asia). Moreover, as the current administration believes that through agriculture the country can develop, finishing the project could mean that Argentina could consolidate as a primary products producer. Leaving the country in a vulnerable situation, becoming too dependent on commodities markets.

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<sup>43</sup>Faus, Joan, ( April 28, 2017), *Argentina's Macri meets Trump to discuss closer partnership*, El pais, [https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/04/28/inenglish/1493388939\\_992435.html](https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/04/28/inenglish/1493388939_992435.html)

<sup>44</sup> Cambero, Fabián & Dave Sherwood, ( January 22, 2018) *China invites Latin America to take part in One belt, One road*, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-china/china-invites-latin-america-to-take-part-in-one-belt-one-road-idUSKBN1FB2CN>

The renovation of the railroad is not a bad project for Argentina per se. The project that could probably be the first big bet of One Belt, One Road could actually be beneficial to the country providing the Argentinian administration changes some of its politics. Firstly, having a diversified economy that encourages not only the exports of agricultural products but of manufactures too. By doing this, the country would be less vulnerable to a commodities shock. Secondly, Argentina needs to start presenting itself in Asia, China is a good starter but not the only country, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, ASEAN, Northeast Asia are big markets too. Diversifying is extremely important, having a China only policy can be very dangerous, as China is notoriously famous for applying economic pressure to other countries in order to get political gains. Therefore, by selling to many countries the influence China can exercise would be greatly diminished. Finally, the region should have a common position regarding One Belt, One Road. By working together, the region can send a political message to China as well as the USA, if you want to bargain with us you have to acknowledge that we have a joint front. We welcome Chinese investment, providing that it benefits both parties and does not constitute a debt trap approach like the one suffered by Sri Lanka. The region is not anyone's backyard; we are ready to have our own independent policy. This foreign policy, does not look for confrontation, rather development any country that wants to join for accomplishing this is welcome.

Currently, in the Argentinian and regional context is very hard to implement these recommendations. Argentinian as well as most regional government are from right wing governments that have commodities export as their economic policy. Latin American integration is not a priority for them, the old way of doing foreign policy prevents a substantial change in the region dealing with China.

## Conclusion

National goals will create opportunities and challenges in the international arena. The ones set by the Kirchnerist administration, that were focused on economic development through industrialization will create tensions with developed countries. Naturally, Argentina will first look for allies in developing countries that also have industrialization plans. In this sense, it should not be a surprise that Latin America, which at that time had a fair amount of left governments that were trying to industrialize their countries were Kirchnerist main allies. Identity politics, sharing common values with Latin American countries was an important factor too. China fit in the equation first as the main consumer of Argentina soy, which brought American dollars required for industrializing Argentina and later as the money lender when the economic

situation was in a bad spot. Nevertheless, tensions with China existed due to Argentina's industrial policies. As it was explained before, the national government partially defused them by giving access to Chinese investment.

Macri's administration objective of giving priority to agriculture instead of industries should have erased any remaining issue with China. Nevertheless, Argentina's choice of blindly following its traditional partners the UE and the USA while ignoring the rest of the World made things harder than they should have been. As the administration halt investment projects from China. The international constrains, Trump election, Brexit, lack of investment from Europe and America made Macri reconsider its initial position and seek in China a trading partner as well as a money lender. Regional context, right wing governments as well as Macri's identity politics, which are close to Europe made Latin American countries a secondary choice for Argentina's foreign policy.

Trump hard positon on trade and investment as well as Europe relatively weak position have left Macri's administration in a difficult situation. It could be said that becoming part of OBOR could give to Argentina what this administration is looking for, trade and investments. That could explain why has Macri shifted its vision on Chinese investments in the country, even though Argentina's is still close to Trump's America. Understanding Argentinian domestic politics is essential to understand the relationship between Argentina and China as well what One Belt, One Road would mean for the South American country. Should this administration continue, One Belt One Road and its investments will be taken not because the national government desires it, but because the USA and Europe cannot provide what Argentina wants. Domestic politics of trying to export agricultural products plus international constrains of protections policies in Europe and the USA result in an Argentina that is welcoming China as well as One Belt, One Road. The main project of One Belt One Road in Argentina, the renovation of the railroad network, could help the government in achieving its domestic policies.

A new approach is required for One Belt, One Road. Argentina needs to work together with the region, so to have a better bargain position. One Belt, One Road possible project in Argentina could be use not only in China's favor but also in Argentina own interest. By having a way to the Pacific, many Asian countries could be reach in addition to China. Letting Argentina profit with the Asian economic bonanza. It is still long for it to be ready but preparing beforehand could mean an Argentina and a region that make the best out of this Century opportunities.

## 拉美專題

### 墨西哥加入《北美自由貿易協定》二十二年之經濟發展評析 (1994~2016)

余小云\*  
楊穎超\*\*

## 摘要

本文主要檢視並評析墨西哥加入《北美自由貿易協定》(*North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA*)二十二年(1994年至2016年)來的經濟發展。文中除了略述墨西哥在簽訂協定前對貿易自由化的努力外，也以相關的經濟數據和資料呈現墨西哥加入《北美自由貿易協定》二十二年來的經濟發展變化，包括國內生產毛額(GDP)成長率、就業狀況、吸引外資、產業升級、外匯存底等面向之成果，以及因而有部分產業萎縮、貿易逆差以及經濟受到美國經濟波動影響等消極效應出現情形。本文認為墨國在1980年代進口替代政策已難以為繼與外債過高的前提下，墨國其實沒有太多的選擇。而從墨國加入該協定後的產業結構與經濟發展皆較過去為佳，國家整體發展也更符合世界銀行對於一國經濟社會發展的水準與指標，墨西哥的加入該協定是利大於弊。該國貿易增長情況與世界銀行的人類發展指數標準來看，墨國經濟較過去表現更好。此外，從1994年到2016年，墨西哥經濟發展、人類發展指數是其發展的兩個重要指標。最重要的是，墨西哥比過去更好。整體觀之，墨西哥參與《北美自由貿易協定》的收穫在大局上是利大於弊的。

**關鍵字：**北美自由貿易協定、墨西哥、經濟發展、新自由主義

### Analysis on the Economic Development of Mexico's Twenty-Two

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## Years Accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994-2016)

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### *Abstract*

This paper mainly examines and evaluates Mexico's economic development during its twenty-two years (1994-2016) of participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In addition to an overview of Mexico's efforts to liberalize its trade prior to signing the agreement, this paper presents relevant economic data and information on the economic developments of Mexico's twenty-two years accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement, including its gross domestic product (GDP). Its growth results, employment conditions, attracting foreign investment, industrial upgrading, foreign exchange deposits and other outcomes, etc. and thus some of the negative effects of some industries shrinking, trade deficits as well as the economy had been affected by the U.S. economic fluctuations. This paper argues that under the premise that the import substitution policy of the Mexican state in the 1980s was difficult to maintain and the foreign debt was over high, the Mexican country did not have much choice. Since the Mexican state's entry into the agreement, its industrial structures and economic development are better than that in the past. The overall development of Mexico is more in line with the World Bank's level and indicators of the economic and social developments of a country. The paper finds that Mexico's accession to the agreement is more beneficial than disadvantageous. Besides, its economic and human developments indexes from 1994 to 2016 are two significant indicators of its development. Most importantly, Mexico has been better off than it was in the past, and its participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been overall beneficial in the big picture than harmful.

**Key words:** North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico, Economic Development, Neoliberalism

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## 一、前言

《北美自由貿易協定》(*North American Free Trade Agreement*, NAFTA)在1994年1月1日生效。早在1980年，美國共和黨總統參選人雷根(Ronald W. Reagan)就提出一個包括美國、加拿大、墨西哥及加勒比海諸國在內的「北美共同市場」(North American Common Market)設想。當然這個設想非其天馬行空之意，而是有新自由主義(Neoliberalism)經濟學的理論基礎作背後支撐，隨著這個思潮的逐漸風行，加拿大1983年也提出了關於建立美加自由貿易區的建議。當1986年5月加拿大與美國展開加強雙方經濟合作、推行自由貿易協商談判時，墨西哥眼見鄰近北方兩國展開經濟策略結盟，同年8月也和美國提出雙邊協定計畫，並於1987年11月簽訂兩國貿易投資原則協議，1990年7月正式達成《美墨貿易投資協定》。加上早於1989年1月1日正式生效的《美加自由貿易協定》，北美自由貿易協議於1992年12月17日簽署，1993年經美國、加拿大和墨西哥三國國會批准後，亦於1994年1月1日正式宣佈成立世界最大自由貿易區之一的「北美自由貿易區」(North America Free Trade Zone)，墨西哥自此成為美國的重要貿易夥伴。<sup>1</sup>

《北美自由貿易協定》可視為1986年8月美、墨雙邊協定擴張延續版，由於當時之墨西哥政府面臨進口替代政策不再有效率、外債過高難以為繼的困境，<sup>2</sup>因此期待加入該協定後能推進市場取向的經濟改革，改變以國有經濟為主的經濟體制，<sup>3</sup>增加投資信心、吸引更多外國投資、擴大就業機會與勞工所得、加速貿易增長，以及促進國內經濟發展。<sup>4</sup>

該協定是第一個連接兩個已開發國家和一個發展中國家的自由貿易協定。對美國的歷史意義是，其成為制定後來其它自由貿易協定的範例以及多邊自由貿易談判的範本，影響了關於市場准入、原產地規則、知識產權、外國投資、爭端解決、勞動者權利和環境保護等方面的談判條件。它也是針對墨西哥一個發展中國家的第一個自由貿易協定，是墨國政府與其他國家簽訂與相關自由貿易協定的範例。<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從NAFTA到TPP(上)—紀念北美自由貿易協定簽訂20周年〉，《金融發展研究》2014年第9期，頁3-4。

<sup>2</sup> Jorge Sebastian Roberts, 2001, "The Reasons for Mexico's Trade Liberalization," <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5dbd/8753721b13ce43ed33948a64732f1247fe9f.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從NAFTA到TPP(上)....〉，2014年第9期，頁5。

<sup>4</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥的新自由主義政策—加入北美自由貿易協定之觀察〉，《台灣國際研究季刊》第8卷、第3期(2012/秋季號)，頁80；威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從NAFTA到TPP(上)....〉，2014年第9期，頁4-5。

<sup>5</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從NAFTA到TPP(上)....〉，2014年第9期，頁4。

由於該協定施行二十二年來，對於世界其它區域自由貿易協定具有影響力，相關對墨西哥發展的正負面評論也皆有，我們有必要總結這些討論。因此本文的章節安排除前言外，第二部分將回顧《北美自由貿易協定》簽署之前，墨西哥關於貿易自由化的努力，第三部分要介紹該協定的重要條款內容，以及墨西哥在協定框架下的貿易發展狀況，第四部分則檢視墨西哥加入《北美自由貿易協定》二十二年的成果與效應，最後總結其對墨西哥發展的影響。本文研究限制大致有兩點：一、一國經濟發展起伏變數太多，而墨西哥在簽署協定前就已經展開了相當多的市場自由化步驟，因此固然墨國加入《北美自由貿易協定》有其經濟發展的重要效果，但不必然將之完全歸因於此協定的效應；<sup>6</sup>二、本文較關注總體經濟的變化，以國家為單位來評估墨西哥加入協定之利弊得失，至於地區與特定群體相關差異，除非特別提及，並不在本文討論之列。

### 協定前墨西哥在貿易自由化中的努力

墨西哥在不同階段歷經了多種不同發展模式的轉變，最初在1940年至1970年代，進口替代工業模式(Import Substitution Industrialization, ISI)發展十分成功，創造了墨西哥的經濟奇蹟。但從1960年代起，這個經濟發展模式由於太仰賴石油出口，開始出現經濟衰退的警訊，<sup>7</sup>到了1970年代，墨國以「舉債發展」策略試圖加速經濟發展，出現了操作外債槓桿率過高、國際資本流動方向逆轉、美國緊縮貨幣政策、國際浮動利率、國際油價大幅提高等內外部問題，此時進口替代政策不再有效率、貿易赤字以及嚴重貨幣貶值問題又紛至沓來，使1982年時墨國面臨嚴重債務危機，成為當時拉丁美洲第一個宣布延期償付外債的國家，並同時面對債務危機、國內低儲蓄率和披索(Peso)高估等一連串問題。另一方面，墨國在1983年後所施行的部分自由化政策，卻對創造工作和出口工業的成長證實有效，而全球化趨勢也已因科技進步成形，全球市場迫使各國追求比較利益，開始迎合外國資本的投入。<sup>8</sup>

在上述的國內外經濟環境背景下，墨西哥在德拉馬德里總統(Miguel de la Madrid, 1982-1988)以及薩利納斯總統(Carlos Salinas, 1988-1994)任內，大力轉向自由經濟與擴大出口的經濟改革政策，以吸引國外資金流入、強化市場競爭力。

<sup>6</sup> 相關報告亦提及此項缺憾，例見：M. Ayhan Kose, Guy M. Meredith and Christopher M. Towe, 2004, “How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican Economy? Review and Evidence,” *International Monetary Fund Working Paper*, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0459.pdf>; M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson, 2017, *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez, “Mexico's economic transformation under NAFTA,” in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, Riordan Roett(eds.), *Mexico's Democracy at Work: Political and Economic Dynamics* (pp. 119-150)(Boulder, CO., London: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005), p.119; 余小云、邵建民，〈墨西哥經濟模式的轉型與發展(1940~2015)〉，《拉丁美洲經貿季刊》，第27期，2016年12月1日，頁21~23。

<sup>8</sup> Jorge Sebastian Roberts, “The Reasons for Mexico's Trade Liberalization” (2001), <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5dbd/8753721b13ce43ed33948a64732f1247fe9f.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup>換言之，在《北美自由貿易協定》前，80年代中葉為了應對外債危機，墨西哥政府已開始推動包括貿易和投資政策自由化的經濟改革，以解除貿易壁壘，推動對外開放和經濟改革，而其對外開放的第一步即是對進口替代政策的改革。1986年當墨西哥成為《關稅及貿易總協定》(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT)成員時，墨國政府一舉將最高關稅稅率降至50%，之後又進一步將其降到20%，墨西哥的貿易加權平均關稅稅率從1985年的25%，降到1989的19%。<sup>10</sup>所以墨西哥政府在簽署《北美自由貿易協定》前，已推出放寬政府對貿易與外國投資的限制政策、降低關稅稅率，並減少國有企業對農業的補貼政策，以促進產業競爭力。

另外，在進入關稅貿易總協定之前，墨西哥對美國進口的230種商品要求應具有進口許可證，而在進行《北美自由貿易協定》談判時，墨西哥對美國出口農產品大約有60%需要進口許可，甚至還有一些非關稅壁壘，如「官方進口價格」等，藉由通過《北美自由貿易協定》，其市場取向的經濟改革，則對於墨西哥特有國有經濟為主的經濟體制，不但有所改革，同時也打破了境內利益集團的貿易保護主義要求，這樣的經濟改革進程在不可逆轉情勢下，墨西哥的經濟發展自此產生了戲劇化的轉變。

### 《北美自由貿易協定》的主要條款與貿易發展情況

《北美自由貿易協定》條文中明訂協定簽署的宗旨在於：取消貿易壁壘、創造公平條件、增加投資機會、保護智慧財產權、建立執行協定和解決貿易爭端有效機制、促進三邊與多邊的合作。而建立自由貿易區的目標在創造就業機會、擴大市場、降低關稅、清除貿易壁壘、增加投資機會、拓展國際貿易、增進國際合作等等。主要條款包括：關稅和非關稅貿易自由化、原產地規則、服務貿易、外國投資、知識產權保護、政府採購與爭端解決，另外有關勞動力和環境條款，則分別包含在《北美自由貿易協定》的補充協定裡。<sup>11</sup>茲分述如下：

#### 取消貿易壁壘

《北美自由貿易協定》加速推動關稅消除，即在該協定生效日期，有一些項目關稅立即予以消除，而其餘的項目關稅得在5年至15年內，逐步取消在協定國生產及貿易的所有商品關稅壁壘和大多非關稅壁壘。其中，美國從墨西哥進口商品的40%為免稅，剩餘部份實行最高35%的關稅稅率，其貿易加權平均關稅稅率平均為7%，而墨西哥對美國農產品的貿易加權關稅稅率平均為11%。<sup>12</sup>

影響美國與墨西哥貿易因素，主要在於兩國的檢疫規定、墨西哥進口許可證

<sup>9</sup> 余小云、邵建民，頁27~32。

<sup>10</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(上)....〉，2014年第9期，頁4-5。

<sup>11</sup>The NAFTA Secretariat, <https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-the-Agreement/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement>.

<sup>12</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(上)....〉，2014年第9期，頁5。

制度，以及美國的市場標準等。而這些制度與規範在紡織、成衣、汽車、農業等產業則有較大的影響。在紡織和成衣業方面，規範在10年內協定國需達到其特定原產地規定，同時逐步取消紡織與成衣產品的所有關稅。協定簽訂前，墨西哥對美國紡織和成衣徵收平均稅率為16%，其中有些產品關稅高達20%。在汽車工業方面，只要這些汽車產品符合汽車、發動機和傳動裝置占到北美原產地62.5%要求即可，其間從有些關稅自協定生效日即刻取消，到一些關稅得在5年至10年內逐步取消。<sup>13</sup>

在協定簽署前，美國對墨西哥進口汽車關稅為2.5%，輕型卡車為25%，汽車零件的貿易加權平均值為3.1%。墨西哥對美、加汽車產品徵收關稅稅率，汽車和輕型卡車為20%，汽車零件為10%-20%。農業方面，主要在於通過協定國間關稅配額轉化成普通關稅，從而消除了農業貿易中的大多數非關稅壁壘。在簽署協定前，美國對墨西哥有近四分之一的農業出口，受到墨西哥政府進口許可限制。協定生效後，墨西哥和美國之間農業貿易的一半，已成為免稅貿易。<sup>14</sup>

## 服務貿易自由化

《北美自由貿易協定》放寬了對墨西哥服務業的限制，尤其在金融服務限制的放寬對銀行業影響較大。另在通信服務方面，該協定授予伙伴國通信服務供應商和使用者一項「權利法案」，即他們皆有權使用公共通信服務，連接反映經濟成本和適用統一費用定價基礎的私人路線；有權選擇、購買或租借最適合其需要的終端服務。其中，《北美自由貿易協定》並不禁止任何一方維持公共網絡或服務的壟斷供應商，所以墨西哥最大的電信公司(TELmex)仍能在該國橫行無阻。<sup>15</sup>

## 協定國相互開放國內市場的相關條款

《北美自由貿易協定》在相互開放國內市場的相關條款，包括：外國投資、知識產權、爭端解決和政府採購等。在外國投資方面，除取消投資壁壘，保障投資者的基本權利，並為投資者暨協定國提供爭端解決機制，其中並在若干特定產業上排除自由化，包括墨西哥石油能源產業、加拿大的文化產業以及美國航空與無線電通訊產業。在知識產權方面，《北美自由貿易協定》規範相同保護著作權、專利權、商標和商業秘密等之強制義務，以期符合烏拉圭回合之「世界貿易組織」(WTO)通過的《與貿易有關的知識產權協定》。在爭端解決方面，該協定有爭端預警和解決條款，並創建了一個仲裁系統，以解決反傾銷和反補貼判定的相應解決條款。在政府採購方面，則明定商品和服務的供應商根據非歧視原則，進行聯邦政府採購，並涵蓋對國有企業採購的一些限制條款。<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> 同上註，頁5。

<sup>14</sup> 同上註，頁5-6。

<sup>15</sup> 同上註，頁6。

<sup>16</sup> The NAFTA Secretariat, <https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-the-Agreement/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement>; 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從NAFTA到TPP(上)....〉，2014年第9期，頁6。

## 勞工與環境的補充協定

《北美自由貿易協定》生效時，同時有關協定國勞工與環境的《北美勞工合作協定》、《北美環境合作協定》等兩個補充協定亦一併生效，該補充協定涵蓋《北美自由貿易協定過渡期調整援助計畫》和《美國社區調整和投資計畫》，以用來減輕與貿易相關的勞動力問題。其中補充協定對勞工和環境有爭端的解決程序，即在進行相關評估後，可對不能執行其法律的一方做出最後處理。<sup>17</sup>

美國和墨西哥另加入針對邊境合作的雙邊補充協定，以期兩國政府在沿美、墨邊境發展環境基礎設施項目方面進行國際合作，以解決兩國邊境因貿易活動增加而造成的環境問題。該補充協定有建立「邊境環境合作委員會」(Border Environmental Cooperation Commission)和「北美開發銀行」(North American Development Bank)，目的在促進兩國政府為廢水處理、固體垃圾處理以及邊境地區工程發展等緊密合作，以保證和促進融資暨補貼。<sup>18</sup>

## 貿易發展

鑑於 80 年代的經濟外債危機，墨西哥學到必須創造安全的產業環境，以吸引外資進駐、提升生產力。墨西哥決定採行出口導向模式主要基於下列理由：出口能帶來成長，且可藉由外國對墨西哥的投資來籌措資金。此外並希望以強調高品質和高生產力的出口導向發展模式，來健全墨西哥工業與推動經濟成長。基本上，墨西哥經濟轉變是在 1986 年加入《關稅暨貿易總協定》(General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, GATT)開始的，至今也與包括美國、加拿大以及歐盟成員國等 46 個國家簽署了自由貿易協定。<sup>19</sup>當 90 年代出口導向模式已趨健全後，在很短時間內所推行的雙邊貿易，帶給墨西哥每年有近 4%—5% 的成長。除了 1995 年國內生產毛額(Gross Domestic Product, GDP)成長率因 1994 年和 1995 年的披索貶值而下降到 -6.3% 外，其在 1996 年至 2008 年成長神速(見圖 1)。即便 2009 年因金融風暴頓挫，降至 -5.3%，隔年就又彈升至 5.1%，其國內生產總值於 2014 年達新高到 1.3 兆美元，年成長率是 2.8%，2016 年總值則緩降為一兆美元，年成長率是 2.9%。<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(上)....〉，2014 年 第 9 期，頁 6-7。

<sup>18</sup> NAFTANOW.ORG, “North American Free Trade Agreement,” [http://www.naftanow.org/agreement/default\\_en.asp](http://www.naftanow.org/agreement/default_en.asp); 同上註，頁 7。

<sup>19</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal, “Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements,” *Congressional Research Service*, 2017, pp.3-4, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40784.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> World Bank, GDP (current US\$): Mexico, [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MX&end=2016&locations=MX&name\\_desc=false&start=1993&view=chart](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MX&end=2016&locations=MX&name_desc=false&start=1993&view=chart); World Bank, GDP growth(annual %): Mexico, [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MX&end=2016&locations=MX&name\\_desc=false&start=1993&view=chart](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MX&end=2016&locations=MX&name_desc=false&start=1993&view=chart).

圖1：墨西哥國內生產毛額(GDP)成長率(1993-2016)



資料來源：World Bank, GDP growth (annual %): Mexico, [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MX&end=2016&locations=MX&name\\_desc=false&start=1993&view=chart](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MX&end=2016&locations=MX&name_desc=false&start=1993&view=chart).

接下來，我們可從一系列出口數字的比較，來看出墨西哥的廣簽自由貿易協定以及出口導向經濟模式的健全發展，如何有助於國內生產毛額的穩定增長。墨西哥1991年的對外貿易，其出口佔國內生產毛額為16%，10年後的2001年提升至28%，如同「表1：墨西哥和各國貿易協定及貿易額(1992-2002)」所示：墨西哥在1993年和2001年的對外貿易因簽署了自由貿易協定，除了與玻利維亞的貿易額較低外，與其它國家至少都增加了2倍，其中與智利、哥斯大黎加及宏都拉斯的貿易成長更高達3倍。美國為其最重要的貿易伙伴，也以近3倍數字成長：由1993年的881億美元增至2002年的2500億美元。<sup>21</sup>再把時間拉長一點，從1994年到2016年，墨國出口數字增加了515%，金額則從608億美元擴大到3739億美元。<sup>22</sup>這些驚人的成長，《北美自由貿易協定》確實功不可沒。到了2015年，其進出口貿易佔國內生產毛額比例為72.8%。<sup>23</sup>因為該協定所推動的北美區域化經濟貿易架構，是墨西哥最主要的經濟框架模式，這不僅是基於地緣關係，也因為墨西哥與美國、加拿大已趨區域整合的經濟體系。

<sup>21</sup> Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez (2005), p.121.

<sup>22</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal, "Mexico's Free Trade Agreements," Congressional Research Service (2017), p.14. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40784.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> 聯合國開發計畫署(UNDP)，《2016年人類發展報告》，[http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr\\_2016\\_report\\_chinese\\_web.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_report_chinese_web.pdf)。

表1：墨西哥和各國貿易協定及貿易額(1992-2002)

簽約國家	生效年	1993 年貿易 金額(百萬美 元)	2002 年貿易 金額(百萬美 元)	增長幅度%
智利	1992	330	1269	285
美國	1994	88146	249719	183
加拿大	1994	2744	7293	165
玻利維亞	1995	33	44	33
哥斯大黎加	1995	121	760	528
哥倫比亞	1995	323	908	181
委內瑞拉	1995	455	1119	146
尼加拉瓜	1998	32	118	269
歐盟	2000	10587	21659	105
以色列	2000	149	301	102
薩爾瓦多	2001	127	302	138
瓜地馬拉	2001	266	631	137
宏都拉斯	2001	45	233	420
歐洲自由貿易協會	2001	682	1337	96

資料來源: Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez, "Mexico's economic transformation under NAFTA," in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, Riordan Roett(eds.), *Mexico's Democracy at Work: Political and Economic Dynamics* (Boulder, CO & London : L. Rienner Publishers, 2005), p.123.

說明: 歐洲自由貿易協會(European Free Trade Association)成員國包括冰島、挪威、瑞典及列支敦斯登。

拜關稅優惠之利，美國從墨西哥進口大幅增加，其中以石油、天然氣、汽車零件和影音通訊為進口大宗，<sup>24</sup>過去美墨貿易中，墨國一直是以原油及石油產品為主要出口大宗，但近幾年來，以 2016 年為例，主要進口項目已變為汽車、汽車零件、電腦設備、通訊器材與影音設備。<sup>25</sup>雙邊貨物貿易總額自 1993 年的 416 億美元猛增至 2016 年的 2301 億美元，增加了 574%；墨國對美國出口從 1993 年的 399 億美元，到 2016 年的 2939 億美元，增加了 736%，美國對墨貿易則雖在 1993 年還有 17 億美元盈餘，但到 2007 年已反轉成 748 億美元的赤字，據美國人口調查局(The U.S. Census Bureau)公布數據(表 2)，2016 年墨西哥對美國貨品貿易順差為 638.7 億美元。該局指出墨西哥是美國第二大貿易夥伴，也是美國貿易逆差第二大來源國，僅次於中國大陸。大約同一時期，美國對中國大陸貿易逆差為 3444 億美元，對日本逆差為 633.2 億美元。<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥的新自由主義政策—....〉，《台灣國際研究季刊》，第 8 卷、第 3 期（2012/秋季號），頁 85-86。

<sup>25</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, 2017, p. 18.

<sup>26</sup> United States Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html>.

**表2：美國對墨西哥的貨品貿易(單位：百萬美元)**

年份	出口	進口	出/入超
2016	230,051.2	293,923.9	-63,872.8
2015	236,460.1	296,433.3	-59,973.2
2014	241,007.2	295,730.0	-54,722.8
2013	225,954.4	280,556.0	-54,601.7
2012	215,875.1	277,593.6	-61,718.5
2011	198,288.7	262,873.6	-64,584.9
2010	163,664.6	229,985.6	-66,321.0
2009	128,892.1	176,654.4	-47,762.2
2008	151,220.1	215,941.6	-64,721.6
2007	135,918.1	210,714.0	-74,795.8
2006	133,721.7	198,253.2	-64,531.4
2005	120,247.6	170,108.6	-49,861.0
2004	110,731.3	155,901.5	-45,170.2
2003	97,411.8	138,060.0	-40,648.2
2002	97,470.1	134,616.0	-37,145.9
2001	101,296.5	131,337.9	-30,041.4
2000	111,349.0	135,926.3	-24,577.3
1999	86,908.9	109,720.5	-22,811.6
1998	78,772.6	94,629.0	-15,856.4
1997	71,388.5	85,937.6	-14,549.1
1996	56,791.6	74,297.2	-17,505.6
1995	46,292.1	62,100.4	-15,808.3
1994	50,843.5	49,493.7	1,349.8
1993	41,580.8	39,917.5	1,663.3

資料來源：整理自美國人口調查局 <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html>.

見微知著，墨西哥與美國、加拿大兩國的國際貿易亦是呈指數成長：1993 年墨西哥出口至美、加有 444.2 億美元，進口有 464.6 億美元，形成 20.5 億的貿易赤字，但 2012 年墨西哥出口至美、加有 2,987.63 億美元，進口 1,950 億美元，有 1,037.63 億的貿易順差。在《北美自由貿易協定》中，墨西哥有 96.3% 的貿易是與美國往來，其餘 3.7% 的貿易則是與加拿大往來，可見美國為墨西哥加入北美自由貿易區後的最大夥伴國。<sup>27</sup>自《北美自由貿易協定》生效以來，到了 2011 年，夥伴國間的三方貿易高達一兆美元，2015 年時，墨西哥主要交易夥伴前五名為美國、加拿大、中國大陸、德國和日本，墨國對美國出口則占其出口總額的 81.2%。2016 年時，加拿大與墨西哥佔美國出口總數的 34%，進口則是美國的第二與第三大夥伴，佔了美國進口總量的 26%。而墨西哥對美國出口，則占墨西哥出口總額的 80.9%。<sup>28</sup>

墨西哥因此成為拉丁美洲第一大出口國，出口部門佔全國生產總值的 34%。

<sup>27</sup> NAFTA, 20 years later, *Consultores Internacionales*, S.C. (2014, 1.6).

<sup>28</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)；〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(下)—紀念北美自由貿易協定簽訂 20 周年〉，《金融發展研究》，2014 年 10 期，頁 55-56；M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson, 2017, *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, pp. 11-15; 中華人民共和國商務部，〈2016 年墨西哥貨物貿易及中墨雙邊貿易概況〉，  
[https://countryreport.mofcom.gov.cn/record/view110209.asp?news\\_id=53227](https://countryreport.mofcom.gov.cn/record/view110209.asp?news_id=53227).

<sup>29</sup>而墨西哥出口成長總額有 87.3%為製造業出口，其中美國和墨西哥的貿易增長，主要在於製造業和裝配廠的專業化已適應了規模經濟的優勢，使跨越國界的製造業供應鏈日益增加，加以關稅降低使製造業、乃至其中間產品的產業價格，皆受到影響而收益。協定國的製造商係通過分工共同生產，貿易的擴展產生了垂直供應關係，尤其是美墨邊境沿線，在美國生產並出口至墨西哥的中間產品以及成品的回流，都增加了美墨邊境地區作為生產基地的重要性。換言之，美國的製造業，包括汽車、電子、器具和機械業等，都依靠墨西哥製造生產商的供給幫助。一項研究報告估計：美國自墨西哥進口中有 40%的原產國為美國，加拿大則有 25%，而綜合計算自美國出口中間產品進口至墨西哥、加拿大，再進口回流到美國的量，佔美國國內商品含量的 75%。<sup>30</sup>

由上述可知：墨西哥進口半成品和零配件，再利用廉價的勞動力，於鄰近全球最大消費市場的美國邊境，設置加工組裝廠，而其出口增長的動力，即建立在勞動成本低和美國市場的需求上。<sup>31</sup>以表現最佳的汽車業為例，因為《北美自由貿易協定》取消了墨西哥限制性貿易和投資政策，以及對美國汽車和汽車零部件的關稅限制，故推動了北美汽車產業一體化的進程，即美國汽車零件部生產商把協定伙伴國生產的產品和零件加以組裝零件部件，然後運往另一協定國組裝成汽車，並在三個協定國中銷售，這使得墨西哥成了美國汽車重要的貿易伙伴。從美國國會的研究報告可知(表 3)，美國自 1993 年至 2016 年出口墨西哥之汽車和汽車零部件增長 262%，進口則增加了 765%。

表 3：1993 與 2016 年美國對墨西哥之汽車和汽車零件貿易比較(單位：十億美元)<sup>32</sup>

	1993			2016			%變化	
	出口	進口	總數	出口	進口	總數	出口	進口
汽車	0.2	3.7	3.9	4.6	49.7	54.3	2222%	1242%
汽車零件	7.3	7.4	14.7	22.5	46.3	68.9	209%	526%
總數	7.5	11.1	18.6	27.2	96.0	123.2	262%	765%

資料來源：M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson, 2017, *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, p. 18.

過去墨國主要出口產業是石油等原物料，以 1993 年為例，最大出口貨品原油佔當年出口總額的 13%，比第二名汽車的 7.8%高出甚多，這還不包括佔 2% 的潤滑油等精煉油，<sup>33</sup>但簽署協定後，進出口結構開始出現多元化傾向(表 4)，就出口而言，基礎逐漸轉變為製造業。雖然在 1980 年代晚期，墨國的製造業出

<sup>29</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥的新自由主義政策—....〉，《台灣國際研究季刊》，第 8 卷、第 3 期(2012/秋季號)，頁 86。

<sup>30</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)：〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(下)....〉，《金融發展研究》，2014 年 10 期，頁 57。

<sup>31</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥的新自由主義政策—....〉，《台灣國際研究季刊》第 8 卷、第 3 期 (2012/秋季號)，頁 86。

<sup>32</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal & Ian F. Fergusson, 2017, *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, p. 18.

<sup>33</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), What does Mexico export? (1993), [https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree\\_map/sitc/export/mex/all/show/1993/](https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/mex/all/show/1993/).

出口數量就已經逐漸增加，但在加入《北美自由貿易協定》後，多樣化的速度更加快了。製造業佔墨國平均產出從1980-1993年的大約37%，到1994-2002年間超過80%。此結果導致墨西哥的進出口基礎一變而成世界最多元化的經濟體之一。<sup>34</sup>而自2005年之後，墨國因原油資源減少，原油產品穩定下降，工業產品的成長則正好接上，<sup>35</sup>因此到了2014年至2016年，出口前三名已變為汽車、原油、與大卡車，<sup>36</sup>而如果僅以2016年來說，主要出口項目是汽車(370億，佔當年度出口總額的8.4%)、汽車零件(299億，佔當年度出口總額的6.8%)、大卡車(247億，佔當年度出口總額的5.6%)，原油則降為當年度出口總額的3.7%，較電腦及電話產品還低。<sup>37</sup>

表4:進出口多元程度表(以占總數的百分比平均)

	項目	年代	阿根廷	巴西	智利	印尼	馬來西亞	墨西哥	祕魯	土耳其	烏拉圭
出口	製造業	1980-1993	25.9	47.5	9.8	23	39.8	37.1	15.9	57.1	37.1
		1994-2000	32.9	54.8	15.8	50.4	77.2	81.2	18.3	76.1	39.1
	農業和食品	1980-1993	67	36.9	32.5	17.1	34.1	11.9	25.3	35.5	62
		1994-2000	52.3	32.9	36.5	16.1	13.1	7.2	34.1	19.4	59.4
	石油和礦產	1980-1993	7.1	14.5	56.8	59.8	25.8	50.9	58.8	7.3	0.5
		1994-2000	14.2	10.9	45.8	29.2	8.8	11.5	47.6	3.8	1.5
進口	製造業	1980-1993	78	47.4	69.9	71.8	75.4	74.9	68.2	57.3	62.9
		1994-2000	88	73.7	76.9	66.5	84.8	84.9	72.1	72.1	74.6
	農業和食品	1980-1993	8.6	11.6	11.4	11.8	11.5	16.8	23.2	8.7	11.8
		1994-2000	6.6	11.2	8.6	17.4	6.7	7.6	16.4	9.4	13.7
	石油和礦產	1980-1993	13.3	40.9	16.8	16	12.6	6.5	7.2	33.8	25.3
		1994-2000	5.1	15	13.5	15.9	6.5	4.7	11.4	16.4	11.7

資料來源: M. Ayhan Kose, Guy M. Meredith, and Christopher M. Towe, 2004, How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican Economy? Review and Evidence, IMF Working Paper, p.31.

在這些產業變化中，汽車工業的增長是相當顯著的。1993年墨西哥只有13間汽車裝配廠，在協定簽署後，2013年超過了30家。<sup>38</sup>該年墨西哥汽車總產額是780億美元，成為世界第5大汽車裝配國，其生產效益並帶動玻璃、輪胎、

<sup>34</sup> M. Ayhan Kose, Guy M. Meredith, and Christopher M. Towe, How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican Economy? Review and Evidence, IMF Working Paper, [https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp\\_0459.pdf](https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp_0459.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal, 2018, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, p.14, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf>.

<sup>36</sup> 經濟部國際貿易局－中華民國對外貿易發展協會，〈墨西哥2014-2016年主要出口產品〉，貿協全球資訊網，<http://www.taitraesource.com/total01.asp>.

<sup>37</sup> Simoes, Alexander. "What Dose Mexico Export?(1993-2016)." The Observatory of Economic Complexity, [https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree\\_map/sitc/export/mex/all/show/1993/](https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/mex/all/show/1993/); [https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree\\_map/hs92/export/mex/all/show/2016/](https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/mex/all/show/2016/); Mexico, The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/mex/#Exports>.

<sup>38</sup> Los ganadores y los perdedores del TLC en México y EU, BBC, <https://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/01/los-ganadores-y-los-perdedores-del-tlc-en-mexico-y-eu/#axzz2xAPu2i00>.

塗料和零件等部門的生產。<sup>39</sup>2014 年汽車生產量急速擴增到 336 萬 5306 輛，較 2013 年之 305 萬 2395 輛，大幅成長 10.25%。2015 年時墨國已達到全球第 7 大汽車生產國地位，全球第 4 大汽車出口國及美國汽車市場第 1 大供應國。<sup>40</sup>

墨西哥在美國汽車和汽車零件部件貿易總額中的比重於 1993 年到 2013 年間從 5% 增長至 18%，在汽車零部件方面，墨西哥的比重同期間，則從 21% 增長至 36%，2013 年墨西哥已成美國汽車商品的首要供應商，佔美國的汽車和汽車零部件進口總額的 28%(763 億美元)。<sup>41</sup>

根據美國人口調查局所提供之表 2「美國對墨西哥的貨品貿易」數字，到 2015 年，美墨的商品貿易赤字約為 600 億美元，此規模約等同於汽車產業貿易的總赤字。據美國貿易代表署指出，墨西哥 2015 年對美國出口最大項目為汽車產業，總出口額為 740 億美元，而美國出口至墨西哥總貿易額僅為 220 億美元。墨西哥擁有超過 400 間零件生產廠，此產業集結超過 2000 家公司，其中 65% 為外國業者所持有。2015 年時，美國對墨西哥汽車產業 50 億美元的直接投資當中，有 60% 流入零件製造。<sup>42</sup>2016 年美國從墨西哥進口的汽車與汽車零件，佔當年度美國的汽車和汽車零部件進口總額的 30%，第三到第五名依序為電腦設備、通訊設備與影音設備。<sup>43</sup>

## 墨西哥加入《北美自由貿易協定》22 年的成果

在墨西哥加入《北美自由貿易協定》22 年來的相關貿易活動推動之下，我們可以看到墨國在就業率、吸引外資、產業升級與外匯存底等一系列成果，乃至若干負面的效應，茲分述如下：

### 就業狀況

傳統工廠的職位和製造業界的空心化，是已開發國家貧富差距擴大的重要原因，對屬於藍領階級的中年男性群體造成嚴重打擊。而在許多面臨過早進入第三產業、去工業化和工業化停滯問題的發展中國家裡，工業部門職位也在下降，女性在工業領域中的就業，受到的不利衝擊更遠大於男性。從 1991 年到 2014 年，發展中國家男性工業就業占男性總就業的比例，平均下降了 7.5%，而女性的這一比例則下降了 39%。<sup>44</sup>

<sup>39</sup> 石雅如，墨西哥加入北美自由貿易區二十年之觀察(1994-2014)，台灣國際研究學會，頁 10，<http://www.tisanet.org/conference/20140413/20140413-1.pdf>.

<sup>40</sup> 經濟部國貿局，《墨西哥國家檔》，2016 年 6 月 8 日，<https://www.trade.gov.tw/Files/PageFile/1ffd41fa-3a82-49bf-90b2-ff932a74f753.pdf>.

<sup>41</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)；〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(下)...〉《金融發展研究》，2014 年 10 期，頁 57。


<sup>42</sup> 陳又嘉，〈川普經濟學〉這比「墨西哥製」汽車更大條！，鉅亨網，201 年 1 月 4 日，<https://news.cnyes.com/news/id/3669610>。

<sup>43</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal & Ian F. Fergusson, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-2017, p.18.

<sup>44</sup> 聯合國貿易和發展會議，《2017 年貿易和發展報告》(頁 1~33)，[http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/tdr 2017 overview\\_ch.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/tdr 2017 overview_ch.pdf)，頁 22。

但根據「經濟合作暨發展組織」(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD)對墨西哥整體失業率百分比的統計數據，該國並未受到如此影響。其失業率從1990年的2.8%，至1993年為3.4%，爬至最高峰的1995年是6.2%，此後就一路下降，直到2008年金融風暴後隔年又升到5.4%，此後再度緩降，2016年為3.9%。<sup>45</sup>而如果以超過一年以上的長期失業率來說，墨國從1995年的1.5%之後都相當穩定，到2016年為1.99%。<sup>46</sup>換言之，簽署協定22年來，對墨西哥整體就業率具有穩定的作用。

圖2：墨西哥的失業率(1990-2016)



資料來源：OECD, <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart>.

## 吸引外資

作為一個開發中國家，又面臨外債危機，墨西哥改採出口擴張政策的目的就是要獲取外資。而吸引外國直接投資(Foreign direct investment, FDI)一直是提供出口資金與弭平貿易赤字的重要策略。墨國在加入協定後，所獲得之外國直接投資是非常高的。以從美國獲得之外國直接投資(U.S.FDI)來說，由表5可知，從1993年的152億美元增加到2012年的1044億美元，其後有所波動，2013年降為864億美元，於2015年又回升至928億美元，外國直接投資淨流入占當年度墨國國內生產毛額的2.6%，而有接近一半的外國直接投資投入了製造業。<sup>47</sup>這與其他一些周邊國家的外資並不相同：外資在墨西哥被用來投到加工產品促進出口，但其他周邊國家的外資卻多被用來進入本國市場。例如2000年上半年，墨西哥的外

<sup>45</sup> OECD, "Unemployment rate," <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart>; Mexico: Unemployment rate from 2007 to 2017, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263702/unemployment-rate-in-mexico/>.

<sup>46</sup> OECD, "Long-term unemployment rate," <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/long-term-unemployment-rate.htm>.

<sup>47</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal, Ian F. Fergusson, 2017, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), pp. 20~21; 聯合國開發計畫署(UNDP)(Selim Jahan), 《2016年人類發展報告》，頁249，[http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr\\_2016\\_report\\_chinese\\_web.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_report_chinese_web.pdf).

國直接投資中，46%投入加工市場，巴西則僅有24%投入。<sup>48</sup>

在這些年中，值得注意的是2001年起，由於遭受美國911恐怖攻擊事件所增加的不確定性、世界經濟成長率減緩等因素，世界的外國直接投資總量從2001年至2004年在已開發國家出現衰退現象，但這些錢卻大量流入墨西哥。例如2000年從美國進入墨國的外國直接投資為393億美元，隔年暴增為525億美元，<sup>49</sup>換言之，如果沒有墨國出口擴張政策的改變，後來就不能搭上外資投入的順風車了。

**表5：美國與墨西哥歷年直接投資(FDI)(1993-2016)** (單位：百萬美元)

貿易投資年	墨西哥對美國的 FDI	美國對墨西哥的 FDI
1993	1244	15221
1994	2069	16968
1995	1850	16873
1996	1641	19351
1997	3100	24050
1998	2055	26657
1999	1999	37151
2000	7462	39352
2001	6645	52544
2002	7829	56303
2003	9022	56851
2004	7592	63384
2005	3595	73687
2006	5310	82965
2007	8478	91046
2008	8420	87443
2009	11111	84047
2010	10970	85751
2011	12500	85599
2012	12751	104388
2013	15869	86433
2014	16567	89650
2015	16597	92812
2016	16800	87600

資料來源：M. Angeles Villarreal, Ian F. Fergusson. 2017. *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, p.37; and M. Angeles Villarreal. 2018. “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications,” p.4.

<sup>48</sup> Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez (2005), p.129.

<sup>49</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal, Ian F. Fergusson, 2017, *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, p. 37.

## 產業升級

出口產品項目對墨西哥工業發展是重要觀察指標，亦可為評估其競爭力的一環。如前所述，出口造成了墨國經濟史無前例的擴張，大幅提升了其在墨西哥經濟的重要性。1980 年出口僅占墨西哥國民生產總值的 7.6%，2000 年即躍升為 31%。工業升級在初級產品變為加工品的部分也有顯著改變。在 1980 年代，初級產品佔了墨西哥出口市場前十名：燃料(包括石油與天然氣)、礦產、農產品等，主要出口產品是原油，以 1983 年為例，占出口比例甚至可以到 55%。到了 1990 年代，石油的出口佔有率跌至 35.2%，到了 2000 年，墨西哥的出口產業有了戲劇性的轉變，石油出口比例跌至 7.3%，而加工品佔有 89.9%。<sup>50</sup>

加入《北美自由貿易協定》後，墨西哥致力於使其出口產品多樣化，由初、中級產品擴大為加工品，並更加精緻化。1985 年時，石油與農產等初級產品仍在出口項目中名列前茅，但在 2000 年時大多已經消失，由小客車、原油、汽車零件、電線、通信、資訊通信設備、電視電器所取代。由周邊各國出口產品的比較，更能看出墨西哥在產業的成長與升級：1980 年代，墨西哥、阿根廷、巴西與智利的出口產品十分雷同，皆為原物料(農、礦產與石油)，後三國在 20 年間都維持類似的出口產品，只有巴西與阿根廷在汽車方面有所成長，而墨西哥則在資本密集與高科技產品有所發展提升，例如機動車輛(motor vehicles)、電子通信設備與電腦等。<sup>51</sup>

汽車工業顯示墨西哥加工業的突飛猛進，不但生產出更高科技且複雜的零件，更參與了研發活動。1990 年代，汽車工業是墨西哥唯一重要的加工業，超過 50 萬人受僱為全球八大汽車製造商(通用、福特、克萊斯勒、日產、本田、福斯、BMW 與賓士)工作，尤其在協定簽署生效的 1994 年至 1995 年間，美國三大汽車商(通用、福特、克萊斯勒)在墨西哥製造的汽車比例從 48% 擴增到 80%。以工業升級的邏輯來看，墨國在汽車工業的持續發展路徑有兩個方向是特別有效的：一是利用福斯與福特這世界兩大汽車廠為基礎，發展更具整合性的汽車供應網絡；二是鼓勵國內相關企業重視研發，使墨國的新興廠商得以成為全球汽車工業的重要推動力量。<sup>52</sup>

## 外匯存底

墨西哥的外匯存底在尚未簽協定之 1990 年為 98.6 億美元，1994 年為 62.8 億，其後一路攀升，2014 年達到 1909.2 億美元而為歷史新高，2016 年為 1735.4 億美元，<sup>53</sup>每年大幅增長趨勢如圖 3。以世界排名而論，1990 年墨西哥的外匯存底為第 26 名，1994 年因金融危機降為 44 名，此後即開始往上升，2014 年排名

<sup>50</sup> Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez (2005), p.127; Alexander Simoes, The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), [https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree\\_map/sitc/export/mex/all/show/1983/](https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/mex/all/show/1983/).


<sup>51</sup> Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez (2005), p.128.

<sup>52</sup> Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez (2005), pp.130-131.

<sup>53</sup> World Bank, “World Development Indicators: The Islamic Development Bank,” <http://data.isdb.org/pxfdrcg/world-bank-development-indicators-wdi-2017-idb-aggregates?tsId=1113470>; World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>.

躍升為第11名，超越德國，2016年排名為第12名。<sup>54</sup>

圖3：墨西哥外匯存底(1990-2016)



資料來源：World Bank, “2017 World Bank-Development Indicators (WDI)-201-IDB

Aggregates: Mexico-Foreign Exchange Reserves (US\$ billion),”

<http://data.isdb.org/pxfdrcg/world-bank-development-indicators-wdi-2017-idb-aggregates?tsId=1113470>.

### 消極效應

相對於出口加工製造業的蓬勃發展，墨西哥國內非加工出口製造業佔國內製造業比重，從加入《北美自由貿易協定》前的91%，跌到1996年的37%。1993年墨西哥玩具製造協會登記有380間廠商，但加入《北美自由貿易協定》後，隨著貿易自由化數百噸的玩具進口，在1995年減少只剩下30家，使墨西哥傳統玩具幾乎從市場上消失。<sup>55</sup>

儘管出口在短期內(1994-2004)即躍升為墨西哥的主要經濟來源，但依宏觀經濟數字觀之，《北美自由貿易協定》剛簽署時墨西哥的貿易收支呈現增長表現出色，但進口擴展的速度卻快過出口，進口的金額累計增加速度超過出口淨值，而呈現明顯的貿易逆差。初期墨西哥重度依賴美國作為出口市場，但由於工業製成品進口的比重增加，每年進口金額大於出口，加入《北美自由貿易協定》的20年間，半成品的進口總額自1993年的460億美元，到2012年2,770億美元，約漲了446%，機械設備等之資本貨物進口也從1993年105億美元，上漲到2012年385億美元，近265%之漲幅。<sup>56</sup>以進出口指數觀之，在2006年至2010年間，每

<sup>54</sup> The World Bank, <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Mexico/>; The GlobalEconomy.com, “Reserves– Country Rankings,” <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/Reserves/>.

<sup>55</sup> 石雅如，〈認識FTA(3)：墨西哥加入NAFTA20年之觀察〉，風傳媒，2014年6月12日，<http://www.storm.mg/article/23106>.

<sup>56</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥加入北美自由貿易區二十年之觀察(1994-2014)〉，台灣國際研究學會，頁11，<http://www.tisanet.org/conference/20140413/20140413-1.pdf>.

年增加-1%，至2010年甚至到-9.6%，將近一成的逆差，2013年上半年數據顯示，墨西哥貿易收支出現高達20億美元的赤字。<sup>57</sup>2015年貿易逆差升至144.6億美元，是2014年的5.1倍。而到2017年，赤字降為108.8億美元，為近三年的最低點。<sup>58</sup>此外，在全球化的影響下，中國大陸對墨國的貿易逆差也佔有很大比例，以2014年—2016年墨國主要進口來源國家看來，前三名依序為美國、中國大陸與日本，而出口部分中國大陸則為第三，一來一往之間，加深了墨國逆差的幅度。<sup>59</sup>此數據恰好證明《北美自由貿易協定》的重要性，因為如果不計入對美加貿易，可以想見墨西哥若非缺乏經濟成長動能，就是逆差會更形嚴重。

此外，儘管《北美自由貿易協定》讓出口製造業獲利，但貿易擴展導致垂直供應關係的產生，尤其在美墨邊境沿線，即在美國生產並出口到墨西哥的中間產品以及成品的回流，增加了美國與墨西哥邊境地區作為生產基地的重要性。美國製造業，包括汽車、電子、器具和機械業在內，皆依靠墨西哥生產商的幫助。而如墨西哥銀行和國家地理統計研究所的數據顯示，有82%的墨西哥出口產品為工業成品，其中有一半為加工出口，但很少或根本未使用墨西哥的國產原料，而進口的生產機械設備則佔了進口總值的75%，長期依賴進口機械，使墨西哥的鋼鐵工業和機具生產鏈相關行業因而沒落，對創造長期的工業與經濟發展之功能有所侷限。<sup>60</sup>

再者，農業在《北美自由貿易協定》簽署前，是墨西哥多數人賴以為生的行業，但通常也被視為是自由貿易協定簽署後影響最大的項目之一。自1980年代初期，也就是墨西哥開始轉向不同發展模式起，重要農產品的產量便不斷下滑：穀物掉了27.6%，紅肉類下降34.6%，牛奶減少15.5%，木材則降了37.4%。而更嚴重的問題是，墨國農業生產的集中程度很高：1490家工廠(firms)生產全國80%的農作，其餘40萬家小公司和企業佔了剩下的20%。即便在1999年時，這個產業雖僅佔有墨西哥國內生產毛額的4%，卻代表了該國25%人口的生計，農業受到嚴重影響，就等於該國很大一部份的人口會陷入更加貧窮的處境。加入北美自由貿易區後，墨西哥農產品的進出口量隨即大幅成長，只是進口增幅比出口高。1990年加入前，墨西哥進口十大基本作物約870萬噸，到了2000年，十大基本作物的進口量已經增加1.12倍，其中90%從美國進口。而墨西哥對美農產品輸出集中於蔬果。1995年—2000年間，墨西哥對美出口水果成長76%，蔬菜則成長26%，但同時期從美國進口的脫水蔬菜卻增加了77%，加工水果乾的進口則增加了3倍。一來一往之後，美國出口到墨西哥的加工蔬果，遠遠超過從墨西哥進口的新鮮蔬果。<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup> 同上註，頁12。

<sup>58</sup> Anthony Harrup, "Mexico's 2017 Trade Deficit Narrows," *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 26, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/mexicos-2017-trade-deficit-narrows-1516985928>; 中華人民共和國商務部，2015年墨西哥主要交易夥伴，2016年6月28日，[http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/dxfw/nbgz\\_201606/20160601347708.shtml](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/dxfw/nbgz_201606/20160601347708.shtml).

<sup>59</sup> 墨西哥2014—2016年主要進口來源國家，貿協全球資訊網，<https://www.taitraesource.com/total01.asp>.

<sup>60</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥加入北美自由貿易區二十年之觀察(1994-2014)〉，台灣國際研究學會，頁13，<http://www.tisanet.org/conference/20140413/20140413-1.pdf>.

<sup>61</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥的新自由主義政策—.....〉，《台灣國際研究季刊》第8卷、第3期(2012/秋季號)頁91-94；Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez, *Mexico's economic transformation under NAFTA*, in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, Riordan Roett(eds.), 2005, *Mexico's Democracy at*

在此情況下，可以想見原來農夫能從高密度的農作獲得可以接受的利潤，但在市場開放後，國內農產品價格必然會隨之降低，進而影響其生計。依照《北美自由貿易協定》協議，2003 年 1 月 1 日起，墨西哥對美加進口包括小麥、大麥、稻米、馬鈴薯等重要糧食作物及 26 種農牧業產品取消進口關稅。面對擁有美國政府補助大量湧入的廉價糧食威脅，2002 年 12 月，墨西哥農民群集在首都和各省首府抗議，要求政府與美、加談判修改《北美自由貿易協定》中關於農業的條款。這時候墨西哥境內黃豆產量只占國內需求的 7%，進口黃豆卻有將近 98% 來自美國。對種植玉米的農民來說，他們也必須面對全球產量最高且高度自動化的美國同行，儘管協定對免關稅進口的玉米數量有配額限制，但其他進口玉米也是象徵性的多徵 1-3% 的稅。為此在 2007 年 1 月 31 日，有 7 萬多農工代表及左派社運份子在首都舉行示威遊行，抗議政府對農產品價格控制不力，導致主食玉米餅價格上揚：以往每公斤不到 7 披索的玉米餅，在 2006 年底價格卻漲到 15 披索，有些地區甚至漲到近 30 披索。<sup>62</sup>過去美國低價玉米價格大量進口，導致墨國境內的小農放棄生產，但近年來因環保意識抬頭，以玉米生產乙醇的生質能源需求量增加，結果導致美國玉米的價格上漲，更加連帶影響外銷至墨西哥的玉米價格。在此同時，墨西哥稻米也有 85% 從美國進口。<sup>63</sup>將這些不利因素加總起來，就有批評者認為此導致農業部門大量裁員，甚至指出 1991 年-2000 年該部門失去的工作職位超過百萬。<sup>64</sup>

最後，對強大鄰國開放市場，相對較易受到對方景氣影響。墨西哥政府一直致力於將出口產品多樣化，並利用許多自由貿易協定將之推銷到全球，但美國仍是其主要貿易夥伴。<sup>65</sup>美國擁有穩定且相對傑出的經濟表現、低通貨膨脹率、充沛資金，對墨西哥而言似乎好處多多，但凡事有利必有弊，例如每一國家經濟都會出現循環起伏，墨國對美國的經濟循環必然會格外敏感。正如同一句墨西哥諺語所說：「如果美國感冒了，那麼墨西哥肯定會得肺炎。」墨西哥對美國貿易占的比重越大，受其影響也越高。從圖 4 可知，將美墨兩國的經濟成長率做成曲線圖放在一起比較，在《北美自由貿易協定》簽署前，墨西哥經濟的興衰起落並不與最大貿易夥伴美國產生緊密聯繫，但簽署後就逐漸產生連動，我們可以發現兩國的經濟成長率波動越來越趨向一致。

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Work: Political and Economic Dynamics, Boulder, Colo. ; London : L. Rienner Publishers, 2005, p.133。


<sup>62</sup> 徐世澄，〈墨西哥農業發展的經驗與教訓〉，人民網，中國共產黨新聞>理論>社會民生>經濟，2007 年 04 月 19 日，<http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/49154/49155/5636156.html>.

<sup>63</sup> 石雅如，〈墨西哥的新自由主義政策—.....〉，《台灣國際研究季刊》第 8 卷、第 3 期(2012/秋季號)頁 91-94；Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez, Mexico's economic transformation under NAFTA, in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, Riordan Roett(eds.), 2005, Mexico's Democracy at Work: Political and Economic Dynamics, Boulder, Colo. ; London : L. Rienner Publishers, 2005, p.133。

<sup>64</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)；〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(下).....〉，《金融發展研究》，2014 年 10 期，頁 58。

<sup>65</sup> Trading Economics, “Mexico Exports By Country,” 2017,  
<https://tradingeconomics.com/mexico/exports- by- country>.

圖4：美國與墨西哥經濟成長率的波動情況(1985-2017)



資料來源：M. Angeles Villarreal, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications,” 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf>.

此外，在圖4中，除了兩國經濟連動之外，還能看到的現象就是美國好，墨國經濟狀況不一定立即反映，但美國有事，不論是貨幣貶值或財政危機，美國挺住了，墨國卻常常跌得更深。例如2000年初，美國網路公司開始沒落，再加上2001年911恐怖攻擊事件發生，造成美國經濟下行，對墨西哥就造成更大的打擊，傷害最大的是其賴以為生的出口業，包括電腦、電子與自動化工業都受到影響。自1982年起，墨西哥的經濟危機大多與政府赤字、劣質公共管理與貪腐有關，但卻無法從內部因素解釋上述在2001年與2002年出現的經濟危機。在此危機中，2000年墨國還有7%的淨成長(net growth)，2001年國內生產毛額成長就掉落成不到0.5%，2002年也僅僅微升到0.65%。對於墨西哥這樣的開發中國家而言，一年近於零的成長是非常嚴重的問題。<sup>66</sup>

然而，對於上述消極效應，也有不同研究或數據提出看法。例如墨西哥的鋼鐵工業是否趨向沒落？據世界鋼鐵協會年鑑數據，墨國粗鋼(Crude Steel)生產1993年為920萬公噸，2007年為1757萬公噸，2016年為1882萬公噸；另外根據經濟部全球台商服務網所顯示，2002年墨國鋼產量尚占全球第16名，2011年墨國鋼鐵之產量為1810萬噸，約占全球產量15億2730萬噸之1.2%，產量排名提升至全球第13名。<sup>67</sup>

其次，墨西哥農業的沈淪，是否都要歸咎於《北美自由貿易協定》的簽署？面對美國優勢農業是否毫無希望？從協定前或近幾年墨西哥農業發展狀況來看，恐怕也是有爭論空間的。歷史上墨國曾進行過兩次土地改革，第一次始於1914年，政策是國家徵收富人土地為國有，將之分配給無地農民的集體組織

<sup>66</sup> Gary Gereffi and Martha A. Martínez (2005), p.136.

<sup>67</sup> 見The World Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, <https://www.worldsteel.org/steel-by-topic/statistics/steel-statistical-yearbook-.html>；經濟部，全球台商服務網，<http://twbusiness.nat.gov.tw/files/201211/1011126MXsteel.pdf>.

「ejido」（印第安人的集體組織稱為 *Comunidad*），農民沒有自己所耕種土地的所有權，只有使用和種植收益權，但組織也無權將土地出售、出租或抵押，所有權實際歸屬於國家。而在 20 世紀中後期，農地使用出現了兩種現象。第一是大量農地被政府徵收為城市用地，而農民集體組織或農民，都無權享受這些土地的增值收益；其二是即便農民保有土地的使用權，但被禁止出售或租賃土地，如果農民本人沒有持續耕作，這些土地就會被收回並分配給其它家庭。結果為了保住土地，多數農村人口只能選擇務農而非進入大城市找工作，長期下來使得農業收入微薄，工業也缺乏勞動力；同時也因為土地無法交易，農業生產大多只能以小農形式進行，生產效率低下。在 1990 年代初期，農業占墨西哥國內生產毛額的 3.8%，而農業人口卻能占總人口的 34.4%，勞動力市場的扭曲已經達到非常嚴重的程度。因此 1992 年－1993 年的第二次土地改革就是為了要改變這個情況，透過授予農民土地所有權方式，來激勵農民進行農業生產和資本投入。簡言之，這種產權改革，對於新自由主義者而言，也就是意味著市場經濟的勃興。<sup>68</sup>

由上述可知，在簽署自由貿易協定之前，墨西哥農業的土地分割太細，導致生產力難以提升，自由化改革反而具有釋放整體生產力的用意。另有研究指出，墨西哥農民之所以會大量失業，主要原因是在 1980 與 90 年代初期墨國自身的農業改革措施所導致，因為這些改革措施乃是私有化與增加競爭力，故以過去政府補貼後的農業數據來批評自由化改革的政策並不準確，而整併與農業有關的國營企業並調整主食作物的價格與補貼政策等，這些政策的效果也很難與協定區分開來。<sup>69</sup>

另一方面，近幾年墨西哥農業發展也不盡是全部挨打。雖然從 2000 年至 2016 年，美國出口到墨西哥的農產品，從 64 億美元增長到 178 億美元，幅度達到 178%，2016 年佔美國出口到世界農產品金額的 13%，但同時間美國從墨國進口的農產品金額價值也不遑多讓。除了在趨勢上與出口一樣節節高昇外，2015 年與 2016 年墨西哥進口到美國的農產品，甚至高過於出口的農產品，是從 2000 年以來的反轉趨勢，2016 年達到 230 億美元。<sup>70</sup>

再者，也有研究從歷史上墨國經濟表現指出，美墨經濟的同步性與依賴似乎不是件壞事。就同步性而言，《北美自由貿易協定》有助於接近美加的發展水平，因為該協定幫助墨西哥製造商更快適應美國的技術革新，減少墨西哥宏觀經濟波動或國內生產總值增長率的較大波動，提高了美、加、墨三國商業周期的同步性。<sup>71</sup>墨西哥與美國經濟的同步，相對於墨國過去經濟大起大落的不穩定情況，似乎反而是一種進步。而關於依賴部分，墨西哥曾經嚴重依賴美國作為出口市場，但

<sup>68</sup> 關於兩次土地改革相關過程，可參考：王一鳴，〈墨西哥土地確權，居然確了十三年〉，《每日頭條》，2017-03-23 2017 年 3 月 23 日，<https://kknews.cc/zh-tw/agriculture/y8rlqlg.html>。

<sup>69</sup> M. Angeles Villarreal, Ian F. Fergusson, 2017, *The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, p.19；威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(下)....〉，金融發展研究，2014 年 10 期，頁 58。

<sup>70</sup> Minnesota Department of Agriculture, “the US Agricultural Exports to Mexico, 2017,” <https://www.mda.state.mn.us/food/business/~/media/Files/food/business/intlprofiles/profilemexico.pdf>.

<sup>71</sup> 威廉·庫珀(William H. Cooper)、王宇(譯)，〈從 NAFTA 到 TPP(下)....〉，金融發展研究，2014 年 10 期，頁 57-58。

近年來這一趨勢正逐漸改善，墨西哥對美國出口的百分比從1993年的83%降低到2012年的78%。<sup>72</sup>

## 結論

對《北美自由貿易協定》最常見的發展評估，通常會提及當年在討論該協定時，贊同方依自由貿易理論的論點，預期協定會改善墨西哥的經濟條件、縮小墨國與美加之間的收入差距。<sup>73</sup>只是協定實施到目前為止，很明顯地，美墨之間的發展仍有相當差距。但如果從改善條件、縮小差距的程度來看，仍可依不同發展定義分別論述之。

依墨西哥政府在1980年代面臨進口替代政策無效率、外債過高困境，因此希望加入該協定增加投資信心、吸引更多外國投資、擴大就業機會與勞工所得、加速貿易增長以及促進國內經濟發展。對當時墨國執政當局而言，這不僅是一國該要選擇哪種發展路徑的問題，更是迫在眉睫的國家危機。從目前所見數據，我們可知舊危機已經消失，而上述期待在加入協定後也基本獲得改善，只是仍有不足之處：墨國在加入協定後擴大其出口擴張政策，國內生產毛額成長率整體而言向上攀升，固然加入後的比率無法達到1964年11.9%或1979年9.7%的成長幅度，但相較於進入1980年代連續探底的發展速度：1983年為-4.2%，1986年為-3.8%，<sup>74</sup>舊的發展模式確實已難以為繼，而外債過高也讓當時的墨國政府無從選擇。

在墨國加入協定後，外債從1986年最高佔國民總收入(Gross National Income, GNI)比的82.9%，到2008年最低的17.8%，但後來又緩步上升，2016年數字為40.7%；<sup>75</sup>而光是從美國獲得之對外直接投資存量來看，1993年的152億美元增加到2012年的1044億美元，2013年降為864億美元，於2015年又升至928億美元；墨國外匯存底的世界排名則從1990年的第26名，到2014年超越德國，2016年排名為第12名。另從失業率數字來看，從1995年的6.2%下降，2016年為3.9%。如以超過一年以上的長期失業率來說，墨國則是在1995年的1.5%後就相當穩定，到2016年為1.99%。在貿易增長方面，美墨貿易總額自1993年的416億美元增至2016年的2310億美元，增加了455%。亦可見何以現任的美國總統川普(Donald J. Trump)近年來一直要重談協定的重要原因。

除了傳統注重GDP成長率的發展觀之外，近年新的發展觀已經將發展定義修正為不以經濟成長為優先，而另外以考量人民福祉及弱勢者的利益為主。反映在該協定中，就是勞工與環境的相關補充協定的規範。在此部分，我們看到積極

<sup>72</sup> 同上註，頁58。

<sup>73</sup> 同上註，頁58。

<sup>74</sup> World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %): Mexico,” <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2016&locations=MX&start=1961&view=chart>.

<sup>75</sup> 其他統計數字也顯示近年的升高趨勢。例如2016年佔GDP比為38.5%。見：World Bank, External debt stocks (% of GNI), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DEXT.GN.ZS?end=2016&locations=MX&start=1984&view=chart>; 司爾亞司資料資訊有限公司(CEIC)－全球經濟資料庫，〈墨西哥外債：占國內生產總值百分比，2002-2017年〉，<https://www.ceicdata.com/zh-hans/indicator/mexico/external-debt--of-nominal-gdp>。

與消極面並存的現象。例如勞工就業率穩定提升，但從殖民時期的歷史來看，墨西哥的貧富差距問題就已經很嚴重了，直到目前仍是如此。<sup>76</sup>只是協定開始後問題嚴重性也在穩定下降。而從世界銀行(World Bank)測量貧富差距的各種「基尼係數」(Gini coefficient)來看，從1993年至2010年的數據都在下降當中。<sup>77</sup>最大的降幅則發生在2000年到2002年，而2006年的基尼係數較之1992年低了近5%。<sup>78</sup>如果再與周邊各國的吉尼係數相比較，我們將發現，墨西哥雖然有貧富差距問題，但與未納入協定的周邊國家如：阿根廷、巴西、智利、委內瑞拉等國相比，墨西哥的貧富差距更有縮小的趨勢。<sup>79</sup>

以世界銀行的人類發展指數(human development index)標準，也就是從過去單純考量經濟面向來評估發展，擴張到加入社會、文化、性別和個人能力發展等經濟發展水準的指標一併觀之，<sup>80</sup>聯合國提供關於墨國從1980年起至2015年的統計數字，最低的是1980年的0.595，最高的是2015年的0.762，2014年與2015年的名次在188個國家中皆名列第77名，<sup>81</sup>這也可以證明墨西哥自從加入《北美自由貿易協定》後的國家發展符合世界銀行新的人類發展指標之趨勢。

另外，在教育的人口素質部分，相對於墨國政府加入協定後變得更富有，在教育人口素質上則墨西哥似乎仍應再加把勁。從3歲到24歲的受教育人口，從1990年的4280萬1821人，到1995年的4564萬994人，2000年起開始下降，2005年為4489萬8388人，但2010年又增為4727萬6312人，<sup>82</sup>可見受教育人口比例並沒有特別增多。在國家富裕的前提下，這麼重要的議題卻沒有大幅度的進步，可見墨西哥政府仍然缺乏有效率、遠見與能力，以發展、強化而國家競爭能力與工業科技政策。<sup>83</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Alice Krozer and Carlos Juan Moreno-Brid, "Inequality in Mexico," 2014,  
<https://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/newsletterarticles/inequality-in-mexico/>.

<sup>77</sup> The World Bank, "All the Ginis Dataset," <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/all-ginis-dataset>.

<sup>78</sup> Leonardo Gasparini, Guillermo Cruces and Leopoldo Tornarolli, "Recent Trends in Income Inequality in Latin America," p.177. *Economia Journal*, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association- Lacea, vol. 1(Spring 20), pp. 147-201, Jan., 2009,  
<https://ideas.repec.org/a/col/000425/008446.html>.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p.20; Dominik Hartmann1, Cristian Jara-Figueroa, Miguel Guevara, Alex Simoes and César A. Hidalgo, "The structural constraints of income inequality in Latin America," *Integration & Trade Journal*, No. 40, June 2016, p.70-85.

<sup>80</sup> 該指標由聯合國開發計畫署(UNDP)於《1990年人文發展報告》中提出，它整合了人類發展三個基本維度的綜合指數：出生時預期壽命、平均受教育年限和預期受教育年限、人均國民總收入，用以衡量聯合國各成員國經濟社會發展水準。1990年發佈的第一份人類發展報告指出，人類發展是以人為本的發展方式。要將發展的主題從追求物質富裕轉移到提升人類福祉，從追求收入最大化轉移到拓展人的可行性能力，從優化增長轉移到擴大人的自由。其關注的是人們生活上的富足，而不僅是經濟上的富裕，這種做法也改變了發展成果的審視角度。詳情亦可參：聯合國開發計畫署(UNDP)，《2016年人類發展報告》，頁2-3，  
[http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr\\_2016\\_report\\_chinese\\_web.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_report_chinese_web.pdf)。

<sup>81</sup> 越趨近於1越好，Human Development Indicators, United Nations Development Programme,  
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MEX>; Mexico: Human Development;  
[https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Mexico/human\\_development/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Mexico/human_development/);  
[http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr\\_2016\\_report\\_chinese\\_web.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_report_chinese_web.pdf).

<sup>82</sup> National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Inegi), <http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/temas/educacion/>

<sup>83</sup> Escaping the Middle-Income Trap: The Experiences of Ireland and Mexico, 2015,  
<https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2015/december/escaping-middle-income-trap-experiences-ireland-mexico>.

台灣有些研究關注國家簽署自由貿易協定，容易導致經濟交流過於緊密，而使協定國家經濟容易相互牽連與影響，從墨國 GDP 成長率起伏深受美國經濟狀況影響可資印證。但另一方面，亦可注意到自從《北美自由貿易協定》簽署後，墨國產業結構改變的現象：過去墨國主要出口產業最大佔比是石油等原物料，但在協定施行後，到 2016 年，主要出口項目則變為汽車、汽車零件與大卡車，原油則掉到前五名之外，這是個相對過去較佳的經濟結構與產業發展，對墨西哥國家的整體經濟發展而言，加入《北美自由貿易協定》應是利大於弊的。

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
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## 拉美重要人物側寫



*Revista Trimestral de Estudios de Economía y Comercio de América Latina Entrevista al Dr. Xuedong Liu Sun, Doctor en Economía y Profesor de Posgrado de la Facultad de Estudios Superiores (FES) Aragón - Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).*

### Sobre su carrera profesional

#### 1. ¿Cuál es su formación profesional y sus líneas de investigación actuales?

Liu Xuedong obtuvo el grado de Doctorado en Economía, de la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) en 1997, Maestría en Economía del Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) en 1991, y Licenciatura en Economía de la Renmin University of China (RUC) en 1985.

Entre las actividades profesionales, destaca la labor docente desempeñado en la Renmin University of China y en la División de Estudios de Posgrado e Investigación, Facultad de Estudios Superiores Aragón, UNAM, asimismo como funcionario en la Secretaría de Economía de México. Actualmente es Profesor de Carrera Tiempo Completo Titular “C”, miembro del Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (SIN).

Sus principales líneas de investigación relacionan con la evolución del sistema de tenencia de tierra y su incorporación al proceso de urbanización; políticas monetarias y ajustes cambiarios para las economías emergentes; asimismo como los temas sobre los intercambios comerciales y de inversiones entre China y México.

#### 2. ¿Qué motivos le llevaron a desarrollar gran parte de su carrera en México?

Después de titularme en la maestría en economía en México logré ingresar a la División de Estudios de Posgrado, Facultad de Economía, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México para seguir terminando los estudios en el Programa de Doctorado. Al mismo tiempo empecé a prestar mis servicios en el sector público e impartir clases en varias instituciones de educación superior en

México. Por las inercias no ha sido fácil para mí dejar lo que ya efectuado y acumulado a lo largo de estos casi 30años.

**3. ¿Cómo ha sido su experiencia como profesor e investigador en México?**

Ha sido una experiencia agradable con buen sabor en la boca, sinceramente.

**4. ¿Cuáles han sido los principales retos al enseñar en una cultura diferente a la suya, especialmente en un ambiente como el latinoamericano?**

El primer reto obvio a superar ha sido el idioma para poder impartir las clases y llevar a cabo las prácticas con los alumnos y los colegas. Al inicio definitivamente me ha costado el trabajo, pues la buena y la fluyente comunicación entre los ser humanos es una de las áreas más difíciles de entablar y lograr el entendimiento mutuo cuya complejidad rebasa la sencilla barrera lingüística en varios aspectos. Pero con el transcurso del tiempo me he podido adaptarme paulatinamente en el ambiente socio cultural propiamente prevalecidos en México.

**5. ¿Cuáles son las principales diferencias que ha identificado con el mundo académico asiático, particularmente en China?**

Como profesor de carrera de la UNAM, debo sujetar a los requerimientos establecidos por los estatutos reglamentarios de operación, por ejemplo, cada año entregar un informe de la labor realizada en el ciclo escolar inmediatamente anterior y al mismo tiempo un plan del trabajo para los siguientes semestres, al iniciar cada nuevo ciclo escolar.

Por su parte, también se pueden solicitar las promociones en caso de que el docente desea de acuerdo con el tiempo establecido por la universidad. Es importante mencionar que las promociones se otorgan de conformidad con los resultados y los logros que tiene cada uno de los profesores, sin cuotas preestablecidas. En pocas palabras, si los profesores han registrado un desempeño bueno, todos sin excepción podrán obtener la merecida ascenso en la categoría académica. Para mí, entonces, este punto marca una gran diferencia con lo regido en China actualmente.

**Sobre las perspectivas económicas para América Latina**

**6. Después de años de bonanza económica en la primera década de este siglo, seguida por años de recesión y crisis, ¿cuáles son las perspectivas para la economía regional latinoamericana en los próximos años?**


Al respecto me gustaría en primer lugar, comentar que las economías dentro de la región de América Latina y el Caribe representan gran heterogeneidad y por ello no es fácil utilizar los mismos criterios calificativos para decir cuáles son las perspectivas para la economía regional latinoamericana en los próximos años.

Como se podrá observar, al iniciar este nuevo milenio, la mayoría de las economías de la región tuvo un desempeño adecuado en el aspecto del crecimiento económico, y por ello de acuerdo con las cifras globales, la tasa de crecimiento económico en promedio fue de 2.7% anualizado para la región de América Latina y el Caribe, durante el periodo de 2000-2016.

Sin embargo, dentro de las economías regionales, Panamá, La República Dominicana y Perú han registrado cifras superiores a 5%, mientras que otros grupos de países que están incluyendo Chile, Columbia, y la mayoría de los centroamericanos, su tasa de crecimiento se ha situado en el alrededor de 4%; las primeras tres economías de la región, Brasil, México y Argentina, de 2.6, 2.4 y 2.2%, respectivamente (Gráfica 1).

Gráfica 1. Tasa de crecimiento económico promedio en los países seleccionados de la región América Latina y el Caribe, 2000-2016

(%)



Fuente: Elaboración propia de acuerdo con las cifras de la Cepal, Cepalstat.

Dentro de estos 16 años, la economía de la región ha tenido un comportamiento de altibajos importantes, sobre todo para Brasil y Argentina, ya que la tasa de crecimiento en promedio fue negativa de 2014 a 2016, en contraste con 4.4% y 4.1% de 2000 a 2013. Por su parte, la mayoría de los países de la zona, el crecimiento económico ha sido relativamente estable y dinámico, tales son los casos de Chile, Costa Rica, Perú, Panamá, etc. En el caso de México, la economía ha mostrado cierta resistencia ante los vaivenes de los choques externos, que no solamente pudo salir rápidamente de la dificultad económica generada por las crisis financieras iniciadas en los Estados Unidos en 2008, sino también ha podido mantener su tasa del crecimiento económico en terreno positivo durante los últimos dos años, a pesar de un ambiente poco favorable al nivel internacional por motivos reconocidos ampliamente.

En cuanto a las perspectivas del crecimiento económico para los países de la zona de América Latina en los próximos años, también debe de tratarse por caso concreto, a pesar de que en términos generales, tendrán potencias importantes ante los desafíos de diversos orígenes.

Para la economía brasileña, el mayor reto quizá consiste en la superación de transición del poder ante las elecciones presidenciales que se celebrarán en noviembre próximo, independientemente de las reformas estructurales pendientes por realizarse.

Por su parte, la economía argentina se encuentra en gran desafío en este año ante las volatilidades registradas por el tipo de cambio, cuya superación y por ende la estabilidad económica dependen en gran medida, de la implementación exitosa de los programas diseñados de manera conjunta entre el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) y el gobierno dirigido por Mauricio Macri. Por ello, lograr la autonomía auténtica del Banco Central del país en América del Sur y recuperar la confianza de los inversionistas son elementos cruciales para que Argentina salga con éxito del problema coyuntural que se vive en esa economía actualmente.

En el caso de la economía mexicana, la victoria contundente del Partido de Morena y sus aliados en las elecciones pasadas ha traído la tranquilidad y la certidumbre para su crecimiento. Asimismo, también es importante señalar que

el optimismo generado en torno a la renegociación del Tratado del Libre Comercio en la América del Norte desde el final de julio pasado es otro factor que podría contribuir al mejoramiento del ambiente de la inversión y del crecimiento económico.

Sin duda, todavía existen diversas variables que podrían implicar panoramas adversos para la economía mexicana, sobre todo los pendientes que se encuentran por resolverse para la nueva administración que entrará a la función a partir de 1er del diciembre de este año. Entre ellos, lo primordial indudablemente sería cómo se logrará el balance de las finanzas públicas al momento de aterrizar los proyectos de inversión y los programas sociales pronunciados en lo largo de la campaña presidencial de Andrés Manuel López Obrador. En segundo lugar, cuáles son las medidas concretas para combatir la corrupción y disminuir hasta erradicar los actos violentos que tantos daños han hecho a la economía y a la sociedad entera de México para garantizar la pacificación social y la seguridad pública.

Otras economías de la región, tales como Chile, Perú, Costa Rica, Panamá, la República Dominicana, etc., debido a la buena dinámica y al desempeño estable que han registrado en el ámbito del crecimiento económico durante los últimos 20 años, se prevé que la tendencia podrá seguirse en futuro.

#### **7. En su opinión, ¿cuáles son los retos más grandes que enfrentan actualmente las economías más grandes de la región?**

Implícitamente ya se relacionó esta incógnita en el apartado anterior. Aquí solamente me atrevería comentar los escenarios que se encuentran prevalecidos al nivel internacional que podrían impactar el desempeño económico de la región. Por un lado, la tendencia proteccionista en los comercios internacionales ha estado impactando todas las economías del mundo y obviamente la región de América Latina y el Caribe no puede resultar ser la excepción. Al mismo tiempo, las medidas de restricciones monetarias instrumentadas por la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos propiciarían todavía menores flujos de capital hacia las economías emergentes. A esto si se considera el efecto devaluatorio originado por las fricciones comerciales existentes entre el país de la Unión Americana y el resto del mundo sobre las monedas locales, los países de la región enfrentarán un desafío enorme por superarse en el corto plazo hasta mediano plazo en futuro.

Por otro lado, también surgen factores favorables que implicarán efectos positivos sobre el crecimiento económico de la zona, sobre todo ante el repunte importante del precio de petróleo crudo observado en el mercado internacional. Adicionalmente, las fricciones comerciales entre China y los Estados Unidos hasta ahora han generado demandas significativas sobre los productos agrícolas, entre ellos, la soya y sus productos derivados, originarios de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay, etc.

**8. ¿Cómo ha impactado el triunfo y el primer año de gobierno de Donald Trump sobre la economía de América Latina?**

Con la excepción de la economía mexicana por razones obvias, al parecer que las políticas comerciales y económicas instrumentadas por el gobierno de Donald Trump no han impactado al menos de manera directa sobre la economía de la región en cuestión. Hasta la fecha, no se han aplicado medidas concretas y precisas por parte del gobierno de los Estados Unidos para influir el crecimiento económico de los países de América Latina y el Caribe.

Sin embargo, de manera indirecta las economías regionales han sido afectadas, pues las fricciones comerciales iniciadas unilateralmente por los Estados Unidos, sin duda, generarán la disminución de los flujos comerciales al nivel internacional. Por su parte, las mismas acciones unilateralmente realizadas por el gobierno norteamericano significarían en gran medida, la violación de las reglas de juego que rige la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) y el consecuente funcionamiento eficiente y óptimo del mismo organismo multilateral.

**9. ¿Cuáles son los riesgos o los efectos para las economías latinoamericanas derivados de una potencial guerra comercial desatada por las medidas proteccionistas del gobierno estadounidense? (esta pregunta está relacionada con las anteriores)**

**10. ¿Cómo puede afectar el futuro económico de la región el ciclo electoral en gran parte de los países latinoamericanos?**

Al respecto, creo que la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos en la actualidad cuenta con las instituciones formalmente establecidas y fuertes que se encuentran en plena función, por ello, los ciclos electorales y las transiciones

del poder implicarán impactos mínimos sobre el crecimiento económico en caso de existirse.

De hecho, ante los cambios ya efectuados en Cuba, Costa Rica, Columbia y México, ninguno de estas economías ha registrado señales de modificaciones significativas de sus políticas económicas instrumentadas hasta la fecha.

### **Sobre el interés de China en América Latina**

#### **11. ¿Cómo describiría actualmente las relaciones económicas entre China y América Latina?**

Los vínculos económicos entre China y América Latina eran escasos antes de los años noventa del siglo pasado, pues ambas regiones se encontraban relativamente cerradas sus economías respectivas independientemente de los obstáculos naturales prevalecidos entre ambas partes, tales como la distancia, idiomas, culturas, etc.

A consecuencia de las medidas de apertura comerciales y de reformas económicas que se han llevado a cabos por los países involucrados, sobre todo por la nación asiática, se han intensificado cada vez más que antes los contactos entre las zonas geográficamente distantes. En la primera fase, los intercambios comerciales entre China y los países en América Latina y el Caribe han sido el elemento principal en el desarrollo de las relaciones bilaterales. A mediado de la década pasada, China ha comenzado a promover las inversiones directas tanto de fuentes gubernamentales como de la iniciativa privada destinadas a la región de América Latina, dirigidas primordialmente en los ámbitos de construcción y mejoramiento de las infraestructuras básicas, exploraciones y explotaciones en materias primas, y de producción agrícola, entre otros.

Desde hace 3-4 años, la cooperación bilateral del sector financiero también ha sido tema de interés para las economías involucradas en cuestión, hasta la fecha se han efectuado operaciones de Swap entre la moneda china y algunas de la zona latinoamericana, préstamos bancarios y gubernamentales, etc.

En la actualidad, se puede decir que los intercambios comerciales siguen ocupando el primer sitio dentro de la agenda de cooperación económica entre China y el continente de América Latina; sin embargo, se han surgido cada vez

más que antes las necesidades de intensificarse y profundizarse las relaciones de inversión y del sector financiero.

**12. En su opinión, ¿a qué se debe la concentración de proyectos de inversión provenientes de China en solo tres o cuatro países latinoamericanos, en específico Brasil, Argentina, Perú y Venezuela?**

Desde el ámbito de inversiones extranjeras realizadas en el continente de América Latina por China, Brasil ocupa en el primer sitio como el receptor principal. De 2001 a 2016, China ha canalizado un total de 113,662 miles de millones de dólares por la vía de salida de inversiones directas al extranjero (Outward Foreign Direct Investment, OFDI) a los países latinoamericanos, entre los cuales, el destino principal ha sido Brasil, con una participación de 48.3%, le siguen las economías como Perú, Argentina, Cuba, Jamaica y Chile, con 10.9%, 9.3%, 5.1%, 4.3%, 2.9%, respectivamente; y México ocupa en la sexta posición, de 2.8%.

Las características registradas por los vínculos económicos entre China y la América Latina, tal como se analizaron anteriormente, no resultarían en una casualidad, sino que han sido una secuela de varios elementos relacionados con ambas partes. Por el lado de China, de acuerdo con el avance en el proceso de modernización llevado a cabo por esa economía asiática, los productos clasificados como bienes intermediarios y de capital han tenido una participación creciente dentro de su comercio exterior con el resto de mundo cuyo nivel de competitividad ha sido cada vez mayor que antes por la excelente evaluación integral que incluye los costos, contenidos tecnológicos y de calidad. Añadido de lo anterior, la estrategia de promover la mayor apertura económica y el libre comercio ha propiciado flujos cada vez más que antes de inversiones hacia el resto del mundo, que en su mayoría han concentrado en la construcción y mejoramiento de las infraestructuras y en los sectores primarios, tales como la exploración de minerales, petróleos, y la producción de los “commodities”.

Desde el punto de vista de América Latina, las economías como Argentina, Brasil, Perú, entre otras, cuentan con atracciones importantes para las inversiones chinas en este lapso. De hecho, las inversiones del país asiático han concentrado mayoritariamente en la exploración de minerales, petróleos, y el sector agrícola, esto es, la producción de los “commodities”, destinadas en las economías mencionadas.

En cuanto a la reducida inversión recibida por México procedente de China, la explicación no solamente tiene que ver la estructura económica sino también relaciona con la alta capacidad que tiene México para obtener recursos financieros en los mercados financieros internacionales a través de emitir bonos tanto por el sector público como por las empresas privadas.

**13. ¿Cuáles son los principales retos que enfrenta ahora la continuidad de inversiones chinas en la región, especialmente considerando las circunstancias financieras actuales de países como Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela?**

La situación que se encuentra en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela es coyuntural y transitoria, a lo largo plazo predominará la normalidad y estabilidad económica, sobre todo para las dos primeras dos economías. Por su parte, también es importante reconocer que las circunstancias financieras prevalecidas en esas economías en gran medida, tendrían que ver con los factores externos.

Las inversiones en los proyectos tanto de infraestructuras como de sectores productivos son consideradas como del largo alcance, por ello las decisiones se deben tomar a través de evaluaciones de todas variables involucradas no solo de características estrictamente coyunturales, sino también aquellas del largo plazo. Asimismo, independientemente de las evaluaciones realizadas, la continuidad de las inversiones que ha venido realizando por China tendría que considerarse caso por caso en lugar de aplicar criterios generalizados. En varias ocasiones, existen proyectos de inversión del largo alcance que pueden resultar benéficos tanto para los inversionistas como para los receptores, a pesar de los entornos adversos.

**14. China es ya el principal inversionista y socio comercio de la subregión sudamericana, pero aún no alcanza esa posición en Centroamérica y México, ¿cree usted que eso pueda cambiar en el futuro cercano? ¿Puede China mantener una posición privilegiada en América Latina, a pesar de una recuperación económica por parte de Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea?**

Como se mencionaba anteriormente, las inversiones que se concretan y se realizan en cualquier sector productivo y bajo cualquier circunstancia tendrán

que traer beneficios tanto para los inversionistas como para los receptores. En este sentido, el papel que desempeñan las inversiones procedentes de China en Centroamérica y México depende de los beneficios que se podrán generar potencialmente en cada uno de los proyectos cuyo desarrollo está relacionado con los intereses de ambas partes.

Por su parte, no estoy seguro de que China ha mantenido una posición privilegiada en América Latina o en otra parte del mundo.

### Sobre la economía política en México

#### **15. En los años que lleva viviendo en México, ¿cuál es su visión sobre la evolución de la economía mexicana?**

En primer lugar, la economía mexicana se encuentra altamente ligada con la norteamericana aun antes de formar parte de la zona de libre comercio en América del Norte. Con la aplicación del TLCAN a partir de 1994, los lazos tradicionalmente establecidos se han consolidado, sobre todo en cuanto a las exportaciones mexicanas hacia exterior, ya que el mercado estadounidense ha sido el destino principal en la actualidad representando más de 80% de las ventas realizadas por México en los mercados internacionales.

En segundo lugar, los productos importados por México han tenido modificaciones significativas tanto de su estructura como de su origen. En el primer aspecto se observó que las importaciones de bienes de consumo y de intermedios aumentaron sus importancias respectivas a costo de las de capital de 1991 a 2016, de acuerdo con la información proporcionada por el INEGI, sobre todo en el caso de las compras realizadas de productos intermedios, al pasar de un promedio de 70% en el inicio del lapso (1991-1993), a superior a 75% en promedio de 2014 a 2016. Del lado de origen de las importaciones, los productos procedentes de los Estados Unidos representan una disminución en su participación en el total de las importaciones desde más de 70% en 1991 a 46.3% en 2016, según cifras reportadas por la Secretaría de Economía. En otras palabras, México está diversificando sus compras que se efectúan cotidianamente en los mercados mundiales, de los cuales destaca la creciente importancia de los productos procedentes de China, que en la actualidad tienen una participación del 18.0% en el mercado mexicano de importación,

concentrando en los de intermedios y de capital, en contraste con escasamente de 0.6% al principio de los años de 90's del siglo pasado.

Cuadro 1. Estructura de las Importaciones y de las exportaciones mexicanas, 1991-2016

(%)				
Importaciones	Total	Bienes de consumo	Bienes de Intermedios	Bienes de capital
1991-1993	100.00	12.05	70.44	17.52
2014-2016	100.00	14.08	75.65	10.28
Exportaciones	Total	Bienes de consumo	Bienes de Intermedios	Bienes de capital
1991-1993	100.00	25.63	62.43	11.94
2014-2016	100.00	24.69	45.41	29.89

Fuente: Elaboración propia de acuerdo con la información publicada por el Instituto de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, INEGI.

En tercer lugar, la continua liga estrecha del comercio exterior mexicano con el mercado de los Estados Unidos definitivamente ha contribuido al crecimiento económico; no obstante, este también ha sido un factor de incertidumbre ante los recientes sucesos sorprendentes, tal como se han observado desde 2015 cuando se iniciaban las elecciones presidenciales en los Estados Unidos.

Actualmente, con la transición del poder ejecutivo para el próximo diciembre, se espera que las instituciones fuertemente establecidas en México garanticen la estabilidad del crecimiento económico en futuro, ya que no se preverán cambios significativos en el rumbo de las políticas económicas que se encuentran aplicadas en la actualidad. Por su parte, de lograr concretarse y al mismo tiempo de mantener las finanzas públicas sanas y equilibradas, los proyectos de inversión y los programas de bienestares sociales que se han pronunciado la futura administración, podrán convertir en dinámicas adicionales que impulsarán el mayor crecimiento económico todavía.

**16. ¿Cómo puede beneficiar o perjudicar una renegociación exitosa o fallida del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) sobre la economía mexicana?**

La renegociación del Tratado del Libre Comercio en América del Norte (TLCAN) ya cumplió un año de discusiones entre los tres socios participantes. Durante este proceso, claramente se podrían observar tres etapas bien marcadas.

La 1era fase contemplaba las tres primeras rondas celebradas en los tres países respectivos que se habían ocurrido con tranquilidad sin sorpresas algunas. Sin embargo, a partir de la 4 ronda cuando los representantes estadounidenses plantearon varias propuestas que distan enormemente con sus dos contrapartes. Aparentemente la modernización de este gran acuerdo comercial trilateral caminaba en un terreno difícil de avanzar desde ese momento. Hasta antes de iniciar las elecciones presidenciales celebradas en 1er del julio pasado, se han terminado escasamente 9 capítulos en un total de 30.

Actualmente se puede clasificar como la 3era etapa de la renegociación del TLCAN, pues en este nueve episodio, México ha enviado tanto los negociadores de la presente administración encabezados por los Secretarios de Economía y de Relaciones Exteriores, sino también el designado representante por el Presidente electo que entrará a función a partir de 1er del diciembre de este año. Por su parte, otra característica clara es que desde 26 de julio cuando se empezaban las pláticas, Canadá ha sido ausente durante estas 4 semanas, además en la 5ta también solamente se encuentran los representantes de México y de los Estados Unidos en las negociaciones.

Todavía es prematuro de pronosticar que el acuerdo comercial está dirigido a uno bilateral en futuro sin la participación de Canadá a pesar de los indicios que apuntarían hacia esa dirección. Además, esta fase está aparentemente más activa que las primeras dos y que todo parece indicar que los Estados Unidos y México están en la vía de conseguir un acuerdo. De hecho, “Kevin Hassett, el presidente del Consejo de Asesores Económicos del gobierno de Estados Unidos, dijo que un acuerdo con México está muy cerca y depende de resolver dos temas complejos”, según un reporte publicado por Infosel.

El complicado panorama en el alrededor de la renegociación del TLCAN durante los últimos dos años ha impactado el crecimiento económico para México al menos afectando parcialmente el buen ambiente de inversión y propiciando una posible baja en grado de inversión otorgado por las distintas agencias calificadoras crediticias al nivel internacional.

Así, pues, los mercados financieros mexicanos en este lapso han sentido la presión al llevar la moneda local de México con altibajos importantes, que en su momento el valor de peso con respecto al dólar norteamericano rebasó a 22 unidades por un dólar. Además, este escenario también podría implicar una disminución en la tasa de crecimiento económico para 2018, 2019 y 2020, debido a la baja que registrarían las exportaciones mexicanas hacia el mercado de su vecino norte y las inversiones extranjeras directas, respectivamente.

**17. ¿Cuáles considera son las perspectivas futuras de las relaciones económicas entre México y China con un nuevo gobierno mexicano en el próximo sexenio?**

Diversificar la economía mexicana y disminuir la dependencia del mercado estadounidense han sido una estrategia planteada desde hace un buen tiempo; sin embargo, los esfuerzos realizados por los distintos agentes económicos han parecido a ser insuficientes. Durante los últimos 24 años cuando se ha instrumentado el TLCAN, las integraciones económicas entre México y los Estados Unidos han sido reforzadas aún más, sobre todo en el aspecto del comercio exterior.

Si bien es una tarea primordial para México que se debe consolidar y se profundizar con mayor trabajo esta relación bilateral con los Estados Unidos en las áreas económicas, comerciales y de inversión, no deben subestimarse los efectos adversos derivados directamente de este vínculo estrecho y tradicional. Además, los impactos poco favorables generados a raíz de los últimos acontecimientos sucedidos durante esta administración estadounidense, nuevamente hacen resurgir la mayor necesidad todavía de diversificar la economía mexicana con una urgencia cada vez mayor que antes.

Por ello, en primer lugar, México necesita cada vez más que antes a llevar a cabo la diversificación de sus comercios exteriores. En segundo lugar, al seguir el camino tradicional de obtener financiamiento en los mercados financieros internacionales, también es importante explorar nuevos mecanismos y fuentes de financiamiento. Sin duda, cómo lograr el acercamiento de mayor profundidad con China y aprovechar las oportunidades de inversiones y de intercambios comerciales brindadas por la segunda economía mundial sería un reto importante por superar, no solamente para México, sino también para China.

No cabe duda las economías que actualmente se encuentran vinculadas con México a través de los diversos acuerdos del libre comercio han sido y seguirán siendo opciones de primera categoría de aplicar la estrategia de diversificación. Al mismo tiempo, también es un hecho de que la mayoría de estos socios comerciales de México son economías desarrolladas y de tal manera, sus mercados y sus cadenas de producción están en fases consolidadas. En este sentido, comenzar a establecer relaciones comerciales y de inversión con esos socios comerciales no será tarea fácil para México, pues en su caso se tendrían que sustituir las ya existentes, y tendrían que enfrentar una competencia de mayor grado.

No obstante, como la segunda potencia económica en la actualidad, China es una economía emergente y las oportunidades del negocio y de la inversión no solamente han sido abundantes sino también que su mayoría es de la recién creación. Bajo este escenario, la competencia para México es igual que otras economías que tienen intenciones de incursionar en este mercado potencialmente atractivo, cuyo tamaño es extraordinariamente grande por el número de población y por el poder adquisitivo que representa esta economía asiática.

De lo anterior, la nueva administración de México que empezará a tomar la posesión a partir del 1er del diciembre de este año, no debe subestimar la importancia de buscar mecanismos adicionales para ampliar y profundizar las cooperaciones económicas tanto bilaterales como multilaterales que actualmente se encuentran vigentes entre México y China. Considerando las características propias de la economía china, esta opción para diversificar la economía mexicana todavía puede ser verdaderamente viable y potencialmente beneficiosa.

## 拉美經貿重要文獻介紹

Title 題目	中拉關係的歷史關節點
Keyword 關鍵詞	
Author 作者	向駿教授 Antonio C. Hsiang, 致理科技大學 國際貿易系
Attribute 屬性	新聞專題
Publish Date 刊物及日期	亞洲周刊 第 32 卷 2018 年 6 月 17 日
Abstract: 摘要	中國在拉美推進「一帶一路」的過程中，應抓住歷史關節點，包括「中國製造二零二五」可趁勢取代陷貪腐醜聞的巴西營建巨擘；阿根廷再度提供人民幣國際化機會；委內瑞拉提供「中國模式」對比案例。
參閱網站	<a href="http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/blogger3.cfm?id=1528343229507&amp;author=%E5%90%91%E9%A7%BF">http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/blogger3.cfm?id=1528343229507&amp;author=%E5%90%91%E9%A7%BF</a>

Title 題目	向駿：特朗普有大戰略嗎？
Keyword 關鍵詞	
Author 作者	向駿教授 Antonio C. Hsiang, 致理科技大學 國際貿易系
Attribute 屬性	新聞專題
Publish Date 刊物及日期	聯合早報 2018 年 6 月 26 日
Abstract: 摘要	美國人會說：美國沒有大戰略，而中國有大戰略要來挑戰美國。儘管如此，對美國總統特朗普的外交政策最不可能出錯的批評，大概就是缺乏大戰略 (lack of a grand strategy)。大戰略是綜合運用國家總體戰略資源、實現其戰略目標的藝術。
參閱網站	<a href="https://www.zaobao.com.sg/zopinions/views/story20180626-870254">https://www.zaobao.com.sg/zopinions/views/story20180626-870254</a>

Title 題目	2018「墨西哥『第三勢力』新總統，能聯手中國力抗川普貿易戰？」。
Keyword 關鍵詞	拉丁美洲、墨西哥、中國、美國、川普貿易戰
Author 作者	向駿教授，致理科技大學 國際貿易系
Attribute 屬性	新聞簡析
Publish Date 刊物及日期	《關鍵評論》2018年7月4日
Abstract: 摘要	討論美國目前對墨西哥採取的政策，簡直就是為了讓墨西哥能選出一位激進左翼總統。加上中美貿易戰的因素，反而提供了中墨加強雙邊關係的契機。
參閱網站	<a href="https://www.thenewslens.com/article/99022">https://www.thenewslens.com/article/99022</a>

Title 題目	尼加拉瓜年改燒出外交危機，老謀深算的奧蒂嘉會提前倒台嗎？
Keyword 關鍵詞	拉丁美洲、薩爾瓦多、中國、
Author 作者	楊建平博士 宏都拉斯國防大學榮譽教授、致理科技大學院拉丁美洲經貿研究中心研究員
Attribute 屬性	新聞簡析
Publish Date 刊物及日期	《關鍵評論》 2018年7月19日
Abstract: 摘要	評論我中美洲邦交國尼加拉瓜因年金改革引發之全國性嚴重社會動亂，此次尼加拉瓜退休金改革在宣布後一週即取消，但仍引發全國性社會動亂，三個月以來越演越烈未見解決曙光，其中主要原因應該係一般民眾長期對奧蒂嘉政府積怨的爆發。
參閱網站	<a href="https://www.thenewslens.com/article/101823">https://www.thenewslens.com/article/101823</a>

Title 題目	「美中大戰略下的台灣」
Keyword 關鍵詞	拉丁美洲、海地、中國、美國
Author 作者	向駿教授，致理科技大學 國際貿易系
Attribute 屬性	新聞簡析
Publish Date 刊物及日期	《台北論壇》2018 年 8 月 1 日
Abstract: 摘要	問題是川普救得了蔡英文嗎？美國前駐華大使芮效儉(Stapleton Roy)7 月 16 日在北京出席第七屆世界和平論壇期間曾表示，像台灣這樣的戰略 問題才是會影響中美關係的根本原因，而不是貿易問題。
參閱網站	<a href="http://140.119.184.164/view_pdf/475.pdf">http://140.119.184.164/view_pdf/475.pdf</a>

Title 題目	非洲王權與拉美獨裁，組成蔡英文所謂的「民主價值同盟」
Keyword 關鍵詞	民主價值同盟、絕對君權、民主價值、海地、中國、拉丁美洲
Author 作者	向駿教授，致理科技大學 國際貿易系
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Publish Date 刊物及日期	《關鍵評論》2018 年 8 月 2 日
Abstract: 摘要	我們想讓你知道的是；蔡英文近來呼籲各國共組「民主價值同盟」抵制中國，她曾隆重感謝「史瓦帝尼為我們發聲從不缺席」，其實台灣這個堅實盟邦是個國王，擁有絕對君權，完全不符「民主價值」的國家。
參閱網站	<a href="https://www.thenewslens.com/article/101027">https://www.thenewslens.com/article/101027</a>

Title 題目	【蔡英文出訪巴拉圭】下一個斷交國話題熱議 學者擔心「薩爾瓦多」
Keyword 關鍵詞	拉丁美洲、薩爾瓦多、中國、美國
Author 作者	楊建平博士
Attribute 屬性	新聞簡析
Publish Date 刊物及日期	《關鍵評論》2018年8月15日
Abstract: 摘要	評論然有中國在中南美洲影響力漸增，台灣的局勢將愈加危險，有學者指出，中國現有意投資薩爾瓦多的港口，中、薩雙方互動頻繁，擔心薩爾瓦多與我邦交恐有變。
參閱網站	<a href="https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=46632">https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=46632</a>

Title 題目	渴求中資拯救「蚊子港」與軍售，邦交國薩爾瓦多是下一個骨牌？
Keyword 關鍵詞	拉丁美洲、薩爾瓦多、中國、美國
Author 作者	楊建平博士
Attribute 屬性	新聞簡析
Publish Date 刊物及日期	《關鍵評論》2018年8月15日
Abstract: 摘要	評論在蔡總統率團參加邦交國巴拉圭阿布鐸總統就職典禮的「同慶之旅」之際，我中美洲邦交國薩爾瓦多媒體報導，美國憂慮中國投資薩爾瓦多港口除經濟目的外，亦可能具有軍事用途，未來恐將對地緣政治造成重大衝擊。
參閱網站	<a href="https://www.thenewslens.com/article/101823">https://www.thenewslens.com/article/101823</a>

Title 題目	小英甘為川普戰略寵物
Keyword 關鍵詞	
Author 作者	向駿教授，致理科技大學 國際貿易系
Attribute 屬性	新聞簡析
Publish Date 刊物及日期	中國時報 2018 年 08 月 29 日
Abstract: 摘要	8 月 21 日中國與中美洲國家薩爾瓦多正式建交後，蔡英文表示：「中國的打壓無孔不入，現在的中國不只是兩岸和平的威脅，中國在世界各地所做的，已造成全球局勢高度不穩定。」蔡英文面臨雪崩外交驚恐的背後有「大戰略」因素。
參閱網站	<a href="https://opinion.chinatimes.com/20180829004295-262105">https://opinion.chinatimes.com/20180829004295-262105</a>

## 拉丁美洲經貿研究中心活動剪影：

2018年6月本校「拉丁美洲經貿」學分學程部份學生通過西班牙語(SFLPT)鑑定，使學生國際移動力與競爭能力大增。



2018年8月24日拉丁美洲經貿研究中心主任向駿教授與研究員楊建平博士參加客家電視聚焦國際-夾縫中的外交-專題研討闡述薩爾瓦多與臺灣斷交後的新聞幕後。<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtFVPblzOCQ>

## 《拉丁美洲經貿季刊》投稿須知及體例

### 壹、投稿須知

- 一、本刊為針對拉丁美洲區域研究學術刊物，歡迎與拉丁美洲經濟、貿易、政治、教育、文化、書評及歷史等相關稿件。自民國99年6月1日創刊，每年區分春(3月1日)夏(6月1日)秋(9月1日)冬(12月1日)四季出版。並經收錄於國家圖書館「臺灣期刊論文索引系統」與國內知名遠流出版集團智慧藏公司之「TAO 台灣學術線上」([www.lib.ntu.edu.tw](http://www.lib.ntu.edu.tw))、凌網數位出版品營運平台之 HyRead 台灣全文資料庫([www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/](http://www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/))及華藝線上圖書館(<http://www.airitilibrary.com/>)期刊資料庫。
- 二、來稿請示作者基本資料註明作者姓名(中、英、西文)、服務機構(中、英、西文)，職稱、地址、聯絡電話、傳真、Email 及主要學經歷(中、英、西文)。
- 三、來稿請依一般學術論文格式撰寫，文章分節並附小標題，包括中英西文論文名稱，文首請撰寫中英西文摘要 500 字以內及關鍵詞 4~6 個，加註釋及參考文獻。為求本刊的完整性、一致性和嚴謹性，請作者依本刊規定進行文章格式的編排及內容的增減。全文依據本刊格式規定後，以三萬字為限(含註腳文字)。
- 四、作者投稿請自負文責，並注意著作權法等相關法律規定。經送審核准採用者，得依編輯需求刊載或加以刪修潤飾，若不同意者，請預為註明。
- 五、本刊設有審稿制度，分初審及複審，聘請專家學者以匿名審稿方式審閱，以決定採用稿件，並視審稿情形，提出審稿意見供作者參考。審查時間原則不超過一個月，並在審查通過後，依論文刊登期數，編排刊登。
- 六、投稿文章，若通過審查程序可獲刊之篇數超過當期篇幅容量，編輯委員會得斟酌領域平衡以及該稿件之時效性等因素，決定當期刊登之稿件及其順序。
- 七、本刊典藏於中華民國國家圖書館「臺灣期刊論文索引系統」，請同意將來稿之合法權利以採取無償之非專屬授權方式供國家圖書館及其他本刊物授權之資料庫、數位典藏業者，進行重製，透過網路提供服務、授權用戶下載、列印等行為。或並得酌作格式之修改。經本刊刊載之文稿，版權歸本刊所有，除作者自用外，授權轉載須徵得本刊同意。
- 八、歡迎以電子郵件投稿，電郵：[cf100@mail.chihlee.edu.tw](mailto:cf100@mail.chihlee.edu.tw)。如以紙本請寄新北市板橋區文化路一段 313 號，致理科技大學商貿外語學院-拉丁美洲經貿研究中心。
- 九、《拉美經貿季刊》接受中、英、西文稿件，經常性專欄列舉如下：Regular Columns as follow, new Column is welcomed!
  - (一) 特稿：(如歐部長談外交休兵)Special Invitation (Ex. Francisco Ou on Diplomatic Truce across the Strait) (Articles from Center's Conference)
  - (二) 專題：如拉美獨立 200 週年。Feature Articles
  - (三) 拉美新聞分析：如拉美財長會議、總統大選。News Analysis (Ex. Peru's Presidential elections)

- (四) 拉美經貿分析：如拉美投資趨勢分析。Analysis of Latin American Economy and Business (Ex. Article from Fund Managers)
- (五) 拉美經貿書評或重要文獻介紹：如大陸的拉美政策白皮書。Book Reviews or Literatures Presentation on Latin American Economy and Business.
- (六) 拉美與兩岸：拉美對中國大陸、臺灣或兩岸關係的影響。China, Taiwan and Latin American (Changing relations between Latin American and China/Taiwan, and Impacts on Relations across the Strait)
- (七) 拉美人物側寫：如拉美國家駐中華民國大使、代表、拉美傑出人物、華商等。Personal Profiles: ( Ambassadors and Representatives from Latin America)
- (八) 拉丁美洲史話：如兩岸與拉美關係變遷、拉美重要歷史事件回顧等，特別歡迎有派駐拉美經歷者供稿。Latin American History (Articles from former Ambassadors to Latin America)
- (九) 拉美經貿統計：表列重要經貿資料。Statistics on Latin American Economy and Business
- (十) 拉美經貿新聞：(重要經貿新聞選粹) News on Latin American Economy and Business
- (十一) 拉美中心剪影：(拉美文化活動、研討會等照片) Photos of Center's Activities.

## 貳、體例

一、內文文字請依照以下規定：

中文字型一律採用新細明體、英文字型一律採用 Times New Roman；內文字型大小：12pt；章節標題字型大小：14pt、粗體；字元間距：標準。

二、行間距：單行間距。段落與之間務必加一行空行間。

### 參、註腳（頁註）格式

一、本刊以橫式編排，採頁下註，作者姓名列於題目之下，作者介紹列於註釋前，並以＊號表示，註腳方式如下。

二、註腳編號，使用阿拉伯數字，以每篇論文為單位順次排序，文中(含註腳)字體應統一採用新細明體，英文字型一律採用 Times New Roman；字型大小：10pt。

### 三、專書

(一) 中文：作者姓名，《書名》(出版地：出版者，出版年)，頁x 或頁x-x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

### 四、專書譯著

(一) 中文：Author's Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，《書名》(書名原文) (出版地：出版者，出版年)，頁x 或頁x-x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Original Title of the

Book), trans., Translator's Full Name (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

## 五、專書論文

(一) 中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，編者姓名編，《書名》(出版地：出版者，出版年)，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," in Editor's Full Name, ed., Complete Title of the Book (Place of Pubation: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

## 六、專書論文譯著 (請依個別刊物實際出版項，完整臚列)

(一) 中文：Author's Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈篇名〉(篇名原文)，編者姓名編，譯著者姓名譯著，《書名》(書名原文)(出版地：出版者，出版年)，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," in Editor's or Author's Full Name, (ed.,) Complete Title of the Book (Original Title of the Book), trans., Translator's Full Name (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

## 七、期刊論文 (請依個別刊物實際出版項，完整臚列)

(一) 中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Journal, Vol. x, No. x, Month Year, p. x or pp. x-x.

## 八、期刊論文譯著

(一) 中文，外文：Author's Full Name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈篇名〉(篇名原文)，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

## 九、學位論文

(一) 中文：作者姓名，《學位論文名稱》(發表地：學校及系所名稱博／碩士論文，出版年)，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, Title of the Dissertation (Diss./Thesis, The Name of the Department, the Name of the Degree- University, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

## 十、研討會論文

(一) 中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，發表於「研討會名稱」研討會(地點：主辦單位，年月日)，頁 x 或頁 x-x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," paper presented at the Complete Name of the Conference (Place of the Conference: Conference Organizer, Date), p. x or pp. x-x.

## 十一、報紙 (若為社論、短評、通訊稿或作者匿名，則可不列作者欄)

(一) 中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《報紙名稱》，年月日，版 x。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Newspaper, Date, Section or Page Numbers.

## 十二、網際網路依線上實際資訊完整臚列，須註明上網查詢年月日及時間。

(一) 中文

1. 專書：作者姓名，《書名》(出版地：出版者，出版年)，頁 x 或頁 x-x，《網站名稱》，<網址>。
2. 論文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x，《網站名稱》，<網址>。
3. 報導：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《網站名稱》，年月日，<網址>。

(二) 外文

1. 專書：Author's Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x, Name of the Website, <URL <http://www.atimes....>>.
2. 論文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Journal, Vol. x, No. x, Date, p. x or pp. x-x, Name of the Website, <URL <http://www.atimes....>>.
3. 報導：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Name of the Website, Date, <URL <http://www.atimes....>>.

**Publication Guidelines for The Quarterly of  
Latin American Economy and Trade**

**1. The Quarterly Guidelines**

**1.1.** The Quarterly is a specialized journal in topics related to Latin American contemporary and historic issues, mainly in the fields of economy, trade, politics, education, culture and social sciences. The official languages of the journal are Chinese, English, and Spanish. Book reviews are also welcome. The Quarterly has been published since June, 2000, and every year there are Spring (March), Summer (June), Fall (September), and Winter (December) issues. The published papers are recorded in different data bases in Taiwan, including the ROC National Library's Journals and Thesis Index System, the Taiwan Academy Online "TAO" Database (<http://www.lib.nyu.edu.tw>); HyRead Database (<http://www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/>), and Chinese language database Airiti (<http://www.airitilibrary.com/>).

**1.2.** Submitted papers should include, in the first page, the author's detailed contact information (name, affiliation, position, mailing address, telephone number, email address, and a brief curricular summary).

**1.3.** Papers and book reviews must use an academic language, and should include: a title (no longer than 20 words); a 150-250 words abstract; 4-6 keywords; the main text, footnotes and references. All submitted manuscripts should follow these rules, in order to maintain academic consistency and quality. Papers should not exceed 30 pages, including references, notes, graphs and figures.

**1.4.** Authors are the only responsible to comply with copyright norms and must refrain from committing plagiarism. Submitted manuscripts will go through a blind peer-review process, including possible changes recommended by The Quarterly Editorial Board. In case of rejecting the proposed changes, or deciding to withdraw the manuscript during the review process, the author must do it in written form.

**1.5.** The Quarterly observes a blind peer-review process, employing anonymous reviews who are specialists in Latin America related-topics. Reviewers will be in charge to evaluate the relevance of the submitted manuscript, and to accept or reject it within a previously determined period of time. The comments and changes proposed by the reviewers should be considered and answered by the author, in order to be considered for publication. Accepted papers will be published in the next Quarterly issue, or a following issue, depending on the final decision by the Editorial Board.

**1.6.** Accepted manuscripts will be published according to the number of existing papers. The Editorial Board will also consider the suitability of the manuscript for following special issues, which will be dedicated to exclusive relevant topics.

**1.7.** After being accepted, the author will automatically cede the paper publication rights to The Quarterly, and it will be contained in electronic and print versions. The paper will also be recorded in the aforementioned databases.

**1.8.** Manuscripts must be send in a Microsoft Word file, to The Quarterly email address: m100@mail.chihlee.edu.tw. It is not necessary to submit a print version of the manuscript. However, if the author wants to send physical mail, it can be done to the following address:

**The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade**

Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies  
Chihlee University of Technology  
No. 313, Section 1, Wenhua Rd.  
Banqiao District, New Taipei City, 220, Taiwan (R.O.C.)  
Tel. +886-02-2257-6167#1639.

**1.9.** The Quarterly accepts manuscripts written in Chinese, English, or Spanish, and it usually contains the following sections (depending on the availability and reception of papers):

- a) Papers on Relevant Topics
- b) Special Issues
- c) News Analysis
- d) Economic and Financial Analysis
- e) Latin America-related Books or Important Documents Reviews
- f) Papers on Latin America Relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait
- g) Papers or Short Analysis on Important Latin American Individuals
- h) Latin American History
- i) Latin American Regional Trade Statistics Data
- j) Relevant News on Latin American Economy and Trade

**2. Papers and Reviews Format**

**2.1.** Submitted manuscripts should be written in Microsoft Word format, in A4 size, Times New Roman, 12pts. font. The title should be written in 14pts. with a bold format.

**2.2.** Space between words should be normal, and space between lines should be single (please

do not use 1.5 or double spaces).

**2.3.** A double space should be left only between paragraphs.

### **3. Foot-notes and References Style**

**3.1.** Submitted manuscripts should include page-numbers at the bottom of each page. The name of the author should come immediately after the title of the paper. The personal information of the author must be contained in a foot note, indicated with a \* next to the author's name.

**3.2.** Footnotes should be limited to making additional statements or clarifying a secondary idea. They should be presented in Arabic and consecutive numbers. Footnotes should not be used for bibliographic references. References should be included at the end of the paper. Citations and reference to other authors' works should be presented in the text according to the following format:

\* Author's last name (publication year: page). Ex: Ramírez (2012: 25).

\* Author's last name (publication year). Ex: Ramírez (2012).

**3.3.** References or Bibliography should be presented in alphabetical order according to the authors' last names. When presenting numerous works of a single author, they should be ordered according to their publication year, starting from the oldest one. The presentation of bibliography should be done according to the criteria established by *The Chicago Manual of Style*. For example:

#### *A) One author*

Ayala-Espino, José Luis (1992). *Límites del mercado, límites del Estado: Ensayos sobre economía política del Estado*. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.

#### *B) Two authors*

Hearn, Adrian H. & José Luis Leon-Manríquez (2011). *China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

#### *C) Edited Books*

Chen, Lucía & Alberto Saladino (Eds.) (2008). *La nueva Nao: De Formosa a América Latina. Intercambios culturales, económicos y políticos entre vecinos distantes*. Taipei: Tamkang University.

D) *Organizations or Institutions as Authors*

World Bank (1993). *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report*. New York: World Bank & Oxford University Press.

E) *Paper or Chapter in an Edited Book*

Teng, Chung-chian (2007). “Hegemony or Partnership: China’s Strategy and Diplomacy Towards Latin America” in *China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heigenbotham, & Derek Mitchell, 84-112. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

F) *Paper in a Journal*

Fiori, José Luis (1992). “Economía política del Estado desarrollista en Brasil.” *Revista de la CEPAL*, no. 47: 187-201.

G) *Non-published Materials*

1. Thesis

Li, Y. (2008). “A Study of Bilateral Trade Between Taiwan and Mexico.” Master Thesis. Kaohsiung: I-Shou University.

2. Papers presented in Conferences

Resende-Santos, Joao (1999). “Socialization and Emulation in International Relations Theory”. Paper Presented in the International Conference of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 3.

I) *Material from the Internet*

Documents, internet sources or databases online, should include the respective URL, and if possible, the retrieval date (month-day-year).

**3.4.** Figures, graphs, maps, pictures and other illustrations must include their respective sources, and should be contained in an appendix after the references. Graphs and tables should also be submitted in a separate Microsoft Excel file.

**Note:** The present Quarterly guidelines (except for those related to footnotes, citations and references) were translated from the original Chinese version. In case of any controversy or discrepancy, the content of the original document in Chinese must prevail.

**Lineamientos para publicar en Revista Trimestral de Estudios Económicos  
Latinoamericanos (RTEEAL)**

**1. Lineamientos de la revista**

**1.1.** Esta revista está especializada en temas históricos y de actualidad de América Latina, y acepta artículos sobre economía, comercio, política, educación, cultura y sociedad en la región latinoamericana. Los idiomas oficiales de la revista son: chino, inglés y español. Las reseñas de libros relacionados con temas regionales también son bienvenidas. La revista se publica sobre una base trimestral, ininterrumpidamente, desde el 1 de junio del año 2000. Cada año se publican números de primavera (1 de marzo), verano (1 de junio), otoño (1 de septiembre) e invierno (1 de diciembre). Los artículos publicados en la revista quedan registrados en diferentes bases de datos de Taiwán, incluyendo el Sistema de Indexación de Revistas y Tesis de Taiwan, de la Biblioteca Nacional; el Consorcio Académico de Bases de Datos y Libros Electrónicos de Taiwan “TAO” (<http://www.lib.nyu.edu.tw>); la base de datos HyRead de la plataforma educativa taiwanesa Hyweb Technology (<http://www.hyread.com.tw/publisher/>); y, la base de datos de la biblioteca electrónica de la compañía de contenidos académicos en lengua china Airiti (<http://www.airitilibrary.com/>).

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- i) Información estadística sobre el comercio de la región
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**2.1.** Los artículos y reseñas enviados deben estar escritos en formato de Word, en hojas tamaño carta, con fuente Times New Roman, tamaño 12 pts. El título debe estar en el mismo tipo de fuente, pero en negrita y tamaño 14 pts.

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**2.3.** Entre cada párrafo deberá dejarse un renglón en blanco.

## 3. Estilo de notas al pie y bibliografía

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\* Apellido del autor (año de publicación: página de la cita). Ejemplo: Ramírez (2012: 25)

\* Apellido del autor (año de publicación). Ejemplo: Ramírez (2012)

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A) Un autor

Ayala-Espino, José Luis (1992). *Límites del mercado, límites del Estado: Ensayos sobre economía política del Estado*. Ciudad de México: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.

B) Dos autores

Hearn, Adrian H. y José Luis Leon-Manríquez (2011). *China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

C) Compiladores

Chen, Lucía y Alberto Saladino (comps.) (2008). *La nueva Nao: De Formosa a América Latina. Intercambios culturales, económicos y políticos entre vecinos distantes*. Taipéi: Universidad Tamkang.

D) Organismo, institución o asociación como autor

Banco Mundial (1993). *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report*. Nueva York: Banco Mundial y Oxford University Press.

E) Artículo en un libro compilado por otro(s) autor(es)

Teng, Chung-chian (2007). “Hegemony or Partnership: China’s Strategy and Diplomacy Towards Latin America” En *China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, compilado por Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heigenbotham, y Derek Mitchell, 84-112. Nueva York: M.E. Sharpe.

F) Artículo de publicación periódica

Fiori, José Luis (1992). “Economía política del Estado desarrollista en Brasil”. *Revista de la CEPAL*, no. 47: 187-201.

G) Materiales no publicados

1. Tesis

Li, Y. (2008). “A Study of Bilateral Trade Between Taiwan and Mexico”. Tesis de Maestría en Economía. Kaohsiung: I-Shou University.

2. Ponencias

Resende-Santos, Joao (1999). “Socialization and Emulation in International Relations Theory”. Ponencia presentada en el Encuentro Anual de la American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 3 de septiembre.

I) Citas de material obtenido de Internet

Los documentos, fuentes o bases de datos publicados en Internet, deben indicar el URL respectivo y, de ser posible, la fecha de la consulta (día-mes-año).

**3.4.** Los cuadros, gráficas, mapas, esquemas e ilustraciones deberán incluir su respectiva fuente y aparecerán en hojas numeradas, después de la bibliografía. Las gráficas deberán también ser enviadas en otro archivo adjunto de Excel.

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